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{
    "localId": "225248337",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 9, The Succession of Power in the USSR",
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    "id": "225248337",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 9, The Succession of Power in the USSR",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248337",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 13,
            "logicalDate": "1948-01-13",
            "month": 1,
            "year": 1948
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    "seq": 5,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "who now serve as his chief advisers and assistants, or, (b) the power will be transferred\nto a single individual.\nStalin must have considered the advisability and practicability of the first alterna-\ntive, since the complexities of the Party-State mechanism would make a triumvirate\nmore practicable than any available single individual. In such event the power would be\ndivided among the three members of the Politburo who are best fitted to constitute the\nbasic authority of the Soviet State through control, respectively, of government appa-\nratus, Party policy, and internal security. Under such an arrangement, the logical\ncandidate to inherit the direction of the government apparatus would be Molotov,\nlong a devoted disciple of Stalin and a skilled administrator. His extensive experience\nin foreign affairs, combined with previous experience in government and Party adminis-\ntration, qualifies him for government leadership during a period in which foreign\nrelations will be a prime factor in Soviet tactical policy. Andrei Zhdanov would logi-\ncally be selected for full control of the Party policy; he is second only to Stalin as\nspokesman for the Party on ideological matters, and, as a member of the powerful\nOrgburo since 1934, has accumulated a wealth of experience and influence in organiza-\ntional problems of the Party. Total control of the internal security of the USSR would\nbe assumed by Lavrenti Beria. In the late thirties Beria was appointed Commissar of\nInternal Affairs, a position which gave him control of the complex Soviet security\nsystem, including the secret police, penal institutions, and forced labor camps. While\nhis present official status is not entirely clear (he was relieved as Commissar of Internal\nAffairs in January 1946), he is believed to retain a large measure of control over the two\nsecurity agencies (MVD and MGB), in addition to being primarily responsible for Soviet\natomic development.\nStalin must have applied the criterion of safety to such a disposition of his power\nas that outlined above, a disposition which has both logic and practicability, and found\nthat there are stronger considerations favoring a single heir. These considerations are:\na. Soviet experience has shown that the structure of the USSR can best be admin-\nistered by a single head-an infallible arbiter whose decisions on all questions are\nfinal.\nb. The fact that the present Soviet dictatorship has successfully withstood such\nstrains as those created by the collectivization of agriculture, the purges, and\nWorld War II is a convincing argument for one-man control.\nC. The history of the Russian people, under both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes,\npreconditions them to accept the idea of a single, all-powerful ruler. There is a\ndeep-seated concept in the Russian mind of a paternalistic ruler-a concept\nassiduously cultivated by the present regime.\nd. One successor, with full authority, would be more capable of dealing with\npersonal jealousies, disagreements, and desires for personal power among leading\nmembers of the Politburo. A division of power among several leading contenders\nwould probably satisfy none and would lead to an eventual struggle for power.\nAs the best available method of assuring the perpetuation and expansion of the\nSoviet system with a minimum risk to the stability of the regime, Stalin would choose\nthe second of the two alternatives and bequeath his power to a single individual.\n3"
}