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{
    "localId": "225248337",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 9, The Succession of Power in the USSR",
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{
    "id": "225248337",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248337",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 9, The Succession of Power in the USSR",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248337",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248337",
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 13,
            "logicalDate": "1948-01-13",
            "month": 1,
            "year": 1948
        }
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nThe relative position of possible successors has in the past been subject to sudden\nchange, and their present standings must be considered as ephemeral. Under present\nconditions the individual who now appears most capable of carrying on the Stalinist\nversion of the Party doctrine with the least risk to the State is Vyacheslav Molotov. He\nhas been associated with Stalin longer and more closely than any other member of the\nPolitburo, and his personal loyalty has never been questioned. Molotov's position as the\nnumber-two figure in the official hierarchy seems to be clearly established in the\npopular Soviet mind as well as in international circles; he is referred to in the press as\nStalin's closest adviser and most trusted assistant. In official photographs and at official\nfunctions he occupies a position of prominence second only to Stalin. His long and\nvaried experience makes him the most logical single candidate, for, in addition to having\noccupied various key positions in both Party and government, he became an alternate\nmember of the Politburo in 1921 and a full member in 1926. It is believed that he would\nbe most acceptable to the powerful Police Ministries, because of his demonstrated\nantagonistic and accusing attitude in foreign relations which enables those Ministries\nto justify their actions as being necessary to insure the safety of the USSR.\nStalin realizes that Molotov has neither the personal characteristics nor the per-\nsonal prestige to occupy the peculiar niche now filled by Stalin himself. Further,\nStalin's appreciation of Molotov's capabilities probably includes the latter's short-\ncomings and therefore does not envisage Molotov as a new Stalin. Stalin would\nrather, for glorification of his own memory and for the safety of the Soviet regime,\nconsolidate Molotov's position in relation to himself as Stalin is to Lenin-in other\nwords, Molotov will be presented as the prophet of the demigod Stalin. Propaganda\nwill include pictures showing the heads of Lenin, Stalin, and Molotov in such close\nproximity that to throw mud at the last would also splatter the two immortals. In all\nprobability, Stalin will prepare both Molotov and the Politburo for the eventual transfer\nof power by gradually delegating increased control of State and Party to Molotov; an\ninitial indication would be the appointment of Molotov to the position of a secretary of\nthe Communist Party. This procedure would reduce the difficulties inherent in an\nabrupt transition and, at the same time, give Molotov the advantage of Stalin's guid-\nance, prestige, and influence. Stalin would also be afforded an additional opportunity\nto estimate the chances of Molotov's success. The full transfer of power cannot, how-\never, be accomplished before Stalin's death. No matter how much authority Molotov\nmight enjoy, the very existence of Stalin, to whom the members of the Politburo owe\ntheir political success, would discourage any effective opposition to the master's will,\neven though the latter may be nominally retired to the position of elder statesman.\nThus, Stalin will never be able to assess accurately the ability of Molotov to stand alone,\nwhile the latter will never, while Stalin lives, be certain that he, rather than the shadow\nof Stalin, controls the Soviet system.\nThere are three additional contingencies which Stalin must have considered and\nprovided for:\na. That he might disappear suddenly from the Soviet scene, in which case he\nprobably has prepared a will addressed to the Soviet peoples and the Communist\nParty, enjoining them to accept Molotov as their new leader.\n4\nSECRE"
}