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tige and power, and its influence persisted until 1935 when Batista, the real power in
Cuba, dissolved it and jailed many of its leaders. In 1939, however, Batista renounced
his anti-Communist, anti-labor stand and permitted the formation of a new labor con-
federation, the CTC, under the leadership of the negro Communist, Lázaro Peña. This
organization included many original CNOC leaders.
Meanwhile a split had developed between Batista and the Auténticos, led by
Grau, within the initial anti-Machado forces. Both sought support from the newly
created CTC. The Communists in the CTC preferred a Batista alliance. The Autén-
ticos sought to oust the Communists from the CTC for, once rid of Communist pro-
Batista leaders, the CTC would then consent to cooperation with the Auténticos.
Competition for control continued after Grau became President in 1944,
although the anti-Communist, pro-Auténtico faction was weakened by the Communist
Party's participation in the Grau governing coalition. This persisted until 1947, when
Grau encouraged a split in the Confederation of Cuban Workers between Communist
and non-Communist members. Each elected national committees. The anti-Com-
munist committee was then recognized as the solo CTC committee, leaving the Com-
munist group without legal standing. Grau subsequently broke with the Communist
Party, causing it to leave the government coalition. Today anti-Communist union
membership is greater than that of the rival Communist unions. The future growth
and prestige of the anti-Communist unions will be greatly affected by the degree of
popular support accorded the Auténtico Party in the 1948 elections.
b. Popular Socialist Party.
Legalized as a political party by 1939 under Batista, the Cuban Communist
Party (the Popular Socialist Party) was accorded cabinet representation in 1943. Sub-
sequent to Grau's election it retained influence by making a political alliance with the
Auténticos, thus escaping the consequences of having supported the losing Presidential
candidate.
In the registration for the forthcoming (1 June 1948) elections, PSP registered
158,755, the smallest of any of the six Cuban national parties. In the election itself
the PSP can be expected to poll nearer 200,000 votes. The importance of its vote,
however, will not be derived from the number cast but for whom they are cast and the
relative strength of the party of the winning Presidential candidate in the next Cuban
Congress. A Communist candidate running alone will have no chance of election. The
PSP is thus now striving for a bargain with a non-Communist candidate by which the
Communists may obtain postelection influence in exchange for support of the non-
Communist candidate at the polls. The degree of adherence by a non-Communist
President to any such pre-election bargain with the Communists will depend upon
the need for the Communist congressional vote in order to maintain a working majority.
2.
NON-COMMUNIST STRENGTH.
Non-Communist strength in Cuba is derived from a substantial majority of the
514,831 unaffiliated registered voters in combination with the adherents of the five
non-Communist political parties whose registered strength is as follows:
3
SECRE
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"ocrText": "tige and power, and its influence persisted until 1935 when Batista, the real power in\nCuba, dissolved it and jailed many of its leaders. In 1939, however, Batista renounced\nhis anti-Communist, anti-labor stand and permitted the formation of a new labor con-\nfederation, the CTC, under the leadership of the negro Communist, Lázaro Peña. This\norganization included many original CNOC leaders.\nMeanwhile a split had developed between Batista and the Auténticos, led by\nGrau, within the initial anti-Machado forces. Both sought support from the newly\ncreated CTC. The Communists in the CTC preferred a Batista alliance. The Autén-\nticos sought to oust the Communists from the CTC for, once rid of Communist pro-\nBatista leaders, the CTC would then consent to cooperation with the Auténticos.\nCompetition for control continued after Grau became President in 1944,\nalthough the anti-Communist, pro-Auténtico faction was weakened by the Communist\nParty's participation in the Grau governing coalition. This persisted until 1947, when\nGrau encouraged a split in the Confederation of Cuban Workers between Communist\nand non-Communist members. Each elected national committees. The anti-Com-\nmunist committee was then recognized as the solo CTC committee, leaving the Com-\nmunist group without legal standing. Grau subsequently broke with the Communist\nParty, causing it to leave the government coalition. Today anti-Communist union\nmembership is greater than that of the rival Communist unions. The future growth\nand prestige of the anti-Communist unions will be greatly affected by the degree of\npopular support accorded the Auténtico Party in the 1948 elections.\nb. Popular Socialist Party.\nLegalized as a political party by 1939 under Batista, the Cuban Communist\nParty (the Popular Socialist Party) was accorded cabinet representation in 1943. Sub-\nsequent to Grau's election it retained influence by making a political alliance with the\nAuténticos, thus escaping the consequences of having supported the losing Presidential\ncandidate.\nIn the registration for the forthcoming (1 June 1948) elections, PSP registered\n158,755, the smallest of any of the six Cuban national parties. In the election itself\nthe PSP can be expected to poll nearer 200,000 votes. The importance of its vote,\nhowever, will not be derived from the number cast but for whom they are cast and the\nrelative strength of the party of the winning Presidential candidate in the next Cuban\nCongress. A Communist candidate running alone will have no chance of election. The\nPSP is thus now striving for a bargain with a non-Communist candidate by which the\nCommunists may obtain postelection influence in exchange for support of the non-\nCommunist candidate at the polls. The degree of adherence by a non-Communist\nPresident to any such pre-election bargain with the Communists will depend upon\nthe need for the Communist congressional vote in order to maintain a working majority.\n2.\nNON-COMMUNIST STRENGTH.\nNon-Communist strength in Cuba is derived from a substantial majority of the\n514,831 unaffiliated registered voters in combination with the adherents of the five\nnon-Communist political parties whose registered strength is as follows:\n3\nSECRE"
}