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YOLIOR SIA JIVI3
While there may be considerable argument concerning the efficiency of the
Soviet system, there is less dispute concerning the effectiveness of the Soviet Union in
implementing its military air policy. The success with which the Soviet Air Force
recovered from the brink of annihilation during the early part of World War II is evi-
dence of this. In the midst of combat, the Soviet Air Force reorganized, re-equipped,
and developed from a fighting force, which was markedly inferior to the German Air
Force, to one which, by the close of the war, was not only markedly superior in numbers
but was also fast approaching equal quality in both aircraft and crews.
Another indication of the effectiveness of the Soviet structure in the implemen-
tation of policy is the apparent success of a widespread program to develop and produce
operational jet aircraft.
Soviet leaders demonstrated their ability to devise and adopt air policy to meet
changing circumstances during World War II.
Since the war, a reorganization of the armed services has given the air force
a more important position than it ever had previously, even though evidence to date
does not indicate this has meant complete independence of the air arm from the ground
force control.
Since 1945 the major operating problems facing Soviet military aviation have
changed materially. In view of the present world situation and demonstrated wartime
weaknesses of the Soviet Air Force, Soviet military air policy should be oriented around
the tasks of creating an interceptor force capable of coping with long-range strategic
attack, and the development of a long-range striking arm of its own. Solution of both
of these problems currently is being given high priority, it is believed, but the success
achieved probably cannot be demonstrated by anything short of actual combat.
There is no basis for a discussion of "economical use of funds," both
because of lack of detailed information on "expenditures,' and because the Soviet
economy is not based on "money" in the conventional sense.
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"ocrText": "YOLIOR SIA JIVI3\nWhile there may be considerable argument concerning the efficiency of the\nSoviet system, there is less dispute concerning the effectiveness of the Soviet Union in\nimplementing its military air policy. The success with which the Soviet Air Force\nrecovered from the brink of annihilation during the early part of World War II is evi-\ndence of this. In the midst of combat, the Soviet Air Force reorganized, re-equipped,\nand developed from a fighting force, which was markedly inferior to the German Air\nForce, to one which, by the close of the war, was not only markedly superior in numbers\nbut was also fast approaching equal quality in both aircraft and crews.\nAnother indication of the effectiveness of the Soviet structure in the implemen-\ntation of policy is the apparent success of a widespread program to develop and produce\noperational jet aircraft.\nSoviet leaders demonstrated their ability to devise and adopt air policy to meet\nchanging circumstances during World War II.\nSince the war, a reorganization of the armed services has given the air force\na more important position than it ever had previously, even though evidence to date\ndoes not indicate this has meant complete independence of the air arm from the ground\nforce control.\nSince 1945 the major operating problems facing Soviet military aviation have\nchanged materially. In view of the present world situation and demonstrated wartime\nweaknesses of the Soviet Air Force, Soviet military air policy should be oriented around\nthe tasks of creating an interceptor force capable of coping with long-range strategic\nattack, and the development of a long-range striking arm of its own. Solution of both\nof these problems currently is being given high priority, it is believed, but the success\nachieved probably cannot be demonstrated by anything short of actual combat.\nThere is no basis for a discussion of \"economical use of funds,\" both\nbecause of lack of detailed information on \"expenditures,' and because the Soviet\neconomy is not based on \"money\" in the conventional sense.\nor\nmell\nTo 30809 RIA\nvarious\nESOROS\nmibis-\nto\nbe\na\npart\nof\nthe\nin\n19"
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