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The Soviet aircraft industry is fully capable of building and maintaining a powerful
air force, given appropriate priorities. The industry is supported by a strong economy
which suffered substantially during the war, but which is fast recovering and will soon
begin to expand beyond its prewar dimensions. In the past, development of the indus-
try was hampered by inadequate supplies of aluminum. Soviet aluminum production
rose, however, from 60,000 metric tons in 1940 to 86,000 metric tons in 1945. The goal
of the Five-Year Plan is 172,000 metric tons in 1950.
ADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN MILITARY AIR POLICY
MATTERS
In commenting on the over-all efficiency of the governmental structure in the
establishment and implementation of military air policy, the absence of firm data re-
quires that conclusions be based on conjecture.
Efficiency is a relative term, and in comparison with the best of American standards
there are many aspects in which the Soviet governmental structure could be considered
inefficient. What is involved is the type of inefficiency inherent in any highly cen-
tralized government which discourages initiative and necessitates that many minor
as well as major decisions be made at the very top levels of government.
A highly centralized system of exercising governmental power gains in effectiveness,
however, since it can channelize the amount of effort necessary to gain any desired
objective. The decisions as to military air policy can be made in the Politburo, and
the handful of men responsible for such decisions are in a position to see that the entire
Soviet economy is organized to execute the policy decided upon, should such prove
necessary.
While there may be considerable argument concerning the efficiency of the Soviet
system, there is less dispute concerning the effectiveness of the Soviet Union in imple-
menting its military air policy. The success with which the Soviet Air Force recovered
from the brink of annihilation during the early part of World War II is evidence of this.
In the midst of combat, the Soviet Air Force reorganized, re-equipped, and developed
from a fighting force, which was markedly inferior to the German Air Force, to one
which, by the close of the war, was not only markedly superior in numbers but was
also fast approaching equal quality in both aircraft and crews.
Another indication of the effectiveness of the Soviet structure in the implementa-
tion of policy is the apparent success of a widespread program to develop and produce
operational jet aircraft.
Soviet leaders demonstrated their ability to devise and adapt air policy to changing
circumstances during World War II.
Since the war, a reorganization of the armed services has given the air force a more
important position than it ever had previously, even though evidence to date does not
indicate that this has meant complete independence of the air arm from ground force
control.
Since 1945 the major operating problems facing Soviet air have changed materially.
In view of the present world situation and demonstrated wartime weaknesses of the
5
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"ocrText": "to\nThe Soviet aircraft industry is fully capable of building and maintaining a powerful\nair force, given appropriate priorities. The industry is supported by a strong economy\nwhich suffered substantially during the war, but which is fast recovering and will soon\nbegin to expand beyond its prewar dimensions. In the past, development of the indus-\ntry was hampered by inadequate supplies of aluminum. Soviet aluminum production\nrose, however, from 60,000 metric tons in 1940 to 86,000 metric tons in 1945. The goal\nof the Five-Year Plan is 172,000 metric tons in 1950.\nADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN MILITARY AIR POLICY\nMATTERS\nIn commenting on the over-all efficiency of the governmental structure in the\nestablishment and implementation of military air policy, the absence of firm data re-\nquires that conclusions be based on conjecture.\nEfficiency is a relative term, and in comparison with the best of American standards\nthere are many aspects in which the Soviet governmental structure could be considered\ninefficient. What is involved is the type of inefficiency inherent in any highly cen-\ntralized government which discourages initiative and necessitates that many minor\nas well as major decisions be made at the very top levels of government.\nA highly centralized system of exercising governmental power gains in effectiveness,\nhowever, since it can channelize the amount of effort necessary to gain any desired\nobjective. The decisions as to military air policy can be made in the Politburo, and\nthe handful of men responsible for such decisions are in a position to see that the entire\nSoviet economy is organized to execute the policy decided upon, should such prove\nnecessary.\nWhile there may be considerable argument concerning the efficiency of the Soviet\nsystem, there is less dispute concerning the effectiveness of the Soviet Union in imple-\nmenting its military air policy. The success with which the Soviet Air Force recovered\nfrom the brink of annihilation during the early part of World War II is evidence of this.\nIn the midst of combat, the Soviet Air Force reorganized, re-equipped, and developed\nfrom a fighting force, which was markedly inferior to the German Air Force, to one\nwhich, by the close of the war, was not only markedly superior in numbers but was\nalso fast approaching equal quality in both aircraft and crews.\nAnother indication of the effectiveness of the Soviet structure in the implementa-\ntion of policy is the apparent success of a widespread program to develop and produce\noperational jet aircraft.\nSoviet leaders demonstrated their ability to devise and adapt air policy to changing\ncircumstances during World War II.\nSince the war, a reorganization of the armed services has given the air force a more\nimportant position than it ever had previously, even though evidence to date does not\nindicate that this has meant complete independence of the air arm from ground force\ncontrol.\nSince 1945 the major operating problems facing Soviet air have changed materially.\nIn view of the present world situation and demonstrated wartime weaknesses of the\n5"
}