Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "225248804",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 31-48, Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curacao",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248804"
}

{
    "id": "225248804",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248804",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 31-48, Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curacao",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248804",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-02-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-02-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-02-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 9,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248804",
    "naId": 225248804,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 14,
            "logicalDate": "1948-05-14",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1948
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-02-04.jpg",
    "mediaId": "766bec9fc1602a8e",
    "ocrText": "ECRET\nVULNERABILITY TO SABOTAGE OF PETROLEUM INSTALLATIONS\nIN VENEZUELA, ARUBA, AND CURACAO\nIn 1947 Venezuelan crude oil production averaged 1,191,000 barrels per day.\nWhile this is equivalent to only slightly more than one-fifth of the US production, it\nis about 80 percent of all Western Hemisphere production outside of the US. Two-\nthirds of available Venezuelan exported crude oil is refined on the adjacent Netherlands\nWest Indies islands of Aruba and Curaçao. (Venezuelan refining capacity is only\n116,000 barrels per day.)\nLocal political situations both in Venezuela and the Dutch islands are, in general,\nfavorable for the continuance of operations, but both production in Venezuela and re-\nfining on the islands are vulnerable to sabotage by trained agents. Together or sep-\narately these installations constitute one of the most remunerative targets in the\nWestern Hemisphere. If the fields are shut down, the refineries are of little value, as\nthere is no alternative comparable source of crude. There is at present no additional\nrefining capacity that could be used in place of the refineries on Aruba and Curaçao.\nFurthermore, tankers now used to transport crude from Lake Maracaibo to the re-\nfineries cannot make ocean voyages, nor can ocean-going tankers cross the bar into\nLake Maracaibo. Crippling of these wells or refineries would be a serious blow to US\ncapacity either to prepare for or to wage war.\nThe USSR presumably has plans against this area, and it is possible that prelimi-\nnary steps have already been taken to put these plans into effect.\nVENEZUELA*\nRecent political developments in Venezuela are in general favorable to the US,\nand the denial to the US of petroleum is unlikely to become a government policy.\nCommunist control of labor is decreasing rather than increasing. There are several\npoints, however, in which the producing fields are peculiarly vulnerable to sabotage.\nThere has been, furthermore, ample opportunity for trained saboteurs to enter the\ncountry, and they may be assumed to have done SO.\nBoth the Betancourt regime in its last months and the present Gallegos admin-\nistration have shown increasing concern over the potentialities of the Soviet threat,\nand, as a result, Venezuelan policy has moved more and more into the orbit of the US.\nThe recent history of the government party, Acción Democrática, justifies the con-\nclusion that earlier acceptance of support of the Communists (at the time of the rev-\nolution in 1945) was a marriage of convenience only. It is expected that the Vene-\nzuelan government will continue to support US petroleum policy by employing all\n* The situations as to Venezuela and as to Aruba and Curaçao are discussed separately in the\nfollowing paragraphs. As other Western Hemisphere installations - Mexico, Colombia, Peru- -\nare of minor present importance compared with Venezuela and Aruba and Curaçao, they are\nnot included. Dangers of enemy direct action - considerable particularly against Aruba and\nCuraçao from submarines approaching close to bombard - are likewise beyond the scope of\nthis paper.\n2"
}