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{
    "localId": "225248804",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 31-48, Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curacao",
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    "id": "225248804",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 31-48, Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curacao",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248804",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 14,
            "logicalDate": "1948-05-14",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1948
        }
    ],
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "Several indications suggest that the USSR and the Soviet Embassy may be plan-\nning for future sabotage operations. The Ambassador himself (accredited since late\n1946) is a petroleum geologist, and he has a staff sufficient to direct any agents that\nmay have slipped in. As early as 1943, trained agents are reliably reported to have\nentered the country, and, though their primary purpose at that time was to stir local\nCommunists to action, it is entirely possible that they could be used in sabotage oper-\nations as well. Immigration from Russia and satellite countries has greatly increased;\nthe records show no Slavic migrants prior to 1946, 109 in 1946, and 2,915 (including\nnon-Slavs from satellite countries) in 1947. While every effort - with the Venezuelan\ngovernment cooperating in every respect - has been made to screen these people, it is\nquite possible that well trained agents may have been included among the almost\n3,000 migrants.\nIn spite, therefore, of a generally favorable situation in governmental orientation\nand in labor, it must be assumed that expert saboteurs are in Venezuela at present, and\nthat they have the capabilities, failing a much more comprehensive protective program\nin which US assistance would almost certainly be necessary, of seriously reducing\nVenezuelan oil production. It is probable that this group could also carry out, or at\nleast assist with, similar activities in Aruba and Curaçao.\nARUBA AND CURACAO\nAbout 60 percent of the total Venezuelan production of crude oil is refined on\nCuraçao and Aruba, where two of the largest oil refineries in the world are located.*\nThe production of these refineries amounts to about eight percent of the world total\nor the approximate equivalent of the oil allotments to the Marshall-plan countries.\nAs a consequence these refineries are a primary enemy strategic Western Hemisphere\ntarget, especially since their destruction would not only create an immediate shortage\nof refined petroleum products but would also nullify the utility of a large percentage of\nVenezuelan crude, since neither the tankers nor refinery capacity would be available\nto transport and process this oil elsewhere.\nIn the event of either (1) further deterioration in the relations between the US and\nthe USSR, or (2) a decision by either the US or the USSR to begin hostile operations\nagainst one another or against powers allied to one another by ties of friendship or\ntreaty, intensive efforts to sabotage these refineries by the USSR are to be expected.\nBecause of highly favorable working conditions, the friendly attitude of the native\npopulation toward the US, and the absence of Communist-directed labor organizations,\nthe possibility of subversive action arising from local Communist penetration of labor\nis unlikely. The Netherlands Colonial Government has cooperated with the oil com-\npanies in refusing admission to known Communists and labor agitators. On two\nrecent occasions it has deported those who succeeded in gaining admittance. (Con-\n* In 1947 Venezuelan crude production was 434 million barrels; 36 million were refined in Venezuela,\nand 396 million were exported. Of the exported crude, 260 million went to Aruba and Curaçao,\n93 million to the US, 11 million to France, and smaller quantities to various other countries.\nMore than 95 percent of the crude received at Aruba and Curaçao is from Venezuela; the balance\nis from Colombia.\n4\nSECRET"
}