Ask the Scholar
Page 10 of 12
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
nations concerned to make compromises in order to reach agreement and have given
considerable impetus to collective action and security in Europe.
On the other hand, France will unquestionably attempt, while pursuing a "joint
policy," to obtain fuller consideration of its aims in regard to political decentralization,
and will remain suspicious and obstructionist in regard to US economic policy in Ger-
many. In order to give weight to French views as opposed to US on various issues, par-
ticularly those concerning European economic interests, France will probably attempt
to utilize continental solidarity. French public opinion toward the German question
has been created by bitter historic experience. The London Agreements were accepted
in the French Assembly by a narrow margin of votes and only after bitter debate and
the attachment of five reservations. These called upon the government to press its
demands in regard to: political decentralization, allocation of reparations, control and
internationalization of the Ruhr, and guarantees of security through military agree-
ments with the US and UK.
In connection with those reservations, any French Government, particularly a
Gaullist one, is likely to delay, by overt and covert means, the completion of a German
Constitution. Such delay would be intended to achieve a high degree of decentraliz-
ation in the final version and to extend, in favor of the federal principle, the provisions
in the London Agreements for the "political organization" of Germany. Although for-
mally stating the principle of federalism and decentralization, the wording and in-
tent of these provisions, necessitated by the consideration of their effect on German,
as well as French opinion, did little to allay French suspición and fear of the develop-
ment of a centralized Germany.
France will, furthermore, oppose any revision of the program for dismantling of
prohibited industries, and will attempt to maintain a high list of reparations and the
present ceiling on German industrial capacity. This policy will be particularly effec-
tive and serious from the US point of view, in regard to the Ruhr. To France, the In-
ternational Authority for the Ruhr represents the means of: (1) preventing a re-
growth of the German industrial war potential; (2) preventing future German control
of this potential through international control of management and ownership; and
(3) favoring the development of the French economy over that of the German. France
will attempt to set high quotas for coal export from the Ruhr in order to encourage
the expansion of steel industry elsewhere in Europe and force curtailment of steel
production in Germany. This policy runs directly counter to US policy, which be-
lieves that a revival of the Ruhr steel industry is necessary not only to restore the
German economy, but also is essential to a healthy Western Europe. The US has
been strongly opposed to an extension of the International Authority's powers of con-
trol over Ruhr industry, a policy which France will continue to push with great deter-
mination.
5.
Continuation of a Joint Policy.
The question of the Ruhr, and other fundamental issues in the US-French conflict
of policy in Germany, will be resolved only by the same type of compromise on both
7
Page data
- Page
- 10
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 64e73a219fe0feae
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 225248917
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "225248917",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248917",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 39-48, France's German Policy",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248917",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-08-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-08-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-08-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 12,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "225248917",
"label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 39-48, France's German Policy",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248917"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "225248917",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248917",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 39-48, France's German Policy",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248917",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-08-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-08-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-08-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 12,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248917",
"naId": 225248917,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 29,
"logicalDate": "1848-12-29",
"month": 12,
"year": 1848
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 10,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875475/875475-08-10.jpg",
"mediaId": "64e73a219fe0feae",
"ocrText": "SECRET\nnations concerned to make compromises in order to reach agreement and have given\nconsiderable impetus to collective action and security in Europe.\nOn the other hand, France will unquestionably attempt, while pursuing a \"joint\npolicy,\" to obtain fuller consideration of its aims in regard to political decentralization,\nand will remain suspicious and obstructionist in regard to US economic policy in Ger-\nmany. In order to give weight to French views as opposed to US on various issues, par-\nticularly those concerning European economic interests, France will probably attempt\nto utilize continental solidarity. French public opinion toward the German question\nhas been created by bitter historic experience. The London Agreements were accepted\nin the French Assembly by a narrow margin of votes and only after bitter debate and\nthe attachment of five reservations. These called upon the government to press its\ndemands in regard to: political decentralization, allocation of reparations, control and\ninternationalization of the Ruhr, and guarantees of security through military agree-\nments with the US and UK.\nIn connection with those reservations, any French Government, particularly a\nGaullist one, is likely to delay, by overt and covert means, the completion of a German\nConstitution. Such delay would be intended to achieve a high degree of decentraliz-\nation in the final version and to extend, in favor of the federal principle, the provisions\nin the London Agreements for the \"political organization\" of Germany. Although for-\nmally stating the principle of federalism and decentralization, the wording and in-\ntent of these provisions, necessitated by the consideration of their effect on German,\nas well as French opinion, did little to allay French suspición and fear of the develop-\nment of a centralized Germany.\nFrance will, furthermore, oppose any revision of the program for dismantling of\nprohibited industries, and will attempt to maintain a high list of reparations and the\npresent ceiling on German industrial capacity. This policy will be particularly effec-\ntive and serious from the US point of view, in regard to the Ruhr. To France, the In-\nternational Authority for the Ruhr represents the means of: (1) preventing a re-\ngrowth of the German industrial war potential; (2) preventing future German control\nof this potential through international control of management and ownership; and\n(3) favoring the development of the French economy over that of the German. France\nwill attempt to set high quotas for coal export from the Ruhr in order to encourage\nthe expansion of steel industry elsewhere in Europe and force curtailment of steel\nproduction in Germany. This policy runs directly counter to US policy, which be-\nlieves that a revival of the Ruhr steel industry is necessary not only to restore the\nGerman economy, but also is essential to a healthy Western Europe. The US has\nbeen strongly opposed to an extension of the International Authority's powers of con-\ntrol over Ruhr industry, a policy which France will continue to push with great deter-\nmination.\n5.\nContinuation of a Joint Policy.\nThe question of the Ruhr, and other fundamental issues in the US-French conflict\nof policy in Germany, will be resolved only by the same type of compromise on both\n7"
}