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    "localId": "225248940",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 41-48, Effect of Soviet Restrictions on the United States Position in Berlin",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 41-48, Effect of Soviet Restrictions on the United States Position in Berlin",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 14,
            "logicalDate": "1948-06-14",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1948
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    "seq": 5,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "TOP\nSoviet Zone increasingly difficult; (b) Soviet travel restrictions on westbound pas-\nsenger rail traffic have curtailed the means of evacuation of refugees and deserters,\nwho must now be limited to relatively high-level personnel warranting air transport.\n(3) Except for the capacity of the Berlin radio of the US sector, the value of\nBerlin as point for the dissemination of Western propaganda through the Soviet\nZone has been, and despite new Soviet assurances is expected to be, curtailed by Soviet\ninterference with the dissemination of Western publications and impediments to the\nissuance of any German pro-Western material in the Soviet Zone.\n(4) The security and transport regulations have limited the value of Berlin\nas a base from which the US can support anti-Communism in the Soviet Zone. West-\nern Zone Germans can no longer easily enter or leave the Soviet Zone, while tightened\npolice controls have reduced the capabilities and the freedom of movement of anti-\nCommunist elements already within the Zone.\n(5) The Soviet-imposed demands for inspection of all westbound freight have\nprevented the shipment of Berlin manufactures that contribute to the finished pro-\nduction of the Western Zones and eliminated almost all commerce between Berlin\nand the west.\n(6) Although the Allied Control Council remains in the city to embarrass the\nUSSR as a symbol of quadripartite agreement in Germany, its functional impotence and\nfailure to meet since the USSR abruptly terminated the 20 March session has: (a)\ndiminished remaining German hope of implementing the Potsdam method of unifying\nGermany politically and economically; (b) eliminated a sounding board for the revela-\ntion of future Soviet moves; and (c) eliminated a useful safety valve for easing US-USSR\ntension below the governmental level.\nThe USSR still has at its disposal further means for harassing the US and making\nthe latter's position in Berlin more difficult. These means include: imposition of uni-\nlateral traffic regulations on inbound food and freight shipments, attempted enforce-\nment of unilateral regulations on the flight of Western Power aircraft over the Soviet\nZone, complete repudiation of quadripartite Kommandatura jurisdiction over the So-\nviet sector of the city and the incorporation of that sector into the Soviet Zone, and,\nfinally, increased efforts to create unrest among the civil population of the Western\nsectors of the city.\nStrategic losses such as the damage to US propaganda machinery, to intelligence\noperations and to the use of the US sector as a sanctuary for refugees from the Soviet\nsystem, cannot be completely retrieved except by the removal of all the Soviet-imposed\nrestrictions and impediments referred to above. Though the US could recapture a\ndegree of the strategic initiative by intensified clandestine intelligence operations, such\naction could do nothing to remedy the unfortunate situation in which recent Soviet\nhindrances have placed the anti-Communist Berlin city government or to relieve the\ntension brought by increased Soviet intransigence in the quadripartite Kommandatura.\n2\n3\nTOD SECRINT"
}