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    "localId": "225248975",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 44-48, Prospects for  Survival of the Republic of Korea",
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    "id": "225248975",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 44-48, Prospects for  Survival of the Republic of Korea",
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    "productionDates": [
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            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1948-10-28",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1948
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    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "Korean inexperience in parliamentary procedures and a motley political com-\nplexion have combined to prevent the development of the \"independent\" bloc into an\norganized minority opposition to the social and economic philosophies of the two major\nparties. Thus far this group has restricted itself to taking advantage of the NSAKI\n-\nHankook conflict in order to jockey for narrow factional, and even individual advantage.\nThis lack of a healthy minority opposition based on a real divergence of political out-\nlook, constitutes a real but understandable weakness of the new government.\nb.\nInstitutional Structure.\nAlthough the greater internal discipline and financial resources of the Han-\nkooks gave them an actual plurality in the Assembly, the unpopularity of the party,\noriginating in its association with the landholding class, frustrated its hopes of gaining\nsufficient moderate \"independent\" support to secure control. The first test of strength\ninvolved the issue of the form and organization of the government, and the Hankooks\nsuffered a major reverse.\nThe original draft of the constitution was written by men close to the Hankook\nDemocratic Party and provided for a parliamentary form of government. Rhee Syng-\nman * and his followers in the NSAKI objected strenuously to this draft, however, and\nadvocated a strong executive system modeled after that of the US. Rhee's adherents,\nconscious of the inevitability of his election to the Presidency, and the Hankooks,\nanxious to curb his power, each advocated that form of government that would best\ninsure their own control of the state apparatus. In this struggle, Rhee was able to\nsecure the support of the strategically placed \"independents\" and to force a revision of\nthe draft which favored his position. This conflict, and the face-saving concessions\nmade to the Hankooks in the course of Rhee's victory, serve to explain the unusual\ngovernmental structure established in the constitution and organic law-a strong\nexecutive government in essence, but with certain superficial features of a parliamen-\ntary system.\nThe President possesses considerable power and freedom of action. He\nappoints the Prime Minister with the approval of the Assembly. but the Prime Minister\nhas no policy-making powers since his function is merely to assist the President. The\nPresident also appoints the Ministers of the various executive departments. These,\ntogether with a variable number of Ministers without Portfolio, constitute the State\nCouncil. None of these appointments requires Assembly approval. Technically, execu-\ntive policy is formulated by a majority vote of the State Council, but since the Presi-\ndent's power to appoint the State Council is unqualified, except in the case of the Prime\nMinister, the President has, in fact, complete control of the executive branch.\nThe present National Assembly of 200 seats is to continue as the legislature\nfor a period of two years; after that, there is to be a unicameral National Assembly\nelected for a fixed term of four years. The Assembly is capable of exercising consider-\nable influence on the executive branch since its members may introduce legislation as\nwell as approve or reject bills introduced by the members of the State Council. The\nSee Appendix A.\n4"
}