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    "localId": "225248995",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 45-48, The Current Situation in China",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 45-48, The Current Situation in China",
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        {
            "day": 22,
            "logicalDate": "1948-07-22",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1948
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    "ocrText": "ORE 45-48\nbris\nJontros\nJolvoB\n00-Jainumino\".\nblow\nTHE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHINA\nbiswot\nSUMMARY\nlisw\n/\nThe position of the present National Government is so precarious that its fall may\noccur at any time. It is quite likely, however, that it may survive with diminishing\npower for some time, but soon become only one of several regimes exercising govern-\nmental powers independently in Nationalist China. Even with the current US aid pro-\ngram, the present National Government has little prospect of reversing or even checking\nthese trends of disintegration. The increasing instability in Nationalist China will\nfacilitate the extension of Chinese Communist military and political influence.\nWithin Nationalist China the power and prestige of Chiang Kai-shek is steadily\nweakening because of the unsuccessful prosecution of the war under his leadership\nand his apparent unwillingness and inability to accomplish positive reforms. Op-\nposition, both within the Kuomintang and among dissident elements, centered chiefly\nin Hong Kong, is gathering strength. In addition, deteriorating economic conditions\nare exerting a cumulative impact on the political structure of the National Government.\nFurthermore, the military forces of the Chinese Communists have been able to seize\nthe tactical initiative on an increasingly large scale. Even with current US assistance,\nit is improbable that the Nationalist Army can successfully defend all of its present\nterritories.\nIn foreign relations, questions concerning the neighboring states of Japan and the\nUSSR are of paramount interest to China for reasons of security. Chinese opinion\nfavors a \"hard\" peace settlement with Japan so as to prevent the resurgence of that\ncountry as a Great Power. It is equally important for China to maintain correct and\nif possible friendly relations with the USSR, for China unaided cannot match Soviet\npower. Implementation of US aid to China is complicated by the question of the extent\nof US controls and supervision, and US insistence upon accompanying economic, po-\nlitical, and military reforms. The USSR thus far has refrained from overt material\nassistance to the Chinese Communists and continues to recognize the National Gov-\nernment, but it is apparent, nevertheless, that Soviet sympathies lie with the Chinese\nCommunists. Even if US aid should prove effective, this might prove to be only a\ntemporary advantage for the National Government, since it might be offset by Soviet\ncounter-aid to the Chinese Communists.\nThe prospect for the foreseeable future in China is at best an indefinite and in-\nconclusive prolongation of the civil war, with the authority of the National Govern-\nment limited to a dwindling area in Central and South China and isolated major cities\nin north and northeast China, and with political and economic disorder spreading\nthroughout the country except possibly in Communist-held areas. The worst prospect\nis complete collapse of the National Government, and its replacement by a Chinese\nNote: The information in this report is as of 11 June 1948.\nThe intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force\nhave concurred in this report.\n1"
}