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{
    "localId": "225248995",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 45-48, The Current Situation in China",
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    "id": "225248995",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248995",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 45-48, The Current Situation in China",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248995",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 22,
            "logicalDate": "1948-07-22",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1948
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    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "for positive reforms, therefore, appears to hinge on some slackening in the rate of dis-\nintegration. Chiang Kai-shek himself has shown no genuine inclination to take any\npositive measures toward reform or to reorganize his Government along more pro-\ngressive lines, and even should he do so, the conservative landlord groups from which\nChiang derives much of his support would hardly accept the desired reforms.\n(1) Lack of Popular Support.\nExcept for the Chinese Communist Party, opposition to the National\nGovernment has been largely unorganized, lacking armed strength and therefore\nrelatively ineffective. The Nanking Government lacks popular support among moder-\nate and liberal groups of politically conscious Chinese. Although there is no single\nprogram to which they all subscribe, sentiment favoring a compromise peace is wide-\nspread among these groups. To many of them, Chiang Kai-shek is no longer accept-\nable as national leader, and they keenly resent any form of assistance, domestic or\nforeign, to bolster the present National Government's position and prolong its rule.\n(2) Opposition within the Kuomintang and National Government.\nof\nWithin the Kuomintang, also, dissatisfaction with the present National\nGovernment as it is now constituted under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek has\nbecome increasingly evident in recent months. The election of Chiang Kai-shek to\nthe presidency in April, confirmed him in his position of leadership, and is a fresh\ndemonstration that throughout Nationalist China there is no other personality who\ncan so effectively rally the support of the various Kuomintang factions and cliques.\nHowever, the victory of General Li Tsung-jen in the contest for the vice presidency\nreflected popular dissatisfaction with Chiang's failure to effect reform measures and\nrepresented a vote of protest against the ineffectiveness of his Government. General\nLi and his group are reportedly preparing a program for military, economic, and po-\nlitical reform. Moreover, Li is believed to favor the development of China along the\nlines of federalism with a considerable degree of provincial autonomy, in marked con-\ntrast to Chiang's insistence upon a strongly centralized government. Public statements\nof Li also indicate that while he is anti-Communist, he may be less averse to reopening\npolitical negotiations with the Communists than Chiang, who remains unalterably\nopposed to such a course. Since the terms of the constitution confer no specific powers\non the vice president, General Li must seek to achieve his program by appeals to public\nopinion and by tactics of persuasion with Chiang Kai-shek.\nIf frustrated in his efforts to persuade Chiang to alter his policies, Li and\nhis group may seek to organize a non-Communist revolutionary movement, capable\neventually of bringing about Chiang's overthrow. Li probably can count on the sup-\nport of General Pai Chung-hsi, his former associate in Kwangsi province, and a large\nsegment of southern troops. If such a movement develops, it might also attract the\nsupport of the Hong Kong dissidents, who reportedly are in close contact with Li,\nand would probably attract the support of many within the National Government who\nhave come to the conclusion that it is futile to hope for a favorable military solution\nin the civil conflict. aid brts\nSECRET\n4"
}