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ORE 46-48 modal asblaed aqurorg tedto of and SOL lied T9VO to and brus of aldito COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN 08 anol to and of d'gld novia coltaxillio SUMMARY bms sout While the Japan Communist Party (JCP) is, on the surface, only a minor political party, it wields an influence out of all proportion to its Diet strength through its domi- nation of Japan's largest labor federation and its ability to capitalize on the complaints of disgruntled groups suffering from the chaotic economic situation or perplexed by the postwar ideological confusion. The JCP has a membership reasonably estimated at 60,000 with additional strength to be found in the approximately 25,000-strong Young Communist League and the numerous and easily exploited Communist sympathizers. The Party holds four seats in each house of the Diet, an insignificant representation in terms of effecting legislation but useful from a propaganda viewpoint. The success of the JCP has been due in large part to its aggressive and well trained leaders while the interlocking relationship of the upper level committee membership makes for smooth coordination. Communications between the Soviets and the Japanese Communists range from the open to the clandestine. In the latter category are the secret Moscow-planned directives which are channelled to the Party's Soviet Fraction, which, in turn, attempts to implement these decisions through the group's powerful position in the Party. The so-called Tokuda group occasionally has a doctrinaire difference of emphasis from the Soviet Fraction with the former generally favoring a more nationalistic and less of the international Communist approach. Despite protestations that the JCP is strictly nationalistic in outlook, it is now evident that the Party is in contact with other Asiatic Communist Parties and may be represented at a Far Eastern Communist Congress. The JCP was largely responsible for organizing, and now makes no attempt to conceal its domination of, the National Congress of Industrial Unions, the largest of the labor federations with a claimed membership of approximately 1,200,000 and eighteen member unions in such vital industries as communications (government em- ployees), steel, transportation, and electric and chemical workers. Communist influ- ence is also exerted in varying degrees on some of the unaffiliated but large unions such as the National Council of Government Workers' Unions, the All-Japan Coal Industry Workers' Union, the Japan Teachers' Union, and recently the Party has made gains at the expense of the anti-Communists in the Government Railway Workers' Union. The Party and its labor federation have cooperated closely as is evidenced by their parallel activities in labor disputes including the "October Offensives" of 1946 and 1947, the abortive Communist-instigated general strike of February 1947, where SCAP's prohibi- tion of the strike caused both organizations to suffer a loss of prestige, and in March 1948, when prompt action by SCAP forestalled an acute party-inspired crisis. Note: The information in this report is as of 23 August 1948. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. 1

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    "ocrText": "ORE 46-48\nmodal asblaed aqurorg tedto of and SOL\nlied T9VO to\nand\nbrus of aldito COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN\n08\nanol\nto\nand of d'gld novia\ncoltaxillio\nSUMMARY\nbms\nsout\nWhile the Japan Communist Party (JCP) is, on the surface, only a minor political\nparty, it wields an influence out of all proportion to its Diet strength through its domi-\nnation of Japan's largest labor federation and its ability to capitalize on the complaints\nof disgruntled groups suffering from the chaotic economic situation or perplexed by the\npostwar ideological confusion. The JCP has a membership reasonably estimated at\n60,000 with additional strength to be found in the approximately 25,000-strong Young\nCommunist League and the numerous and easily exploited Communist sympathizers.\nThe Party holds four seats in each house of the Diet, an insignificant representation\nin terms of effecting legislation but useful from a propaganda viewpoint. The success\nof the JCP has been due in large part to its aggressive and well trained leaders while\nthe interlocking relationship of the upper level committee membership makes for\nsmooth coordination.\nCommunications between the Soviets and the Japanese Communists range from\nthe open to the clandestine. In the latter category are the secret Moscow-planned\ndirectives which are channelled to the Party's Soviet Fraction, which, in turn, attempts\nto implement these decisions through the group's powerful position in the Party. The\nso-called Tokuda group occasionally has a doctrinaire difference of emphasis from the\nSoviet Fraction with the former generally favoring a more nationalistic and less of the\ninternational Communist approach. Despite protestations that the JCP is strictly\nnationalistic in outlook, it is now evident that the Party is in contact with other Asiatic\nCommunist Parties and may be represented at a Far Eastern Communist Congress.\nThe JCP was largely responsible for organizing, and now makes no attempt to\nconceal its domination of, the National Congress of Industrial Unions, the largest of\nthe labor federations with a claimed membership of approximately 1,200,000 and\neighteen member unions in such vital industries as communications (government em-\nployees), steel, transportation, and electric and chemical workers. Communist influ-\nence is also exerted in varying degrees on some of the unaffiliated but large unions such\nas the National Council of Government Workers' Unions, the All-Japan Coal Industry\nWorkers' Union, the Japan Teachers' Union, and recently the Party has made gains at\nthe expense of the anti-Communists in the Government Railway Workers' Union. The\nParty and its labor federation have cooperated closely as is evidenced by their parallel\nactivities in labor disputes including the \"October Offensives\" of 1946 and 1947, the\nabortive Communist-instigated general strike of February 1947, where SCAP's prohibi-\ntion of the strike caused both organizations to suffer a loss of prestige, and in March\n1948, when prompt action by SCAP forestalled an acute party-inspired crisis.\nNote: The information in this report is as of 23 August 1948.\nThe intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force\nhave concurred in this report.\n1"
}