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{
    "localId": "225249019",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 46-48, Communist Strength in Japan",
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    "id": "225249019",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 46-48, Communist Strength in Japan",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1948-09-28",
            "month": 9,
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "order to save the Party embarrassment in case the activities should be disclosed.\nJapan's economic condition, rudimentary police force, and long coast line offer a sizable\nprofit in smuggling. Evidence indicates that the JCP has resorted to this type of\nenterprise. The traffic in Santonin offers an interesting example of JCP enterprise.\nSantonin is a product prepared largely in the USSR from domestic plants and is widely\nprized in Japan as a vermifuge. The limited quantity introduced since the War and\nthe origin of the drug have offered the JCP a near monopoly position.\nc. Factionalism.\nAvailable evidence indicates that there are two major factions within the JCP-\none identified with the theories of NOZAKA Sanzo and one with the policies pursued by\nTOKUDA Kyuichi, the Party's Secretary General, and his group of adherents.\nTOKUDA's theory, relying on leadership by the trusted few and the orthodox Marxist\nprincipal of revolution by violence, distrusts united front tactics and the parliamentary\nmethods of the bourgeois democrats which it is felt will impair Party purity and virility.\nThe TOKUDA group, sometimes referred to as the \"Prison Communists,\" although\ndecidedly pro-Soviet, apparently desires to establish a communized but independent\nJapan which will cooperate closely with the USSR and with Communist Parties in other\ncountries but which will not become an integral part of an international Communist\nmachine. Reportedly TOKUDA's nationalism makes him wary of joining a \"Far East-\nern Cominform,\" since he is doubtful of the advisability of too closely identifying the\nJCP with the USSR in the Japanese mind.\nAs contrasted with TOKUDA, NOZAKA favors a slower, more parliamentary\napproach with the use of united front tactics while simultaneously preparing for the\nultimate revolution by violence. There appears to be growing antagonism to\nTOKUDA's \"bossist\" rule of the Party organization and disappointment with his leader-\nship of the abortive general strike of February 1947. Even though the 6th Party Con-\ngress adopted NOZAKA's outline for \"Revolution by Peaceful Means\" after heated\ndebate, TOKUDA was re-elected the Party's Secretary General which position largely\ngoverns party appointments. It would be naïve to over-emphasize \"factionalism\" as\nan internal factor inhibiting the growth of the Japan Communist Party. It is rather\na doctrinaire difference of approach and emphasis.\nd.\nExternal Relationships.\nChannels of communication between the Soviets and the Japanese Com-\nmunists are numerous and naturally range from the obvious and somewhat open to\nthe clandestine. In the latter category are the Moscow-planned directives for the JCP\nwhich are channeled to the Party's Soviet Fraction from the Soviet Mission's Intelli-\ngence Section via TASS representatives. Available evidence indicates that the mem-\nbership of the Soviet Fraction is largely identical with that reported for the Supreme\nExecutive Council and that it is, therefore, in a position to implement Soviet directives\nat the highest party levels. At the same time overt communications take place through\nthe Office of the Soviet Delegate to the Allied Council and of the USSR Representative\nat the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. These are principal centers for intelli-\n5"
}