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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
13 August 1948
Aduenoum to ORE 47-48 -
0021264
$
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED Copy No. /
STATES FORCES FROM TSINGTAO
1. There has been no substantial change in the situation in China with
respect to Tsingtao since the publication of ORE 47-48, 23 June 1948.
2. Certain modifications or supplementary points which should be given
consideration in a present reading of ORE 47-48 are given below:
a. The position of the National Government is somewhat weaker
than in June. Therefore, there is increased likelihood that US with-
drawal from Tsingtao might touch off a chain of events resulting in
the collapse or overthrow of the Government.
b. Strength figures in Shantung province (see page three) for the
first week of August were an estimated total of 300,000 Communist
troops, and 180,000 Nationalist troops. Of the Communist troops
approximately 180,000, including the better quality troops, were
concentrated in the Tsinan area, some 180-200 miles from Tsingtao.
It is improbable that the Communists could assault Tsingtao success
fully unless the bulk of these troops were moved, along the rail line,
to Eastern Shantung. Such a redeployment would probably require a
month's time and could hardly occur without detection.
C. The steadily advancing disintegration of the National Govern
ment gives added significance to the point mentioned on page 2, pa-
ragraph 1 b: "By keeping a foothold in Tsingtao the US could main-
tain contact and give support to non-Communist de facto independent
$.
regimes which might emerge in North China as the power of the
National Government declines."
U.S.
AND
d. War weariness has increased the possiblity of a negotiated
peace, a point not given consideration in ORE 47-48, but treated
separately in ORE 12-48, 3 August 1948. While a peace agreement
between the National Government and the Chinese Communists is
unlikely in the immediate future, this does not preclude cessation
of hostilities in particular areas as a result of agreements between
local commanders. in negotiations either on a national or local
scale (Shantung), the Chinese Communists might seek US withdrawal
from Tsingtao among their terms.
NOTE: This paper has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations
of the departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.
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"ocrText": "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\n13 August 1948\nAduenoum to ORE 47-48 -\n0021264\n$\nCONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED Copy No. /\nSTATES FORCES FROM TSINGTAO\n1. There has been no substantial change in the situation in China with\nrespect to Tsingtao since the publication of ORE 47-48, 23 June 1948.\n2. Certain modifications or supplementary points which should be given\nconsideration in a present reading of ORE 47-48 are given below:\na. The position of the National Government is somewhat weaker\nthan in June. Therefore, there is increased likelihood that US with-\ndrawal from Tsingtao might touch off a chain of events resulting in\nthe collapse or overthrow of the Government.\nb. Strength figures in Shantung province (see page three) for the\nfirst week of August were an estimated total of 300,000 Communist\ntroops, and 180,000 Nationalist troops. Of the Communist troops\napproximately 180,000, including the better quality troops, were\nconcentrated in the Tsinan area, some 180-200 miles from Tsingtao.\nIt is improbable that the Communists could assault Tsingtao success\nfully unless the bulk of these troops were moved, along the rail line,\nto Eastern Shantung. Such a redeployment would probably require a\nmonth's time and could hardly occur without detection.\nC. The steadily advancing disintegration of the National Govern\nment gives added significance to the point mentioned on page 2, pa-\nragraph 1 b: \"By keeping a foothold in Tsingtao the US could main-\ntain contact and give support to non-Communist de facto independent\n$.\nregimes which might emerge in North China as the power of the\nNational Government declines.\"\nU.S.\nAND\nd. War weariness has increased the possiblity of a negotiated\npeace, a point not given consideration in ORE 47-48, but treated\nseparately in ORE 12-48, 3 August 1948. While a peace agreement\nbetween the National Government and the Chinese Communists is\nunlikely in the immediate future, this does not preclude cessation\nof hostilities in particular areas as a result of agreements between\nlocal commanders. in negotiations either on a national or local\nscale (Shantung), the Chinese Communists might seek US withdrawal\nfrom Tsingtao among their terms.\nNOTE: This paper has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations\nof the departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force."
}