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{
    "localId": "225249043",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 47-48, Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Tsingtao",
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    "id": "225249043",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 47-48, Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Tsingtao",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249043",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 23,
            "logicalDate": "1948-06-23",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1948
        }
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875476/875476-08-06.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "with a consequent strengthening of the economies (and military potential) of both\nthe Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. On the other hand, the Communists\nalready have ports in Shantung, and it may be to their advantage to continue using\nTsingtao as a means of trading through the Nationalists with non-Communist areas.\nThe most important strategic advantage that the possession of Tsingtao would\nprovide the Chinese Communists, however, would be its denial to the Nationalists.\n2.\nTHE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST ATTACK ON TSINGTAO.\nThe Chinese Communists are believed capable of launching a successful assault on\nTsingtao if they choose to do so. They are capable of taking Tsingtao even if\nthe US forces now present in that area join the Chinese Nationalist Army in the de-\nfense of the city, but would probably be unable to do so if the US forces were materially\nreinforced. It is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will attempt to assault Tsing-\ntao in the course of the next six months, although raids with limited objectives are\npossible.\na.\nCommunist Capabilities.\nChinese Communist troops outnumber the Nationalist troops in Shantung\nProvince (the Communists have an estimated 295,000 troops, the Nationalists 200,000)\nand could provide more troops in an assault on Tsingtao than the Nationalists now\nhave defending that city. The Communists are reported to be considerably superior\nto the Nationalists in morale and combat efficiency. The Communists have consider-\nable mobility, while the Nationalists are pinned down in the cities and the possibility\nof reinforcing one garrison with units from another must be discounted. The acute\nreplacement problem facing the National Government would render ready reinforce-\nment of troops to Tsingtao difficult. There is little question but that the Nationalists\nhave sacrificed the military security of Tsingtao in terms of both the quantity and\nquality of troops allocated to its defense in the expectation that the presence of US\nforces will deter the Communists from attempting to take the city.\nb. Communist Intentions.\nThere appears to be little probability that the Communists will choose to as-\nsault Tsingtao within the next six months. The advantages which the Communists\nfeel they can now derive from Tsingtao probably will not justify the price of a frontal\nattack, although it is not improbable that the Communists will conduct raiding oper-\nations.\nAlthough Chinese Communist propaganda is strongly anti-American, the Com-\nmunists thus far have shown little inclination to risk direct conflict with the US, in\npart at least, because of the possibility that this would be disadvantageous to a Com-\nmunist de facto regime seeking international recognition. However, this is no guar-\nantee that they would not assume such a risk if it were felt that the benefits accruing\nto them (and perhaps to the USSR) would so justify. At this time it appears that the\npresence of US forces in Tsingtao will deter a Communist assault. However, the Com-\nmunists may attempt, in the next six months, to control trade between the city and\n3"
}