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{
    "localId": "225249043",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 47-48, Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Tsingtao",
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    "id": "225249043",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249043",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 47-48, Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Tsingtao",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249043",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 23,
            "logicalDate": "1948-06-23",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1948
        }
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{
    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "its hinterland and to exploit civil disorders resulting from a large refugee population,\nwidespread unemployment, and general war weariness. Such civil disorders, of course,\nwould be an excellent mask for Communists' raiding operations. The effectiveness of\nsuch measures to bring about the reduction of the city would be very questionable,\ninasmuch as the Communists' capability to blockade the port from the sea will probably\nremain nil.\n3.\nCONSEQUENCES OF US WITHDRAWAL.\nUnless the deteriorating military and political trends throughout China are re-\nversed or materially retarded, there is an increasing possibility that a Chinese Com-\nmunist attack on Tsingtao will occur eventually, even with US forces in existing\nstrength present in the area. Therefore the US may be confronted with a situation in\nwhich it may be forced to withdraw in order to avoid involvement in the Chinese civil\nhostilities. However, such a withdrawal would probably become imperative only at a\ntime when the situation of the National Government would have so deteriorated that\nit would be but one of many necessary decisions in a re-examination of the entire US\nposition in China and the Far East.\na. Favorable Factors.\nWithdrawal of US forces from Tsingtao might somewhat offset the virulent\nanti-US sentiment currently rife among many groups in Nationalist China. If care-\nfully arranged, a withdrawal could be presented as evidence of the \"anti-imperialist\"\npolicy of the US. However, in view of the strong position of the Chinese Communists\nin Shantung, it would be difficult to convince Chinese opinion that the sole or primary\nreason for the evacuation of US personnel was a gesture of good will.\nWithdrawal would avert the possibility of direct involvement of the US in the\nChinese civil conflict. The consequences of direct involvement in the war are par-\nticularly serious because of the political, economic, and military weakness of the Na-\ntional Government. To make direct US participation in the civil warfare effective\nin achieving a conclusive victory for the National Government would require a sub-\nstantial outlay of US resources. US involvement would probably occur when the\nNational Government was on the verge of complete disintegration, and in such circum-\nstances it would be very questionable whether the US, at that time, could change the\ntide of military events in China. As a result, the United States would suffer a very\nserious loss in prestige and gain little but the hostility of the Chinese people.\nImmediate withdrawal from Tsingtao would also avoid the grave, albeit re-\nmote, risk of conflict with the USSR. If the US found itself actively engaged in the\nChinese war on the side of the Nationalists, it is possible that the USSR would counter\nsuch aid with similar assistance to the Chinese Communists. It is estimated, however,\nthat while the USSR will exploit every opportunity to hinder or embarrass US efforts\non behalf of Nationalist China or in the protection of US interests in the Far East, the\nKremlin will, for the time being, avoid an armed clash between US forces and Soviet-\ndominated forces.\n4"
}