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{
    "localId": "225249043",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 47-48, Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Tsingtao",
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    "id": "225249043",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 47-48, Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Tsingtao",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249043",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 23,
            "logicalDate": "1948-06-23",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "Withdrawal now would avert a possible hurried and embarrassing withdrawal\nlater. Immediate withdrawal would entail a grave loss of US prestige, but such a loss\nof \"face\" would certainly be less than if the withdrawal were carried out hurriedly and\nunder the very obvious pressure of the Communist Army. If US forces were to par-\nticipate in the initial defense of the city, it would be difficult to extricate them and,\neven if that could be done, it would involve an irretrievable loss of \"face\"; the Chinese\nCommunists would undoubtedly proclaim a major military victory over the US.\nFinally, withdrawal now would eliminate the danger that US forces might find them-\nselves on Chinese soil at the time of the downfall of the National Government.\nb. Unfavorable Factors.\n(1) Adverse Effects on US Interests in China.\nThe evacuation of US forces from Tsingtao-no matter how or when\nit was accomplished-would be regarded by the Chinese as a withdrawal of US support\nfrom the National Government. (Chinese Communists and USSR propaganda would\ncertainly emphasize to the Chinese and to the world that the US had forsaken the Na-\ntional Government.) This might set off a chain of events which would seriously\nundermine and probably accelerate the disintegration of the already weakened Na-\ntional Government.\nMany Chinese who have tolerated the National Government primarily\nbecause of the prestige and material benefit resulting from support by the US may\nbecome disaffected if there were evidence that (for whatever reason) the United States\nwas withdrawing its support. The evacuation of Tsingtao would, in effect, jeopardize\nthe psychological benefits that have accrued to the Chinese Government and the United\nStates Government as a result of the US aid programs. The position and the influence\nof Chiang Kai-shek would be weakened with a consequent acceleration of trends toward\ndisintegration of the Government.\nThe alarm which the Chinese Government expressed at the proposed US\nwarning to American nationals to evacuate the Tientsin-Peiping area is an indication\nof a probably more violent reaction to any move involving the evacuation of US forces\nfrom Tsingtao. The grave concern with which the Chinese Nationalists regard the\nGovernment's situation in North China and Manchuria might degenerate into utter\nhopelessness with a consequent snowballing of sentiment for a compromise peace with\nthe Communists.\nTo the extent that the Communists have been holding off a direct attack\non Tsingtao because of their reluctance to stir up additional US support to the National\nGovernment, the removal of US forces from that city would increase the probability\nof an early assault. If such an assault were to be undertaken and were to prove\nsuccessful, the National Government would very probably blame the US, thus worsen-\ning Sino-US relations.\nUS withdrawal from Tsingtao, at the present time, would in effect write\noff the possibility that the National Government, through its own efforts and with\n5"
}