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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 48-48, Probable Effects on Israel and the Arab States of a United Nations Arms Embargo",
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    "ocrText": "COPY NO. 1\nFOR THE PRESIDENT\nOF THE UNITED STATES\nPROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL\nAND THE ARAB STATES OF\nA UN ARMS EMBARGO\nPage Dennis 1-2\n~\nINKEL\nGENCE\nLIBRART , UNIVERSITY ANNUM BEGUROS\nORE 48-48\nREPRESENTATIVE\nPublished August 5, 1948\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) - $\nJ\nC.I.A.\nOSD letter,\n6:13:20\nNARS Date 7.5.24\nBIOTHY\nWARNING\nThis document contains information affecting the na-\ntional defense of the United States within the meaning\nof the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.\nIts transmission or the revelation of its contents in any\nmanner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.\nCOMEDA\nDISSEMINATION NOTICE\n1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient\ndesignated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's\noffice who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further\ndissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-\ntion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:\na. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for\nthe Department of State\nb. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army\nc. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy\nd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force\ne. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-\nmission\nf. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff\ng. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other\nDepartment or Agency\n2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with\napplicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by\narrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.\nDISTRIBUTION:\nOffice of the President\nNational Security Council\nNational Security Resources Board\nDepartment of State\nDepartment of Defense\nDepartment of the Army\nDepartment of the Navy\nDepartment of the Air Force\nState-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee\nJoint Chiefs of Staff\nAtomic Energy Commission\nXU\nnital\nhas\nORE 48-48\nPROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES\nOF A UN ARMS EMBARGO\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nSUMMARY\nd\n1\n1. CURRENT SITUATION\n3\n2. IMPLICATIONS OF A UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST JEWS AND ARABS\n4\n3. IMPLICATIONS OF A UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST ONE BELLIGERENT\n5\na. Against the Jews\n5\nb. Against the Arabs\n6\n4. IMPLICATIONS OF UN FAILURE TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION\n6\nMap-Military Situation-11 June 1948\nAPPENDIX A-PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION\n1. TACTICAL SITUATION\n8\n2. STRENGTH OF FORCES INVOLVED\n8\nAPPENDIX B-ISRAELI ARMS SUPPLY\n1. GENERAL\n10\n2. PRESENT STOCKS\n11\na. Light Infantry Weapons and Ammunition\n11\nb. Mortars\n11\nc. Artillery\n12\nd. Armored Vehicles\n12\ne. Miscellaneous\n12\n3. PRODUCTION CAPACITY\n12\na. Jewish Industry before and during World War II\n12\nb. Jewish Munitions Industry after World War II\n13\nc. Jewish Munitions Industry after the UN Partition Recommendation\n14\n4. RAW MATERIAL SITUATION\n14\n5. POSSIBLE OUTSIDE SOURCES OF SUPPLY\n15\na. The USSR and its Satellites\n15\nb. Western Europe\n15\nc. The UK\n16\nd. The US and Latin America\n16\n81-84 яно\nAPPENDIX C-ARAB AREA SUPPLY\nESTATE SARA SHT СИА JEAREI ИО STONNER\n1. GENERAL\nОФЯАНМЯ 8MSA nu A TO\n17\n2. PRESENT STOCKS\n17\nатиятиоо TO FISAT\na. Egypt\n17\nb. Transjordan\nYRAMMUE\n18\nc. Iraq\n18\n8\nd. Syria\nTHERRIO\n18\ne. Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen\n19\nemañ ИЗ n TO\n3. PRODUCTION CAPACITY\n19\nno MU A TO SMOTTAOLITMI\na. General\na\n19\nsdf\n0\nb. Syria and Lebanon\n19\nAdata odi JamisyA\nc. Iraq\n20\n8\nd. Egypt\noT nu TO 20\ne. Palestine\n20\nf. Transpordan and Saudi Arabia\n8401 VISIHIM-Q2M\ng. Yemen\n21\nMOITAUTIS YHATIJIM ТИЛВЕЯЧ-А ХТОИЗЧЧА\n4. RAW MATERIAL SITUATION\n21\n5. POSSIBLE OUTSIDE SOURCES OF SUPPLY\nMOITAUTIE JADITDAT 21\n8\nS\nAPPENDIX D-AIRCRAFT AND AIR DEFENSE SUPPLY\nYJ99U8 ВМЯА LISARBI-8 ХӀСИЯЧА\n1. GENERAL\n23\n2. ISRAEL\n23\n3. THE ARAB STATES\nSHOOTS 23\n11\nvitasini tdght .0\nII\nAPPENDIX E-NAVAL STRENGTH AND SUPPLY\nanshold x\nSC\nVISILITA D\nSI\nasíaidoV b\n21\na\nTERMSAO &\nII 78W birow gation bes stoted extrant daiwst\nII TAW bhow THIS Titurbal datwot d\nmollabremmoseR nottine9 MU odd made amalideM deimal\nMOITAUTES JAINTAM WAST +\nnistus to взойной amartO a\nat\nasillain8 all brie REAU ear .8\naqoual mistasW .d\nMILITARY SITUATION- 11 JUNE 1948\n(On effective date of U.N. cease-fire order)\n35°\n35'30'\nPALESTINE\nTyre\nVA\nBaniyas\nJewish held area\nJewish controlled area\nJewish area (as accepted by\nEn Naqura\nBint Jubeil\nU.N. General Assembly,\nRas en Naqura\nI\nNovember 1947)\n33°\nSuhmata\nR\n33°\nPartition Boundary (as accepted by the United\nNations General Assembly, Nov, 1947)\nAcre\nY\nInternational Boundary\nDistrict Boundary\nStandard Gauge Railroad (4/8%\")\nS\nNarrow Gauge Railroad (3'5w\")\nHAIFA\nFirst Class Road\nLAKE\nSecond Class Road\nTIBERIAS\nOil Pipe Line\nIntermittent Stream\nJewish Communal Area\nNazareth\no\n10\n20\n30 Miles\n10\n20\n30 Kilometers\nNaharayim\n(Power station)\ni\n50\n100\n200M\n50\n100\n200 Km\n.\nKonya\nLajjun\nT\nU\nR\nK\nE\nY\n30\n32°\nJist Sh. Husein\n30/\nAdana\nJenin\nMersin\nBaqa\nAleppo\nS\nA\nM\nR\nA\nN\nLatakia\nNatanya\nTubas\nTulkarm\nNur ash\nShams\n(Br.)\nSabastiya\nR\nA\no Homs\nTripoli\nBEIRUT NON\nA\nNablus\ns\nA\nR\nA\nB\nD\nQalqiliya\nDAMASCUS\nAuja\n(Power station)\nRas al Ein\nARAB\nJiftlik Post\nR\nTEL AVIV\nHELD\nJisr Damiya\nHaife\nJAFFA\nARAB\nDeir Nidham\nTel Aviv\nAMMAN\n32°\nBeit\nJaffa\nRisho\nNabala\n32°\n*\nKtAir field)\nGaza\nPort Said\nMa'an JERUSALEM *\nLydda\nRamle\nRamallah\nA\nQantera\nBeit Sira\nS\nJericho\nAllenby Bridge\nLatrun\nQalandiya\n(Air field)\nCITY OF JERUSALEM\nEGYPT\nSuez,\nPalestine Potash Code\nN\npopsy\nMasmiya\n'Aqaba\nJERUSALEM\n34°\nBethlehem\nA\nSolomon's Pools\nof\nAI\nMajdal\n,\nE\nR\nU\nS\nA\nL\nE\nM\nSuer\nBeit Jibrin\nR\nARAB\nL\nHebron\n31°\nS\nGaza\n31°\n30\nARAB\nMareb\nARAB CON T ROLLED\nKhan Yuni\nRafah\nG\nA\nZ\nA\nQuatara\nBeersheba\na\nSources:\nPalestine, 1:500,000. Geo. Philip and Son, 1942\nSurvey of Palestine Motor Map, 1:500,000. 1939\nJEWISH\nT\nPalesting 1:250,000, M.D.R. 1509/12375, 1946\n34°30'\n35°\n35°30'\nMap Branch, CIA, 4-48\n11010\n(First Revision 6-48)\nORE 48-48\nPROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES\nOF A UN ARMS EMBARGO\nSUMMARY\n1. Neither Israel nor the Arab states now have sufficient stocks of arms and equip-\nment to carry out prolonged, full-scale hostilities following the end of the four-week\ntruce which began 11 June. Israel is weak in heavy equipment, although it has ade-\nquate stocks of small arms and ammunition, and is believed capable of supporting\nguerrilla warfare operations with its own armament industry. The Arab states, al-\nthough superior in artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft, have only limited stocks\nof ammunition and replacement equipment and possess insufficient facilities for pro-\nducing armament.\n2. Both sides are negotiating to obtain matériel from outside sources. Zionist\nagents abroad have been able to stockpile light weapons and ammunition from Czecho-\nslovakia and other Eastern European countries for eventual shipment to Palestine, and\nthe Jews undoubtedly hope to acquire additional heavy equipment from the US. The\nArabs look, as in the past, to the UK as a principal source of arms but are exploring\nadditional sources. Arab financial resources for such transactions, however, are not\nextensive.\n3. The application of an effective UN arms embargo against both Israel and the\nArab states would limit the scale of the fighting and would probably result in a mili-\ntary stalemate, leading eventually to a compromise. The Arabs would find themselves\nincapable of prosecuting a large-scale offensive. The Jews would also be unable to\nwage offensive war, but would probably be able to maintain their present positions\nalong the coast and possibly in Galilee. Jewish extremists would resist any attempts\nat compromise, and the Provisional Government of Israel itself would probably make\nevery effort to have the embargo modified before entering into negotiations with the\nArabs. The Arabs would also be loath to make concessions. In the end, however, both\nIsrael and the Arab states (or at least Transjordan) might feel constrained to accept a\nJewish state exclusive of the Negeb.\n4. Inadequate enforcement of the embargo could also be expected to result ulti-\nmately in a virtual stalemate. Israel, possessing better facilities for obtaining illegal\narms than the Arabs, would be able to defend more territory than under an effective\nembargo but could not win a decisive victory. The Arabs would probably obtain\nmeasured assistance from the UK, which favors a stalemate. Since some support for\nIsrael would come from the US, anti-US feeling in the Arab states would rise following\nany Jewish successes. The USSR would probably supply arms to both belligerents in\nNote: The information in this report is as of 1 July 1948.\nThe intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force\nhave concurred in this report. This report was prepared in collaboration with the Depart-\nments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and at the request of the State Department.\n1\nan effort to promote continued unrest in the Middle East. (See ORE 38-48 for an\nevaluation of Soviet Policy in the Middle East.)\n5. A UN embargo against the Jews alone would lead to eventual Arab victory, and\nwould increase US prestige with the Arabs. In Israel a struggle for power between pro-\nSoviet, extremist groups and the moderates would ensue, with the moderates probably\nattempting to find a modus vivendi with the Arabs. The amount of support provided\nby the Soviet bloc, on one hand, and the nature of the terms provided by the Arabs, on\nthe other, would determine the outcome.\n6. A UN embargo against the Arab states alone would permit the Jews to obtain\nsufficient military supplies to take the offensive and force Arab acceptance of a Jewish\nstate and the withdrawal of Arab armed forces from Palestine. Under such circum-\nstances, the Arab states would probably see no significant loss involved in leaving the\nUN and severing relations with the nations responsible for the embargo. They might\nalso be willing to risk the economic dislocation entailed in cancellation of economic\nconcessions; these concessions might eventually be reassigned to more friendly powers.\nPolitical upheavals would probably ensue in the Arab states, facilitating Soviet ex-\nploitation.\n7. If the UN takes no positive action following the end of the truce, military de-\nvelopments will in large measure depend on the great powers. If the present US and\nUK embargoes are maintained, fighting would continue on a greater scale but neither\nside would obtain decisive victory. The UK would probably attempt to redress the\nbalance if Soviet aid or other factors appeared to make Jewish success imminent. The\nZionists would then increase the pressure on the US to end its embargo. If the US\ndid so, the Palestine battle would become bloodier, and US-UK relations would be fur-\nther strained. A cessation of British aid to the Arabs at this point, in order to avoid\na break with the US, would result in significant Soviet military aid to the Arabs, ac-\ncompanied by intensified efforts to extend Soviet influence into the Arab countries.\n2\nPROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES\nOF A UN ARMS EMBARGO\n1. CURRENT SITUATION.\nWhen the United Nations Palestine truce became effective on 11 June, the fighting\nbetween the Arabs and the Jews was tending toward a stalemate, in which both\nsides were experiencing difficulties in marshalling effective military strength. Never-\ntheless, neither Israel nor the Arab League bloc was willing to retreat publicly from\nits basic position. The Zionists insisted on the maintenance of a fully independent\nstate within the territories allocated them under the UN partition plan. The Arabs,\nalthough they showed some signs of willingness to compromise, were committed to\nopposing both sovereignty for Israel and unlimited Jewish immigration into it.\nAt present under the truce, Arab regular and irregular forces within Palestine or\nnear its borders total approximately 50,000, about 25,000 of whom have been actually\ncommitted inside Palestine. The strength of the Israeli forces totals some 90,000.\nAbout 35,000 of the Israeli troops have been used for active operations, half of this\nfigure being employed as a striking force, and half for local, mobile defense.\nThe Arabs have approximately 250 light aircraft and transports, while Israel pos-\nsesses an estimated 45 light aircraft, an unknown number of transports, and possibly\nseveral heavy bombers. The sea power of both Arabs and Jews is relatively slight. The\nArab Armies have a wide variety of small arms and are stronger than Israel in artillery\nand tanks. However, their stocks of ammunition and replacement matériel are lim-\nited, and the Arab states have insufficient facilities and raw materials for the produc-\ntion of armament. Present Israeli stocks of small arms are adequate to arm all com-\nbatant members of the Israel forces. Israel's industrial capacity is restricted by the\nshortage of raw materials but is believed capable of keeping present weapons and\nequipment in condition and of supplying replacements and ammunition for guerrilla\nwarfare.\nThe arms and equipment of neither Jews nor Arabs are sufficient for prolonged,\nfull-scale hostilities, and both sides are involved in negotiations for obtaining matériel\nfrom various outside sources. The Jews have managed in various ways surreptitiously\nto acquire large amounts of arms and equipment from British Army stocks in Pales-\ntine. The efforts of Zionist agents abroad have resulted in the stockpiling of quantities\nof small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition in various eastern European\ncountries for eventual shipment to Palestine. Most of these stocks come from Czecho-\nslovakia, Yugoslavia, and possibly from Poland and the USSR. Jewish acquisitions\nfrom the US consist mainly of machinery, motor vehicles, and air transport. The Israeli\nforces are much more concerned with obtaining such heavier equipment than in ac-\nquiring small arms.\nThe Arab states look to the UK (subject to its UN commitments) as their principal\nsource of arms supply and will continue to do so. However, such alternate sources as\n3\nFrance, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia are now being explored,\nand Spain and Argentina are also possibilities. It is expected, however, that financial\nlimitations will prevent large purchases from these sources.\nThere is no evidence that either Arabs or Jews have smuggled any substantial sup-\nplies of arms into Palestine since the truce went into effect.\n2. IMPLICATIONS OF A UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST JEWS AND ARABS.\nIf the efforts of the UN Mediator fail and hostilities are resumed, it is possible that\nthe UN will impose an arms embargo on Israel and the Arab states. If effectively en-\nforced, such a step would: (1) deny arms to both sides, and thus keep the war on a\nsmall scale and of a more or less local nature; (2) make it difficult for the belligerents\nto negotiate blackmarket arms purchases and even more difficult to effect delivery;\nand (3) probably create a military stalemate leading eventually to a political com-\npromise between the Jews and Arabs.\nIf the Provisional Government of Israel (PGI) is unable to obtain the heavy equip-\nment which it needs to conduct a successful campaign against the Arab states, it will\nbe forced to reappraise its position in the light of these changed conditions. Policy\nhitherto has been based on the assumption that the Zionist organization throughout\nthe world, and particularly in the US, would be successful in enlisting sufficient great-\npower support to assure the establishment and continued existence of the Jewish state.\nFaced with the realization that their present military resources would not be sufficient\nto force a solution to the Palestine problem in accordance with the terms of the General\nAssembly partition plan, it seems inevitable that the more moderate Jewish elements\nwould be obliged to consider some retreat from their present attitude.\nWhile Arab outside sources of supply would also be cut off, this loss would be com-\npensated for by the shutting off of Jewish supplies. Thus a stalemate would ensue.\nThe Jewish forces, though incapable of waging offensive war, could probably maintain\ntheir present positions along the coast and possibly in Galilee. Under these circum-\nstances, both the PGI and the Arab states, or at least Transjordan, might be willing to\naccept a Jewish state exclusive of the Negeb (assigned by the UN plan to the Jews but\nnow cut off by Arab forces).\nNo such willingness to consider compromise could be expected from the Jewish\nextremists. Both the Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi have already rejected the\nauthority of the PGI, and they have been working with the government only for reasons\nof expediency. Both groups would reaffirm their claim to all of Palestine and Trans-\njordan, disassociate themselves from the decisions of the PGI, and resume their terrorist\nactivities. This schism would further weaken the Jewish political position, and produce\nincreased dissension in Jewish ranks. Attempts by the Irgun to import arms during\nthe truce have already resulted in a bloody engagement with the Israeli Army.\nBefore seeking a compromise with the Arabs, the Jews would make every effort to\nbring about modifications in the embargo. To this end, they would probably be willing\nto undertake a political alignment with any country which evinced a disposition to\nconsider their pleas.\n4\nEven if the embargo were inadequately enforced, a military stalemate would prob-\nably eventuate. Jewish facilities for obtaining illicit arms would be greater than those\nof the Arabs, although the Arabs could probably obtain sufficient quantities to prevent\nan Arab defeat but not to permit a decisive victory. The Jews could consolidate the\nareas of Palestine which they now hold and perhaps also force the Arabs to relinquish\nthe Negeb.\nAn active, well financed Zionist organization throughout Europe and the US would\nbe able to run arms ships as formerly it ran ships of illegal immigrants. Principal\nsources for small arms, automatic and semiautomatic weapons, ammunition, explosives,\nmortars, and light artillery would continue to be Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with\ndelivery accomplished by transshipment through Albania, Bulgaria, and Italy. This\narrangement would entail minimum jeopardy to the UN status of the countries of\norigin. Any air or ground transport, self-propelled units, or heavy ordnance supplied\nby these countries would probably be of German or US manufacture, thereby making\ndetermination of the immediate source more difficult.\nThe British apparently favor the development of a military stalemate, which would\nforce a compromise solution. For this reason, it is likely that British arms in sufficient\nquantity to bring about such a situation and to prevent an Arab defeat would find their\nway into Arab hands. Czechoslovakia would accept arms-purchase contracts on a\ndollar basis, and private sources in Italy could furnish arms on the same basis. The\ndollar shortage of the Arab states, however, would limit the quantities thus procured\nto a very small percentage of what the Jewish forces could obtain.\nThe US would probably be deeply involved in the illicit Jewish arms traffic. Finan-\ncial support would certainly stem mainly from this country, and a considerable portion\nof the actual war matériel would likely originate here. Consequently, violent anti-US\nreaction could be expected throughout the Arab world in the wake of any Jewish mili-\ntary successes. There is also the probability that under such circumstances similar\nresentment would be directed against the UN and against those nations voting for the\nembargo. Meanwhile, the USSR could be expected to exploit the inadequacies of the\nembargo in order to play both ends against the middle.\n3. IMPLICATIONS OF A UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST ONE BELLIGERENT.\na. Against the Jews.\nAn effective UN arms embargo against the Jews alone would obviously mean\nmilitary victory for the Arab forces. In a relatively short time the Arabs would be in\na position to establish some form of unitary state in Palestine, wherein the present\nArab majority would be able to control the Jewish minority. US prestige in the Middle\nEast would be improved since Arab leaders would probably credit the US with having\npermitted this pro-Arab measure.\nThe repercussions in Israel of an embargo against the Jews would be violent.\nThe Jews would look on the embargo as a betrayal by the West, and the Stern Gang\nand other pro-Soviet elements would gain in influence and would attempt to wrest\ncontrol from the pro-West or moderate elements. To circumvent the schemes of the\n5\nextremists, the moderate elements might try to bargain with the Arab leaders in the\nhope of finding a modus vivendi for the Jews under some form of confederation. De-\nciding factors in the extremist-moderate struggle for power would be the amount of\nsupport given by the USSR to the extremists and the nature of the political terms the\nArabs would be willing to grant the moderates.\nb. Against the Arabs.\nAn effective UN arms embargo against the Arabs alone would mean military\nvictory for the Jews. While the Arabs would be denied outside help, the Jews would\nbe able to buy arms in various parts of the world, and to effect relatively easy delivery.\nThey could thus assume the offensive and force Arab acceptance of a Jewish state.\nOther nations could be expected to grant diplomatic recognition, which would add to the\nprestige of Israel and its government and help to ease current economic difficulties.\nThe Arab states would, of course, look upon such an embargo as a hostile act\nintended to defeat their claims in Palestine and to guarantee Israel's independence.\nArab leaders have already declared that, if increasing aid is given the Jews by other\npowers, the Arab states will leave the UN, break off diplomatic relations with those\nnations most directly concerned, and cancel the concessions held by the same powers\nin Arab countries. These concessions might eventually be transferred to more friendly\npowers.\nIn terms of self-interest, the Arab states would lose little by severing diplomatic\nrelations with the SC members responsible for the embargo or even by withdrawing from\nthe UN. The imposition of economic sanctions by the Arab states on the powers which\nhad voted for the embargo would cause serious dislocations in the Arab countries and\nwould delay development programs indefinitely. Nonetheless, the Arabs might well be\nwilling to sacrifice economic benefits in order to punish the offending nations. Sanc-\ntions would likely include the cancellation of oil and air concessions or the sequestration\nof foreign installations. Moreover, the Arab masses would probably turn against their\nown governments, holding them responsible for the defeat. The violence and unrest\naccompanying these political upheavals would create the chaotic conditions most\nfavorable to Soviet exploitation.\n4. IMPLICATIONS OF UN FAILURE TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION.\nIn the event that the UN truce expires with the UN having taken no positive action,\nthe development of the military situation in Palestine will depend largely on the policies\npursued by the US and UK regarding arms shipments to the Middle East. If the US\nand the UK should maintain embargoes, the Jews could obtain more arms and equip-\nment from other sources than the Arabs. This advantage, however, would not be imme-\ndiately decisive; fighting would continue on a greater scale but would not bring out-\nright victory to either side.\nThe USSR probably would not support either side exclusively. If it should attempt\nto increase its influence in Israel by making large shipments of matériel to the Jews,\nor if for any reason a Jewish victory appeared imminent, the UK would almost certainly\n6\nseek to redress the balance by resuming arms shipments to the Arabs. Thus the mili-\ntary deadlock would hold.\nThe UK's action would cause the Zionists to increase their pressure on the US to lift\nits embargo. If their efforts were successful, the result would be an increasingly\nbloody struggle in Palestine for an indefinite period of time, coupled with a catastrophic\ndeterioration in already strained US-UK relations. Should the UK subsequently stop\nits shipment of arms to the Arab states in order to avoid a complete break with the US,\nthe Arabs would be in a desperate situation. At this stage, the USSR would almost\ncertainly give support to the Arab Armies considerably beyond the small amount of\nmatériel aid already reaching them through the Soviet satellites and would take ad-\nvantage of the isolation of the Arab world from the West to extend its control into the\nArab countries.\nsdi of notified of BAW bits nabiaY yed MA\nashya buids A AloH and to dison and at ashediT month\n10 belgeness\nIslance grit 20 missessing ni implement millibe\nnet no tubel of disort odt mo asked seviedal most althw m with not\nsignature betalost 02 tuoda at asont Items benisterm adT\ninstruct to enolling add blod of bennitnes bas ,daggy\n3a belate bad vivA 19T to and at adam add to HOARS\ndigneta in obagind 900 Inoda contution sout 11\n(stasos odt to 111 2/8W box Janos still guots then hovem bad\nentos ritiw to Intering add of rebied sdt most\n-90 had group lab[aM M mon Jass grilbel beon\nin гвя to 819W aquari ipart sant is violed hubel 7490 begular\nVIVA 1sT to tassdition sellm DI behabol Vigque 1916W wt notials Salqmaq\nIST to incording asim of ast simes has shbyJ ballonidos address doiged driA\ndatwel would will ,Vive\nstatog\nwill forther of bauntimos allow notyed derá 8918 moinevel only nt\nfor bib adatA add digrodis JKB visititie Hair 21 guitsvos yd andel 38 hear VIVA\n08 banego bad and ,8wst offT inlog YOU in hear arti VQU330\nstimu notgal danA to vila add at bitt 00 BLUOT easq-vd\nmiys! isdio advadus bas madhon add bite VIID BIO sdit belowoon\nmissurest oini ROW stadi of derA VII herroquire agross\ndaidw nativess brosse A 1110 adj to divos andititing\nnoveled betrool 5d or tast 2.0W mor) door bevom bed\nbire\n:\nbria visition details act redi befamities at # sawt IL to MA\nInforma add and Holdw JUSTIOW bag name 000.00 belador\noini twode to sublida 8 to AmiA (Isured\n7\nAPPENDIX A\nPRESENT MILITARY SITUATION\n1. TACTICAL SITUATION. (See attached map.)\nWhen the Arab and Jewish truce began on 11 June 1948 the Jews controlled loosely\nalmost all of Galilee, roughly the area north of a line running from Haifa through\nJenin to Beisan. The Arabs had made three small penetrations into this area. A\nmixed force of Syrian regulars and Arab irregulars had established itself south of the\nLebanese border at Malikiya. A second force of regular Syrian troops had penetrated\nfrom Syria as far as Mishmar hay Yarden, and was in position to threaten the main\nroad running from Tiberias to the settlements north of Lake Hula. A third Syrian\nforce is reported to have penetrated to, and occupied, the city of Nazareth.\nIn addition to the Galilee area, the Jews remained in possession of the coastal belt,\nroughly ten miles in width, from the Lebanese border on the north to Isdud on the\nsouth. The Jews also maintained small forces in about 20 isolated settlements in the\nNegeb, and continued to hold the western portions of Jerusalem.\nThe three-pronged attack of the Arabs in the vicinity of Tel Aviv had stalled, at\nleast temporarily, by 11 June. The Egyptian column, about one brigade in strength,\nhad moved north along the Palestinian coast, and was in control of the coastal area\nfrom the Egyptian border to the general vicinity of Isdud, with some units deployed\nalong the road leading east from El Majdal. Strong Jewish counterattacks had de-\nveloped near Isdud before 11 June. Iraqi troops were in possession of Ras el Ain, a\npumping station for Jerusalem's water supply, located 10 miles northeast of Tel Aviv.\nArab Legion units controlled Lydda and Ramle, ten to fifteen miles southeast of Tel\nAviv. The truce apparently interrupted Jewish operations designed to seize those two\npoints.\nIn the Jerusalem area, Arab Legion units continued to control the Jerusalem-Tel\nAviv road at Latrun by covering it with artillery fire, although the Arabs did not\nphysically occupy the road at any point. The Jews, however, had opened an emergency\nby-pass route on the Jerusalem highway. In the city of Jerusalem, Arab Legion units\noccupied the Old City and the northern and northeastern suburbs. Other Arab Legion\ntroops supported by Arab irregulars were attempting to force their way into Jerusalem\nthrough Jewish-held positions south of the city. A second Egyptian column, which\nhad moved north from Beersheba, was last reported to be located between Bethlehem\nand Jerusalem.\n2. STRENGTH OF FORCES INVOLVED.\nAs of 11 June, it is estimated that the Jewish military and quasi-military forces\ntotaled approximately 90,000 men and women. Hagana, which has become the official\nIsraeli Army, consists of a striking force of about 18,000 organized into approximately\n8\nsix brigades; local mobile defense units, totaling about 17,000; and nearly 50,000 militia\nused for the static defense of both urban and rural areas. While present estimates\nput the strength of Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang at 7,000 and 400, respectively,\nthere is reason to believe that both organizations may be considerably larger.\nAt the beginning of the truce period, Arab regular and irregular forces operating\nwithin or near the border of Palestine totaled approximately 50,000; of these, 25,000\nregulars and an undetermined number of irregulars were actually within Palestine.\nThe above totals are broken down by countries in the accompanying table.\nARAB LEAGUE MILITARY FORCES\nPERSONNEL STRENGTHS\nTotal In\nNear\nOr Near\nCountry\nTotal Army\nIn Palestine\nPalestine\nPalestine\nEgypt\n61,500\n5,000\n8,000\n13,000\nIraq\n40,000\n6,000\n6,000\nLebanon\n3,900\n2,000\n2,000\nSaudi Arabia\n8,000\n3,000\n3,000\nSyria\n9,600\n1,000\n2,400\n3,400\nTransjordan\n10,000\n10,000\n10,000\nYemen\nIrregulars\n(Origin undetermined)\n?\n?\n13,000\nTOTALS\n133,000\n25,000*\n12,400*\n50,400\nPlus at least some of the Arab irregulars, originally estimated at 13,000, on whose present\nlocation exact information is lacking.\n9\nAPPENDIX B\nISRAELI ARMS SUPPLY\n1. GENERAL.\nPresent stocks of small arms (including rifles, submachine guns, and pistols) are\nconsidered adequate for arming all combatant members of the Israeli forces with per-\nsonal weapons. It is also believed that present stocks of small-arms ammunition are\nlarge and that the Jews can produce more. The Israeli forces are generally deficient\nin heavier equipment but have an ample supply of mortars, most of which, along with\nmortar ammunition, are locally made. Although there were no indications of any\nappreciable quantity of artillery in the possession of Israel, the Zionists now claim to be\nwell equipped in this line. The Zionists are supplementing their small stock of armored\ncars and captured tanks with scout cars and armored personnel carriers converted\nfrom trucks. Israeli forces are equipped with grenades and appear to be well supplied\nwith various types of explosives.\nIt is estimated that present stocks of arms and ammunition in Israel would not\nsuffice for more than a comparatively short period of heavy fighting.\nIn 1938, a plan for establishing an armament industry in Palestine, submitted to\nthe British High Commissioner, was flatly rejected, and an order forbidding munitions\nproduction was issued. Nonetheless, there is evidence that even before the proclama-\ntion of the independent state of Israel a considerable capacity for the illegal manu-\nfacture of weapons and ammunition had been developed within the present boundaries\nof the new Jewish state. Matériel so manufactured has been uncovered by numerous\nBritish police and military raids on various installations. Following the UN partition\nrecommendation. when it became clear that a major conflict would develop between\nJew and Arab, Jewish leaders prepared for the complete conversion of Palestine's small\nbut efficient industry, which had been built up earlier by Jewish colonists, to military\nneeds.\nThe matériel now produced by Jewish industry includes small arms and small-arms\nammunition, mortars, and various explosive devices. While the shortage of raw mate-\nrials restricts the munitions industry, it is believed that current production is adequate\nto keep present stocks of arms in condition and to supply replacements and ammunition\nfor guerrilla warfare.\nZionist agents have for many months been actively engaged throughout Europe\nand the US formulating plans to assure a steady and adequate flow of arms to the Jews\nin Palestine. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are probably the chief European sources\nfor such arms. Because under the Mandate the importation of arms into Palestine was\nillegal, the matériel acquired was stockpiled both in these countries and in Bulgaria,\nAlbania, and Italy for subsequent shipment to Palestine. The stocks are believed to\nconsist of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition; they are for the most part\nof Czech manufacture, the only notable exception being quantities of Mauser rifles from\n10\nYugoslavia. Aircraft and other heavy matériel have been acquired in the US; much of\nthis equipment is shipped to Palestine via Latin American countries.\n2. PRESENT STOCKS.\na. Light Infantry Weapons and Ammunition.\nIsraeli stocks of rifles, submachine guns, and pistols are of various origins,\nmostly British, and are adequate to arm all members of Irgun Zvai Leumi, the Stern\nGang, the Israeli Police, and all combatant members (approximately 35,000) of\nHagana with personal weapons. It is alleged that in northeast Palestine 90 percent\nof the Jewish men are armed. According to one source, 25 settlements in the Tiberias-\nSafad region with a total population of 8,415 Jews had a total of 2,699 rifles and 372\nautomatic weapons. The high percentage of arms per capita in this particular region\nmay be accounted for by the fact that the Zionists consider it a critical area. On the\ncoast and in the cities which have greater protection in depth, the percentage is\nprobably much lower. The ratio of pistols and submachine guns to rifles is greater\nin the larger towns and cities than in the settlements. The main weapons in this\ncategory are the British caliber .38, Number 2 revolver, and the US-made Smith &\nWesson caliber .38 revolvers in use by the British Army. Other small arms possessed\nby the Zionists are British Bren machine guns, Sten and Thompson submachine guns,\nBrowning machine guns, British and German-type rifles, Vickers and Spandau light\nmachine guns, and medium and heavy machine guns, Boys antitank rifles, PIATS,\nand bayonets and commando knives. Some Sten guns of superior quality, possibly\nthe major portion possessed by the Zionists, are manufactured in Tel Aviv or Galilee.\nPresent stocks of ammunition for small arms are believed to be large, and\nthe Israeli are reported able to produce more. Although before the present truce\nsome of the stocks of ammunition were expended in operations, the Zionists allegedly\nbought large quantities of British stores including 250 tons of ammunition. They\nalso are reported to have salvaged unknown quantities of ammunition and weapons\njettisoned by the British at the time of the British withdrawal. Ammunition for the\nrelatively small number of heavy machine guns is in short supply.\nb. Mortars.\nThe Israeli have an ample supply of mortars, most of which are locally made.\nIt is alleged that in January there were 157 mortars of unnamed caliber in 25 settlements\nin the Safad-Tiberias area. British 2-inch and 3-inch mortars stolen from the British\nArmy have been used by Israeli forces, but the number thus acquired by the Zionists\nis not known. The Israeli are also manufacturing mortars of these calibers, and\ntheir use of such weapons has generally been increasing. In one Jewish settlement\ncache, 94 of these locally manufactured mortars were discovered by the British in\nJune 1946. Palmach, the full-time combat unit of Hagana, is reported to have 6-inch\nmortars and to have fired at least six such projectiles during the Haifa engagement.\nMortar ammunition is produced in Israel.\n11\nc. Artillery.\nAlthough the exact number of field artillery pieces possessed by Israel is not\nknown, the Jews claim now to be well equipped. Twenty-five-pounder field guns\n(at least 4) and six-pounders (15-20) have been reported in the possession of Hagana,\nas well as some 3.7-inch pack howitzers. There is nothing to indicate, however, that\nthe Israeli forces are in possession of any self-propelled artillery. It has been reported\nthat 40 antiaircraft guns were installed for the defense of Tel Aviv following the first\nair raids.\nd. Armored Vehicles.\nAlthough the Zionists apparently had no tanks or other tracked offensive ve-\nhicles at first, they reportedly seized two Sherman tanks from the Arab Legion in\nthe middle of May and two Cromwell tanks from the British at the end of June. During\nWorld War II the British are believed to have supplied the Zionists with a small\nnumber of armored cars so that they might protect their road convoys against Arab\nattack. The Zionists have supplemented this matériel with a number of trucks to which\nprotective boiler plate has been fitted. A large number of trucks have thus been\nconverted into improvised types of scout cars and armored personnel carriers.\ne. Miscellaneous.\nThe Israeli forces are equipped with standard British hand and rifle grenades\nstolen from the British Army and with some improvised grenades. Some of their\nhand and rifle grenades appear to have been made in the US in 1938, but they are\nnot US service types. Israeli forces are also reported to have used a new 30-pound\nrocket shell. They appear to be well supplied with various types of explosives, as\nmine warfare has been conducted on a relatively large scale, both with road mines and\nwith demolition charges. The Zionists claim to have both antitank and antipersonnel\nmines. Most of the mines are improvised from explosives stolen from the British.\nStandard British mines are also used.\n3. PRODUCTION CAPACITY.\na. Jewish Industry before and during World War II.\nJewish colonists before the war had developed a small but efficient and well\ndiversified manufacturing industry with a total of 1,556 factories and workshops. This\nincluded about 178 metal-working shops which employed about 2,000 workers and\npossessed some 300 lathes, 130 power presses, 55 milling machines, and 80 shapers and\nplaners. The abundance of experienced workers, many of whom were driven out of\nEurope by Axis persecution, provided the country with a foundation for development\nof an industry based on skills and craftsmanship. Of particular importance among\nmetal manufactures were such specialized products as precision optical apparatus, sur-\ngical and medical equipment, tools and dies, and electrical instruments.\nThe establishment and development of the Near East as a strategic center\nand the demand for war supplies by the Allied armies in that area led to a considerable\n12\nexpansion of the productive capacity of the Palestinian industry. By 1942, Jewish\nindustry included some 2,120 industrial establishments employing 45,000 workers.\nThe metal-working industry in particular was expanded to meet war needs, with 191\nmetal works employing 5,716 workers and 208 machinery works employing 4,058.\nChemical production was also developed as an important branch of Palestinian in-\ndustry, with 180 plants employing some 4,795 workers. The British operated a land-\nmine filling factory during the war at Wadi Sarar, using mine casings and components\nfurnished by metal works in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and elsewhere. Peak production of the\nplant was 5,000 mines daily. Explosive charges for the mines were not manufactured\nin Palestine, however, but were imported from Great Britain.\nb. Jewish Munitions Industry after World War II.\nOne of the principal sources of information as to the postwar development\nof an illegal Jewish munitions industry has been raids conducted by British police\nand military on installations suspected of furnishing demolition materials to Jewish\nextremist forces. Even prior to VE-Day, Jewish efforts turned from the accumulation\nof considerable stocks of hidden weapons, acquired by smuggling, illegal purchases,\nand thefts from military personnel, to the domestic manufacture of spare parts and\nammunition for weapons and even to fabrication of complete weapons. Among the\nlatter were crude rocket projectiles which were fired from mortars in an attack on a\nBritish police barracks in May 1945. The projectiles were about 3 feet long, and\ncontained a fuel tank, jet, and explosive charge of gelignite, and showed evidences of\nworkmanship of persons familiar with the manufacture of rocket weapons. About 50\nwere found, used and unused, and it is estimated that some 200 may have been manu-\nfactured. A Tel Aviv workshop raided shortly thereafter contained evidence of the\nmanufacture of such projectiles and mortar parts. Other workshops for manufacture\nof crude bombs and electrical detonators were also found.\nA major haul was made in a raid in July 1946 on the Jewish settlement of\nMeshek Yagur, a few miles east of Haifa, where a small underground arsenal yielded\nthousands of grenades, mortar shells, and, among other weapons, 94 2-inch mortars\nof undetermined origin.\nFurther raids by British military and police in August 1946 revealed large caches\nof arms and explosives, including thousands of homemade mines and bombs, in Tel\nAviv churches, schools, and houses, establishing almost to the point of certainty that\nTel Aviv is the main supply base of the Jewish forces in Palestine.\nEvidence of Jewish ingenuity in fabrication of munitions was displayed fre-\nquently in terrorist raids throughout 1947. Crude but effective flame-throwers were\nused by Irgun in raids on police barracks. New and powerful types of road mines\nwere developed by the extremists for attacks on British truck convoys. Homemade\nmortars, constructed of pipe, were used more frequently.\nBritish military patrols discovered a complete arms-manufacturing and spare-\nparts workshop in June 1947 occupying 3 floors of a building opposite British Head-\nquarters in Tel Aviv. The shop was fitted with lathes and other power tools, and\nstocks of homemade rifles and spare parts for rifles and automatic weapons were\n13\nfound in the basement. A raid on one of the larger Tel Aviv metal works in July\nbrought to light Sten gun components and blueprints for Sten guns, and one worker\nwas caught at his lathe making a cap for Sten barrel extensions. It was considered\nprobable that this plant was merely one link in a chain of Sten gun parts manufac-\nturers of which the previously raided shop was also a link.\nc. Jewish Munitions Industry after the UN Partition Recommendation.\nUnder the provisions for the partition of Palestine, the major parts and most\nof the industry of Palestine were centered in the Jewish state of Israel. It is estimated\nthat five-sixths of the industrial workers in Palestine work for Jewish enterprises which\nare concentrated in the cities of Haifa and Tel Aviv. Palestine's main industries—\ndiamond-polishing, textiles, chemicals, food-packing, metal works, and electrical goods—\nare all in the Jewish state. As the scale of Jewish-Arab conflict within Palestine in-\ncreased and as Arab League forces made threatening moves toward Palestine's borders,\npreparations were made by Jewish leaders for the maximum conversion of this small\nbut efficient industry to military needs in the emergency. Among the preparations\ntaken as open warfare became more imminent was the armoring of commercial trucks\nand buses with armor plate or (in its absence) with ordinary steel plate.\nAll available information points to a considerable increase in production in\nearly 1948. Illegal arms factories, located in Tel Aviv and Galilee, were manufactur-\ning complete Sten guns in considerable numbers. Cost of the finished weapons to the\nJewish forces is reported to be about $3 apiece. Mortars of 2 and 3-inch caliber are\nalso being manufactured and used in increasing numbers. (Approximately 3,000\n2 and 3-inch mortars of varied origin are estimated to be in the hands of Hagana\nforces.) Mortar ammunition for both types is also being made. British officers have\nstated that the Sten guns and 3-inch mortars made by the Jews are in many cases\nsuperior to those made in England. The Jews are also reported to have facilities\nfor the manufacture of considerable quantities of small-arms ammunition in various\narms factories. Among the items produced in other factories are explosive devices\nsuch as mines, grenades, and demolition charges, smoke, pyrotechnics, detonators, and\nfuses, bayonets and knives, barbed wire, concrete emplacements, sandbags, first aid\nsupplies, and other defense products.\n4. RAW MATERIAL SITUATION.\nPalestine suffers from an almost complete lack of mineral resources, especially\niron ore and nonferrous metals. The important potash and bromine deposits in the\nDead Sea and various sulphur and gypsum deposits are the only exploitable mineral\nwealth. Coal and petroleum are completely lacking. In addition, the country is\ndeficient in raw material for its food-processing and textile industries. Raw material\nfor the iron and nonferrous metal foundries is scrap metal, of which plentiful supplies\nhave been brought from the North African battlefields. As a result of short supplies\nof most raw materials, the Jewish colonists before the war concentrated on the develop-\nment of industries in which the finished product depends for its value upon the tech-\nnical skill of management and workers, while raw materials play a relatively minor part.\n14\nThe estimated annual requirements of Palestine's industry in 1940 for raw ma-\nterials, if its total productive capacity were devoted to the war effort, were as follows:\nIron and steel\n30,000 tons\nNonferrous metals\n2,000 tons\nChemicals\n6,000 tons\nWood and cork\n20,000 tons\nFats and oils\n5,000 tons\nHides and leather\n1,000 tons\nPaper products\n9,000 tons\nCoal\n30,000 tons\nCoke\n5,000 tons\nPetroleum\n65,000 tons\nTextile raw materials\n2,500 tons\nFoodstuff raw materials\n47,000 tons\nMiscellaneous materials\n25,500 tons\nTOTAL\n248,000 tons\n5. POSSIBLE OUTSIDE SOURCES OF SUPPLY. (Countries from which Israel is receiving\nmatériel.)\na. The USSR and its Satellites.\nNo reliable evidence exists of purchases of arms from the USSR, although it\nis known that Jewish Agency representatives in Prague have negotiated with the Soviet\nPurchasing Commission there. The Governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,\nas well as those of Bulgaria and Albania, have cooperated in the transfer of arms to\nthe Jewish forces by providing facilities, applying security measures, and maintaining\nthe utmost secrecy concerning movements of arms. In Czechoslovakia, the transfer\nof arms is apparently being effected by Hagana and Intra-Spet, a Czech Government\nexport-import agency. While some shipments have been made from Czechoslovakia\nby air (from Zatec and Ruzyne airfields, near Prague), most shipments appear to\nhave been made by sea from ports located mainly in Italy, Bulgaria, and Albania.\nBulgaria and Albania have no resources for making actual contributions of arms of\nany significance. There are indications of some purchases of arms from Poland, as a\nresult of negotiations between representatives of Hagana and the Polish Central Jewish\nCommittee. Shipments thus made entered Palestine under the guise of pipe and\nplumbing supplies.\nb. Western Europe.\nApparently the only Western European country in which the Jews have met\nwith success in their efforts to purchase matériel is Belgium. Sale was made by the\nOffice of Mutual Aid to the National Hebrew Government, and the matériel consisted\nof tenting and individual equipment of US manufacture rather than weapons. Al-\nthough Italy, because of Zionist pressure, has taken no effective action against the\n15\ntransshipment of arms, there is no evidence that Italy has actually supplied any arms\nto the Jews. Italy has adopted an attitude of \"benevolent neutrality.\" It is believed\nthat no arms have been shipped from any of the Scandinavian countries. Swedish\nmunition manufacturers would probably be willing to sell arms to both Jews and\nArabs; no direct purchases can be made at this time, however, inasmuch as the\nSwedish Government will not grant export licenses for shipment to Israel or the\nArab states.\nc. The UK.\nThe Jews have acquired large amounts of arms and military matériel from\nBritish Army stocks in Palestine. These acquisitions were accomplished not with the\ncooperation of the British Government, which has been reluctant to sell arms to the\nJews, but through purchases from individual members of the British Army, and by\nbribery, theft, re-purchase from Arabs, and through open raids on British supply in-\nstallations. The British Army supplies now in the hands of the Israeli forces include\nrifles, pistols, Bren guns, Sten guns, explosives, grenades, 2.7 and 3-inch mortars, and\na very few 3.7-inch howitzers.\nd. The US and Latin America.\nThe bulk of Jewish acquisitions from the US has consisted of machinery and\nmotor vehicle and air transport, much of which was purchased on the open market\nin the US for allegedly peaceful purposes. Both corporations and private individuals\nare engaged in this illicit traffic. One man is reported to be engaged in the manufac-\nture of small arms for Hagana in the Dominican Republic. The shipment of much of\nthe matériel acquired in the US has been via Latin American countries.\nAn American organization, Service Airways, with headquarters in New York\nand Burbank, California, is exporting surplus US aircraft to Palestine. Its Panamanian\nsubsidiary, Lineas Aeras de Panama, SA (generally referred to as LAPSA) operates a\nfleet of Constellations and C-46's out of Panama ostensibly to Rome. These aircraft\nare reported to be carrying small planes, aircraft parts, and arms to the Jewish forces\nin Palestine. Several C-46's bearing the Panamanian flag have recently been observed\nat the Zatec airport, a center for clandestine arms operations near Prague.\n16\nAPPENDIX C\nARAB ARMS SUPPLY\n1. GENERAL.\nThe armies of the Arab states (particularly the British-trained units of Trans-\njordan, Egypt, and Iraq) are organized along conventional lines, although they are\nmuch weaker than Western armies in supporting weapons, motor transport, and logis-\ntical organization. (At present, for example, they possess an aggregate strength of\nabout 150 pieces of light artillery (75-105 mm.), less than 50 light tanks, and perhaps\n300 armored cars.)\nThe Arab armies do not possess sufficient stockpiles of arms, ammunition, trans-\nport, and other essential war matériel to bring a campaign against Israel to a success-\nful conclusion; on the basis of present stocks, the Arab states would be in a difficult\nsupply position and could not launch extended offensive operations. The arms de-\nliveries made to the Arabs by the UK prior to the truce probably served mainly to\nequip existing units or to replace obsolete equipment, and consequently would not be\navailable for expansion of the armies in the field or for the replacements which, it\nis expected, would begin to be required soon after resumption of the fighting. At\npresent deficiencies in ammunition reserves are particularly acute, although other\nsupply difficulties are expected to arise.\nThe armament producing facilities and raw materials in the Arab states are\ntoo limited to affect materially the present supply situation. Under the circumstances,\nthe Arabs undoubtedly hope for assistance from the UK, although limited additional\nmatériel might be obtained from private sources in Czechoslovakia and other countries.\n2. PRESENT STOCKS.\na. Egypt.\nThe Egyptian Army's small arms, predominantly British, consist of Lee-Enfield\n.303 rifles of World War I and II vintage, Sten and Thompson submachine guns, and\nat least 500 Bren light machine guns, as well as Lewis light machine guns and Vickers\nand Hotchkiss heavy machine guns. It also has British hand and rifle grenades.\nThe Egyptian Army employs the 2-inch, 3-inch, and 4.2-inch mortar, but stocks\nare not known. It was to have received from the UK 192 4.2-inch mortars, 273 3-inch\nmortars, and an unknown number of 2-inch mortars. At least 100 20-mm. PIAT\nantitank weapons are known to have been delivered by the UK out of an allotment\nof more than 1,400.\nEarly in 1948 the Egyptian Army possessed approximately 40 light artillery\npieces (75-105 mm.). It also had at the outset of the Palestine fighting about 40\narmored cars, some of which have since been immobilized, and about 25 light tanks.\nEgypt is short in motor transport, especially for battlefield use.\n17\nb. Transjordan.\nThe Transjordan Arab Legion is probably the best equipped of the Arab forces.\nIts British infantry equipment includes 10,795 rifles and carbines and 463 Bren light\nmachine guns. It has 30 2-inch mortars, 12 3-inch mortars, 8 4.2-inch mortars, and\nabout 50 antitank guns.\nTransjordan forces possess 16 25-pounder light artillery pieces and had, in May\n1948, 114 armored cars. A British delivery of 800,000 pounds sterling worth of trucks,\ntractors, armored cars, and miscellaneous equipment was held up on 12 June because\nof the truce. The Arab Legion has adequate motor transport but would face main-\ntenance and replacement problems during extended operations.\nTransjordan's chief difficulty is with ammunition reserves; shortages of artil-\nlery and 3-inch mortar ammunition were developing at the time of the truce, and it is\nlikely that additional shortages of arms and ammunition would develop within a\nmonth of hostilities if outside resupply was not made available.\nc. Iraq.\nThe small arms of the Iraqi Army are practically all of British origin, although\nsome 15,000 rifles and other French equipment obtained during 1941 are also avail-\nable. The basic infantry weapon is the Lee-Enfield .303 rifle. Iraq is amply supplied\nwith infantry weapons. A 4-million-pound sterling order for British arms, largely\nfilled by the April 1948 deadline, included 1,400 Sten submachine guns, 250 Bren light\nmachine guns, and an unspecified number of rifles. Iraq is also believed to possess\nat least 79 Lewis or Bren light machine guns, 30 Vickers heavy machine guns, 193\nHotchkiss heavy machine guns, and 60 Italian machine guns.\nIncluded in the British shipment due in April 1948 were 60 2-inch mortars,\n48 3-inch mortars, and 30 4.2-inch mortars, as well as 360 20-mm. PIAT antitank\nweapons.\nIraq has 16 25-pounder artillery pieces, 24 3.7-inch pack howitzers, and some\nadditional light artillery and light AA weapons. About 100 armored vehicles and some\n900 3/4-tons and 3-ton trucks were to have been furnished by the British during 1947-48.\nIraq previously had virtually no armored vehicles. Iraq's motor transport is still in-\nadequate, although the government has requisitioned all trucks being privately im-\nported through Basra as well as other civilian trucks.\nd. Syria.\nThe bulk of the Syrian infantry forces are equipped with French 1886/93 rifles\npurchased before World War II, although some 1,300 Lee-Enfield rifles and about 1,000\nMauser rifles purchased from Czechoslovakia are on hand. Syria has received about\n300 Thompson submachine guns and about 1,000 submachine guns of Czech origin as\nwell as US .45 caliber pistols. The Syrian Army also has French 7.5-mm. light ma-\nchine guns (Chatellerault Model 24 (24-29) and Hotchkiss 8-mm. heavy machine guns\n(1914 model). The amount and types of mortars available are not known.\nSyria is believed to have 12 light artillery pieces, probably obsolescent French\nmodels. Eleven or 12 light tanks (nine of which were disabled before the truce) and\n18\n24 armored cars have been observed. The gendarmerie has 27 British-supplied Chevro-\nlet armored cars. Syria has ample motor transport.\nAmmunition is a critical item of supply. It is reportedly adequate for only\na month of aggressive action.\ne. Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.\nLebanon's small army possesses old French equipment in unknown quantity,\nand has acquired a little equipment under a contract with the French firm of Brandt.\nAmmunition is extremely short, reportedly being sufficient for only a few days of fight-\ning.\nSaudi Arabia has a diversified and mainly obsolete stock of Italian, British,\nGerman, and US lend-lease weapons, including M-1903 rifles, 45 37-mm. guns, 126 60-\nmm. mortars, machine guns, and automatic rifles. Saudi Arabia has 656 US lend-\nlease trucks (about half of them jeeps) and 422 British trucks. Adequate fuel is avail-\nable but motor maintenance is a major problem.\nYemen's small, heterogeneous arms stocks add nothing to the Arab war effort.\n3. PRODUCTION CAPACITY.\na. General.\nThe Arab states in general lack even the limited industrial base which lends\nstrength to the forces of Israel. This can hardly be attributed to lack of raw ma-\nterials, since all are similarly deficient in this respect. The lack of efficient manage-\nment and skilled technicians in the Arab states is an important factor bearing on\ntheir lack of industrial capacity. Perhaps a more important factor is their position\nas small countries which have been up until recently, or still are, dominated by major\npowers whose policy was to supply them with their requirements for weapons and\nammunition rather than to see their own small industries built up. The result is that\nthe Arab states are even more dependent than Israel upon foreign sources for their\nweapons and equipment.\nb. Syria and Lebanon.\nAs far as is known, there is no production of finished munitions in these coun-\ntries, other than limited production of homemade bombs and small arms ammunition in\nclandestine arms factories. The French Army formerly maintained a munitions depot\nin Hamana, Lebanon, a small village about 25 kilometers east of Beirut, but this was\nmainly a storage depot for munitions imported from abroad, mostly from France.\nSmall-arms cartridges may have been filled at this depot, but primary manufacture\nwas not undertaken.\nHomemade bombs of unknown origin have occasionally been used in past dis-\norders. A clandestine small-arms ammunition factory is reported in operation at\nGharifeh, an isolated Druze village in the Baakline district of Lebanon. Established\nin 1945, the plant has a daily capacity of about 8,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition\nand 16,000 percussion caps. Imported tin, brass, lead, powder, and other supplies are\n19\nfurnished by Darwiche Tabbara and Sons, pyrotechnics and fireworks manufacturers\nin Beirut.\nBoth Syria and Lebanon are encouraging the development of private munitions\nindustries. The Beirut firm of Muhammad Farhat and Abd-al-Razzak Habib, a dock-\nyard and general repairs shop, recently received a license from the Lebanese Govern-\nment for the manufacture of munitions. Initial production was to consist of mines\nand grenades. Machines for manufacture of percussion caps and detonators for these\nwere reportedly still on order in January 1948. The firm is also reported to be trying\nto purchase equipment to produce more complicated weapons, including rifles and\n60-mm. mortars. Syrian military leaders reportedly were negotiating in May 1948\nwith the owner of the Italian Zorzoli firm, manufacturers of an efficient machine pistol\n(model TZ-45), to move his plant and workers from Turin to a new location near\nDamascus.\nc. Iraq.\nLittle information is available regarding the productive capacity of Iraq of\narms and ammunition. The Iraqi Army is known to maintain, probably in the Baghdad\narea, a rifle factory which is capable of producing British-designed caliber .303 rifles\nof the short Enfield type. A small arms ammunition factory is also available for\nproduction of various types of small-arms ammunition, mainly the .303 caliber round\nfor the Enfield rifle. Production of these plants was stopped during the war owing\nto shortages of raw materials, and it is not believed to have started again owing to\nlack of demand. (The Iraqi Army can supply itself more cheaply from British surplus\nstocks than it can from its own factories, since all raw materials for munitions manu-\nfacture must be imported.) An artillery shell case factory was also purchased from\nthe UK but has never been placed in production. A recent report indicates that Iraq\nis interested in selling this plant to Egypt. It is authoritatively reported that the Iraqi\nGeneral Staff does not intend to establish any more munitions plants.\nd. Egypt.\nIn the 19th century, Egypt was self-sufficient in the production of small-arms\nand ammunition. However, the development of a modern army made the native\nmunitions industry completely inadequate, with the result that the industry was allowed\nto languish in favor of almost complete dependence on imported weapons and am-\nmunition. Production is for all practical purposes nonexistent at present.\nEgypt is anxious to build a munitions industry, and has entertained representa-\ntives of US and Czech firms interested in establishing plants for the Egyptian Govern-\nment. However, such munitions plants would be dependent on imports for raw and\nsemi-finished material requirements.\ne. Palestine.\nThe Arab section of Palestine contains a few textile factories, a soap factory, a\nmatch factory, some plants for processing olive oil, and a few metal and chemical\nworks. However, five-sixths of Palestine industry was included in the new Jewish state.\n20\nArab industry, which in 1940 included 192 small metal works employing 804 persons\nand 20 chemical works employing 407 workers, has also been curtailed by the loss of\nJaffa, in which several metal shops were engaging in the armor plating of trucks and\nsome mortars were made.\nf. Transjordan and Saudi Arabia.\nThere is no evidence of any manufacture of weapons or ammunition in Trans-\njordan or Saudi Arabia.\ng. Yemen.\nThe Yemen Army possesses a few field pieces which are obsolete. A certain\namount of rifle ammunition is made in Sana'a in a machine shop operated by a Russian\nJew with a few native assistants. It is a small and primitive establishment, with an\nestimated capacity of 1,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, provided raw ma-\nterials ar available. Although black powder is produced in some quantity, brass is\nextremely scarce and cartridges are necessarily very expensive.\n4. RAW MATERIAL SITUATION.\nAll the Arab states lack significant quantities of iron, steel, coal, nonferrous metals,\nand chemical requirements of a munitions industry. There is no prospect in the near\nfuture that any of the Arab states can overcome these basic hindrances to establishment\nof a self-sustained munitions industry.\n5. POSSIBLE OUTSIDE SOURCES OF SUPPLY.\nAlthough the matériel now possessed by the Arab states is of mixed foreign manu-\nfacture, the bulk of the serviceable and efficient military equipment available to them\nis of British origin, and the only logical standardization would be along British lines.\nIt is further difficult to foresee any source but the UK which would provide anything\nlike an adequate supply of arms to the Arabs. UK delivery of equipment to the Arab\nstates was halted on 9 June, two days before the truce became effective, but the treaties\nremain in effect. The Arabs will undoubtedly look first to the UK in attempting to\nobtain additional matériel.\nThe Arabs have also been approaching other sources of supply, however, including\nthose in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovakian\nand Belgian arms representatives have recently conducted arms demonstrations in\nCairo. Syria and Lebanon, which feel less need to standardize on British lines, have\nbeen particularly active in seeking supplies from other sources. Syria has still to\nreceive delivery on the bulk of a Skoda (Czechoslovakia) order for some 10,000 rifles,\n1,000 submachine guns, 500 machine guns, and 13,000,000 rounds of ammunition due\nin January 1948. Lebanon has outstanding orders for machine guns, 20-mm. guns,\nlight mortars, antitank guns, and ammunition with the Parisian firm of Edgar Brandt,\nbut this source is unable to supply amounts adequate for more than day-to-day peace-\ntime needs. In general, Arab lack of dollar credits will restrict purchases outside the\n21\nUK, although the USSR and its satellites might provide some matériel under special\ncircumstances. labimado 08 has\nAnother source of arms still capable of exploitation is the reservoir of British, Ger-\nman, and US equipment abandoned during the North African campaign. This equip-\nment, consisting mainly of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition, has come\nlargely into the hands of private individuals and small concerns and was a principal\nsource of the arms acquired by Arab irregulars. The traffic has been particularly active\nin Egypt, but there are no indications that the Egyptian Government has officially\nsanctioned it or has acquired such matériel itself.\nAcquisition of arms from the US for Arab use in Palestine is not likely, although a\nconsiderable number of vehicles, not subject to the current embargo, have been ac-\nquired recently from the US.\n000,1 to betamites\nWAR\n10 of\nW Date to 910J581\nbloow bas to MI\n20 03 zi n\ninsurance to XV of BATTH to staupoba DA will\nsubtotal not tud e no bottart asw\nof ril 2117 of rti\nmisido\n10\nall\nat bas\nno\n8 In no\nnot/fitimate to shauos 000,000.81 brtn entriosent\narug srung entriosm not enabro and 8401 Visunat at\n22\nAPPENDIX D\nAIRCRAFT AND AIR DEFENSE SUPPLY\n1. GENERAL.\nAt present the Arab states are markedly superior to Israel in the number of military\naircraft of all types available. However, on the basis of present stocks of planes and\nreplacement parts, it is estimated that future deterioration of Arab air strength would\nbe rapid, while Israel would be able to continue to provide effective air opposition. A\nshortage of trained Arab pilots is another critical factor; even if an arms embargo were\nnominally in effect against Israel alone, the Jews might be able to outstrip the Arabs\nin operational effectiveness. Neither side has local sources of aircraft. The Jews have\nbeen obtaining aircraft from Czechoslovakia and (through clandestine sources) from\nthe US. The Arabs were not receiving aircraft at the time of the truce on 11 June\nbut presumably might obtain additional matériel from the UK under the appropriate\ncircumstances.\nThe Arab states are superior to Israel in antiaircraft weapons, having guns of light\nthrough heavy calibers as against a limited number of light weapons installed by the\nJews at Tel Aviv. However, neither side has enough equipment for adequate defense\nagainst sustained attack. Ammunition stocks are limited. Israel has been buying AA\nequipment from Czechslovakia and has approached Oerlikon. The Arabs have ob-\ntained AA equipment from the UK and have approached Czechoslovakia and Oerlikon.\nThe Arabs have only a few radar sets, while Israel is not known to possess any. Al-\nthough a number of sources of radar equipment are available to both sides, neither\nthe Jews nor the Arabs are believed capable of making efficient use of radar.\n2. ISRAEL.\nIt is estimated that Israel has the following operational aircraft, in addition to an\nunknown number of C-46's and/or C-47's and possibly two or three B-17's:\n8-10 Messerschmitt 109's (2-seated C-110 Version)\n2 DH Rapides\n4-6 Ansons\n6-10 Austers\n21 Miscellaneous light types\nUp to the time of the truce Israel was receiving aircraft from Czech firms and through\nclandestine sources in the US. It is estimated that at least 50 ME-109's would be avail-\nable to Israel from Czechoslovakia and an unknown number of fighters, light bombers,\nand transports from clandestine US sources.\nForty light AA guns, are reported in position around Tel Aviv. The Jews have\nobtained AA equipment from Czechoslovakia and have negotiated with Oerlikon in\n23\nSwitzerland for 20-mm. guns. Additional weapons might be available from the Soviet\nbloc.\nRadar equipment, not known to be in the possession of Israel at present, might be\nobtained from British, US, and German World War II stocks now in private hands and\nfrom electronics firms in the Netherlands, Sweden, and other countries.\n3. THE ARAB STATES.\nIt is estimated that the Arab states have the following aircraft:\nEgypt\n48-51 Spitfire V's and IX's\n6 C-47's\n6 C-47A's\n1 C-57A\n1 PBY-5\n16 AT-6's\n9 BT-13's\nIn addition, Egypt maintains, at approximately 60 percent operational efficiency, 69\nobsolete aircraft, as follows: 4 Boulton Paul Defiants, 13 Ansons, 2 Percival Q-6's, 29\nMagisters, 5 Avros, 1 Hirth, 4 Gladiators, 4 Lysanders, 3 Oxfords, 4 Hurricanes. Egypt\nalso has 103 C-46's donated by the US for mechanical instruction only and not to be\nflown; of these, 10 are believed to have been put into operation.\nIraq\n31 Ansons\n15 Gladiators (condition very poor)\n11 Sea Furies\n15 Miscellaneous light training and liaison types\nSyria\n20 AT-6's\n25 Miscellaneous light training and liaison types\nLebanon and Transjordan nil\nNo aircraft were being received by the Arabs at the time of the truce 11 June.\nArab antiaircraft artillery ranging in caliber from 20 mm. up to 3.7 inch is concen-\ntrated at Alexandria, Cairo, and Baghdad. Ammunition stocks are low. Fire control\nradar is not used with the heavy AA guns. The Arabs have been receiving AA weapons\nfrom the UK and were expecting 48 40-mm. Bofors guns at the time of the truce. Ad-\nditional weapons might be available from Czechoslovakia, with which the Arabs con-\ntracted for the purchase of arms prior to the Communist coup, and from the Oerlikon\nfirm, which had been approached prior to the truce.\nEgypt apparently possesses a few British radar sets (including early warning as well\nas lighter equipment) but is not believed to have spare parts and qualified maintenance\npersonnel. Except for some indications that a radar station (possibly supplied by\nEgypt) has been installed along the Jerusalem-Latrun road, there is no other evidence\nthat the Arabs possess radar. The Arab states might be able to obtain radar equipment\nfrom the UK, as well as from the private sources also available to Israel.\n24\nAPPENDIX E\nNAVAL STRENGTH AND SUPPLY\nEgypt is the only nation under consideration which possesses more than token\nnaval forces. Israel reportedly has several corvettes and might be able to employ light\ndefensive armament on merchant vessels chartered by its representatives for bringing\nin immigrants and supplies; conceivably it might also be able to obtain naval assistance\nfrom the Soviet bloc.\nThe Royal Egyptian Navy consists entirely of sloops or small, slow, escort vessels.\nIt has sufficient (although inadequately trained and experienced) personnel to man\nthese vessels and is believed to be able to provide logistical support for the force in the\nSoutheastern Mediterranean. Replacement parts and ammunition are limited. Ad-\nditional equipment might be available from the UK, which has supplied most of Egypt's\nequipment with the exception of some recently acquired US surplus motor minesweepers.\nCurrent Egyptian fleet strength may be summarized as follows:\nType\nNo.\nDisplacement\nSpeed\nArmament\n(tons)\n(knots)\nSloop (PG)\n1\n1,441\n17.0\n2-6 pdr; 4 M.G.\nSloop (PG)\n1\n1,105\n16.0\nReported Disarmed\nMotor Minesweepers\n9\n290\n12.0\n1-3\" 150 Dual Purpose\n(YMS)\n2-20 MM AA\n2-Depth Charge Throwers\nLanding Ship Tank\n1\n2,140\n10.8\n4-40 MM AA\n(LST)\n6-20 MM AA\nSmall Transport\n1\n2,640\n14.0\n2-3 pdr.\n(APC)\nMotor Patrol Boats\n2\n20\n([email protected])\n1-37 MM AA\n(YP)\n([email protected])\nEight or more miscellaneous vessels of negligible fighting value are available. The\nLST is badly in need of a refit.\n25\nTROMAN RATIONAL LIBRARY\n0.8.\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\n2757-S-1948\nPSF 205"
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