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    "localId": "225249105",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 49-48, The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 49-48, The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations",
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            "logicalDate": "1948-11-18",
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    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "fore, probably now subscribe to a \"nationalist\" brand of Communism which the USSR\nis trying to liquidate in the other Satellites.\nAs long as the Tito Communists remain in power, Yugoslavia's political development\nin the Soviet sphere may differ from that of the other Satellites, which the Kremlin will\nbe preparing for closer union with the USSR or even, perhaps, for eventual incorporation\ninto the Soviet Union. Yugoslav economic planning too may veer somewhat from the\napproved satellite pattern. In the matter of collectivization of agriculture, Tito's\nregime need no longer follow the Soviet timetable. Rather, Tito will be motivated to\na greater degree by such considerations as maintaining his political position, stockpiling\nto meet future needs, or exchanging agricultural products for vital materials from\nthe West. Such divergencies may become manifest in some economic fields, since the\nTito regime will feel it urgently necessary to become economically strong in order to\nwithstand the increasing political pressure from the USSR and the Satellites. Thus,\nYugoslavia can perhaps be expected progressively to lessen its hostility to the European\nrecovery program, and to make more determined efforts to trade with the West.\n5.\nSOVIET POTENTIAL FOR LIQUIDATING TITO.\nBarring any major change in the international situation, the trend of Yugoslav-\nSoviet relations will be toward continued and perhaps a gradual widening of the\nbreach caused by Tito's defiance of the Cominform. The USSR, however, has the\npower at any time to liquidate Tito by the use of armed force, subject, of course, to\nthe dangers that such a step might entail. As long as international tension does not\nincrease, the USSR can afford to refrain from overt action against the Tito regime. As\nlong as the USSR hopes to expand its influence by political means, the Kremlin is\nunlikely to order drastic steps against Yugoslavia which would inevitably weaken the\npolitical strength of the Communists in other countries. The possibility of direct\nSoviet action against Yugoslavia may increase, however, if international tension\nincreases the possibility of war, or the USSR deliberately launches World War III.\nUnderlying all these considerations, however, remains the influence of the Tito\naffair upon the Kremlin's attempts at maintenance of discipline over Communist parties\nthroughout the world, as evidenced by the purges of \"unreliable\" elements. As the\ngap between Tito and the Cominform widens, the Kremlin will be concerned lest other\nSatellites attempt to emulate Tito's independent stand. The Kremlin may thus feel\nconstrained to take further repressive measures against the Satellites, such as increased\nmilitary occupation or even annexation.\n5\n>SECRET"
}