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tions to an expeditionary force. In common with all other Latin American republics, Argentina would be militarily expensive to the US in any global war, since US matériel would have to be diverted for adequate modern defense. Furthermore, the contribution that Argentina could make to common military defense of the continent would be greatly restricted by the limited extent of its sea and air power as well as by the inade- quate land transportation facilities to the other republics. In the event of war with the USSR, Argentine leaders will probably demand re- sponsibility for regional defense, despite their country's limited military capacities. This will make it difficult to include Argentina in a general strategic plan. It is an- ticipated that the Argentine Government will seek to exploit its status as an ally to obtain military equality if not superiority to Brazil, to further its efforts to establish an undisputed hegemony over the southern half of the continent exclusive of Brazil, and to obtain possession of the Falkland Islands. Argentine demands for US ac- quiescence in such efforts could be expected to generate friction with that government and possibly within the inter-American system and with the UK, which frictions would tend to undermine the unity required in war. On the other hand, by virtue of its relatively advanced industrial and engineering experience combined with the relatively high quality of its military discipline and train- ing, Argentina could be expected to make more efficient use of equipment obtained from the US than any other Latin American state. And it would of course be far less costly to the US to send equipment than to send both equipment and military person- nel and have to maintain troops at such a distance. The limitations of Argentine sea power are such that the US could at best expect some assistance in the defense of Cape Horn and the Straits of Magellan as an alterna- tive route to the Panama canal, provision of access to naval bases with their denial in Argentina's own self-interest to Soviet submarines, and limited patrol of sea lanes. II. Argentine Foreign Policy up to the Present. 1. BASES AND HISTORICAL OBJECTIVES OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY. In the past Argentine foreign policy has stressed Argentine ties with European nations, Argentine independence of US influence, the extension of Argentine leader- ship in Latin America, and neutrality in world power conflicts. Argentina has considered that its national interest lay in keeping the closest pos- sible ties with available and potential customers, in resisting any possible subordination to US economic interests, and in opposing US leadership in inter-American activities. Argentina, prior to World War II, depended on Britain for financial development and markets for its beef, on Germany for military ideas, and on France for intellectual stimulus. The historical precedent of Argentina's former position as the center of the Spanish viceroyalty of La Plata, the possession of great wealth in agricultural resources, and the existence of a proud nationalist spirit have fostered the Argentine belief that their country possesses opportunities and capacities for development greatly beyond those of any other Latin American country. Since they viewed their country's po- 6

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    "ocrText": "tions to an expeditionary force. In common with all other Latin American republics,\nArgentina would be militarily expensive to the US in any global war, since US matériel\nwould have to be diverted for adequate modern defense. Furthermore, the contribution\nthat Argentina could make to common military defense of the continent would be\ngreatly restricted by the limited extent of its sea and air power as well as by the inade-\nquate land transportation facilities to the other republics.\nIn the event of war with the USSR, Argentine leaders will probably demand re-\nsponsibility for regional defense, despite their country's limited military capacities.\nThis will make it difficult to include Argentina in a general strategic plan. It is an-\nticipated that the Argentine Government will seek to exploit its status as an ally to\nobtain military equality if not superiority to Brazil, to further its efforts to establish\nan undisputed hegemony over the southern half of the continent exclusive of Brazil,\nand to obtain possession of the Falkland Islands. Argentine demands for US ac-\nquiescence in such efforts could be expected to generate friction with that government\nand possibly within the inter-American system and with the UK, which frictions would\ntend to undermine the unity required in war.\nOn the other hand, by virtue of its relatively advanced industrial and engineering\nexperience combined with the relatively high quality of its military discipline and train-\ning, Argentina could be expected to make more efficient use of equipment obtained\nfrom the US than any other Latin American state. And it would of course be far less\ncostly to the US to send equipment than to send both equipment and military person-\nnel and have to maintain troops at such a distance.\nThe limitations of Argentine sea power are such that the US could at best expect\nsome assistance in the defense of Cape Horn and the Straits of Magellan as an alterna-\ntive route to the Panama canal, provision of access to naval bases with their denial in\nArgentina's own self-interest to Soviet submarines, and limited patrol of sea lanes.\nII. Argentine Foreign Policy up to the Present.\n1.\nBASES AND HISTORICAL OBJECTIVES OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY.\nIn the past Argentine foreign policy has stressed Argentine ties with European\nnations, Argentine independence of US influence, the extension of Argentine leader-\nship in Latin America, and neutrality in world power conflicts.\nArgentina has considered that its national interest lay in keeping the closest pos-\nsible ties with available and potential customers, in resisting any possible subordination\nto US economic interests, and in opposing US leadership in inter-American activities.\nArgentina, prior to World War II, depended on Britain for financial development and\nmarkets for its beef, on Germany for military ideas, and on France for intellectual\nstimulus. The historical precedent of Argentina's former position as the center of the\nSpanish viceroyalty of La Plata, the possession of great wealth in agricultural resources,\nand the existence of a proud nationalist spirit have fostered the Argentine belief that\ntheir country possesses opportunities and capacities for development greatly beyond\nthose of any other Latin American country. Since they viewed their country's po-\n6"
}