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{
    "localId": "225249115",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 50-48, Probably Argentine Policy Toward the United States to 1952 and Its Effects on United States Interests",
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    "id": "225249115",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 50-48, Probably Argentine Policy Toward the United States to 1952 and Its Effects on United States Interests",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249115",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 15,
            "logicalDate": "1949-02-15",
            "month": 2,
            "year": 1949
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{
    "seq": 18,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875477/875477-03-18.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "tina's dollar crisis has deepened, however, he has reportedly aligned himself with pro-\nUS and moderate elements in the cabinet including his enemy Bramuglia. Miguel\nMiranda, as President of the National Economic Council, has controlled Argentina's\nforeign economic policy which is extraordinarily important in the total foreign policy\ndeveloped by the Perón administration. The attitudes of Miranda, a self-made indus-\ntrialist who entered the government in 1946, illustrate some of the contradictions and\nproblems of working out a program of economic cooperation with Argentina. He is\nfully conscious that industrialization and the long-range program for economic inde-\npendence can best be realized with foreign private investment. However, many of his\nactions and the trading ventures of IAPA (Argentine Trade Promotion Institute) under\nhis direction have apparently done as much to alienate US business as the nationalists'\nwar on foreign investors. During the past two years Miranda has gambled on his\nability to finance much of Argentine capital development through shrewd trading with\nthe outside world which has needed Argentine agricultural products.\nIII. Probable Argentine Policy toward the US in the Absence of a US-USSR War.\nSince the long-range, permanent objectives of Argentine foreign policy indicate a\ncounter-US-if not actually anti-US-position in Western Hemisphere and in world\naffairs, any exceptional degree of Argentine cooperation in US objectives in the period\nshort of war will be due either to casual coincidence of the objectives of the two countries\nor to some special situation pushing the Argentines toward a larger degree of coopera-\ntion than would normally be the case. The present impairment of European sources\nof supply of heavy machinery and equipment and the importance attached by the\nPerón administration to their five-year plan of industrialization constitute such\na\nspecial situation; it is therefore these admittedly temporary factors that are likely to\nbe most influential in guiding-within the boundaries set by long-range policies-the\nexecution of Argentine policy during the next few years.\nThe urgency-from the Argentine point of view-of the present situation, and its\nopportunity-from the US point of view-are both due to a fundamental miscalcula-\ntion on the part of the Argentine Government. It seems clear that President Perón\noriginally estimated that Argentine resources were such that he could carry out his\nambitious five-year plan and at the same time avoid any such compromise of Argentina's\nlong-term policy of complete independence, as would be involved in making important\nconcessions to the US and to US capital in particular. Argentina may derive certain\nlong-run advantages, both political and economic from development leading to a great\nmeasure of independence of US and European sources of supply, and the local political\nadvantage deriving from the sponsorship of such a program, can hardly be questioned.\nBut the attempt to realize all the elements of the program simultaneously, and without\nincurring unpopular obligations to foreign countries, assumed a highly favorable\neconomic situation.\nTo a certain extent Argentina did possess these advantages. When Perón assumed\ncontrol late in 1945 there was on hand a wartime accumulation of $1.5 billion in gold\nand foreign exchange. Argentina subsequently gained an equal amount of hard-\n11"
}