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{
    "localId": "225249115",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 50-48, Probably Argentine Policy Toward the United States to 1952 and Its Effects on United States Interests",
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    "id": "225249115",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 50-48, Probably Argentine Policy Toward the United States to 1952 and Its Effects on United States Interests",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249115",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 15,
            "logicalDate": "1949-02-15",
            "month": 2,
            "year": 1949
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{
    "seq": 21,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875477/875477-03-21.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "trying to strengthen his political position through demagogic appeals to anti-US senti-\nment and intensifying his efforts to obtain urgently needed dollars from the US. On\nthe one hand he has attempted to implicate a US citizen and \"international capitalist\nintrigue\" in an alleged attempt on his life. On the other hand he has sent the presi-\ndent of the Argentine central bank to the US to develop a plan for obtaining dollars,\nhas given renewed assurances of willingness to comply with US requirements for par-\nticipation in European dollar trade, and has taken preliminary steps toward reorganiz-\ning Argentine economic policy in a direction more consistent with US views of inter-\nnationally cooperative trade policy.\nIt seems probable that some short-term decision will have to be made in the near\nfuture, but it seems equally probable that any such decision will always be subject to\nrevision in the light of Argentine necessities as they seem to the Perón administration\nto become less urgent or to press for solution. If President Perón decides that the\nadvantages to be gained by making the concessions required for US aid outweigh the\ndisadvantages, the US should be able to exact as a consideration both some abatement\nof anti-US activities and propaganda and also increased cooperation in international\nagencies and projects. If, on the other hand, meeting US terms seems to involve a\nbackward step in nationalistic policy that the president dare not risk, he will covertly\nallow the tempo of his industrialization program to slacken and continue to try to\nbuild up Argentina as the leader of a Hemisphere bloc that would oppose US plans\nin the Hemisphere, and would stress independent action in world affairs. The coming\ndecision, and any later decisions made in view of changed circumstances will of course\nbe influenced by the severity or moderation of US terms as well as by Argentine need,\nand also by the manner of the presentation of US terms in relation to President Perón's\ndomestic commitments to a nationalist-influenced foreign policy of complete Argentine\nindependence. The Argentine feeling of rivalry with the US is not likely to disappear;\nbut the degree of its manifestation during the next few years-or longer, possibly\ndepending on US action-may be lessened by the favorable bargaining position tempo-\nrarily given the US by recent Argentine overestimation of their own strength and\npresent need for US cooperation.\nIV. Probable Argentine Policy in the Event of a US-USSR War Before 1952\nWhile the degree of Argentine opposition to or cooperation with the US during the\nperiod in which there is no US-USSR war will vary according to the government's\nchanging views of Argentine needs, it is estimated, weighing all considerations as they\nexist at the present time, that Argentina will, in the event of war between the US and\nthe USSR prior to 1952, join in the war on the side of the US.\nArgentine alliance with the USSR in such a war must be considered extremely\nunlikely. It is true that the Perón administration, in implementing its present rather\nambiguous foreign policy under the guise of the so-called \"Third Position\" (opposed\nequally to capitalist and Communist imperialism), has at the propaganda level attacked\nthe US much more vigorously than it has attacked the USSR. It is also true that the\nArgentine Government has engaged in tentative efforts to play Soviet states off against\n14"
}