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{
    "localId": "225249115",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 50-48, Probably Argentine Policy Toward the United States to 1952 and Its Effects on United States Interests",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249115"
}

{
    "id": "225249115",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249115",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 50-48, Probably Argentine Policy Toward the United States to 1952 and Its Effects on United States Interests",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249115",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
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{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249115",
    "naId": 225249115,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 15,
            "logicalDate": "1949-02-15",
            "month": 2,
            "year": 1949
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 9,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875477/875477-03-09.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "fice of nationalistic independence, but lavish expenditures for industrial equipment\nfrom the US combined with decline in world demand for Argentine products vitiated\noriginal estimates, produced a financial crisis in mid-1948, and caused virtual suspen-\nsion of procurement in the US for Argentine industrial development. This crisis con-\nfronts the Perón regime with the difficult choice between some sacrifice of the appear-\nance of economic independence and some slackening of the industrialization program-\neither step a dangerous one for the regime's stability. At the moment, the Argentine\npresident seems to be temporizing. Any decision reached will be subject to constant\nreview; if and whenever Perón decides the advantages to be gained from concessions\nto the US outweigh the disadvantages, Argentina will become more cooperative; if he\ndecides that the political cost of abandoning appearance of independence is too high a\nprice to pay for US assistance, he will intensify Argentine resistance to US policy at\nhome and abroad.\nIn case of a US-USSR war before 1952, it is estimated Argentina will be a cobellig-\nerent on the side of the US. An Argentine alliance with the USSR is extremely unlikely\nin view of the slight possibility of reciprocal advantage, and various factors indicate\nArgentina would prefer cobelligerence to neutrality. By remaining neutral Argentina\nwould risk: another increase of Brazilian armed strength relative to that of Argentina\nsuch as occurred from Brazilian participation in World War II; forfeit of Argentina's\nmuch-vaunted claim to leadership in Latin America; probable sanctions by the US and\npossibly by other American republics. Defeat of the US would, moreover, expose Ar-\ngentina to ultimate Communist rule.\nThere would be strong pressure for a declaration of war from the anti-Communist\nArgentine military, and the government could expect to strengthen its position with\nthe predominantly Catholic populace through participating in a war against atheistic\nCommunism. The government could also anticipate distinct advantages in controlling\na war crisis situation through a declaration of war. There is evidence of Perón's own\napprehension of international Communism; his government has reportedly made ex-\ntensive preparations for an all out attack on Communism and Soviet agents, prepar-\nations which include the possibility of breaking relations with the USSR and its satel-\nlites. The exact nature, extent, and timing of Argentine cobelligerence will be deter-\nmined by the attitude of Argentina toward the US at the time and by bargains struck\nwith the US or arranged in an inter-American conference under the Rio treaty.\nvd\nad\nmoitiaoq\na\nel\nard\nof\nblurw\nbetam\n2"
}