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Allies or the German administrations identified with them are censured. The slowness
of economic recovery, the bad food situation, and the failure to raise production levels-
all these are advanced as political arguments, contributing to a popular belief that
Germany is being eliminated systematically as a potential economic competitor of the
Western Powers. Extremists on both the Left and Right are able to capitalize on the
resultant industrial unrest. Not even the moderate political parties believe that
Allied interference in Germany is compatible with German economic recovery. Because
of this German emphasis upon Allied interference as a political issue, the degree of
Allied control in Germany may determine the future alignment of political forces in
that country.
The value of the Occupation in German eyes will be measured only by its ability
to rehabilitate the Western German economy while preventing Soviet expansion into
Western Germany. German interest in economic aid, however, is no stronger than
German resentment against present foreign control. As long as any form of Occupa-
tion exists, German efforts to curtail or circumvent the jurisdiction of the Allied Military
Governments will continue. German governmental agencies will continue to evade
their responsibilities and attribute their ineptitude to an insufficient delegation of
authority by the Occupation Powers, upon which will be visited all the resentment of
the German population against the prolongation of their miseries.
The political development of most immediate importance is the retirement of Kurt
Schumacher, first chairman of the Social Democratic Party. His disappearance from
the scene may modify the present policy of the party and possibly its organization as
well.
With Schumacher in retirement, many South German party leaders, who in the
past were unable to revolt against his leadership, will probably attempt to reduce the
strict control exercised by party headquarters. The first step may be a demand that
a dual chairmanship be created, which would equalize the position of the Land interests,
represented largely by the South German Federalists and the central party bureauc-
racy, represented largely by the North German Centralists, who have dominated the
party since 1945. Failing in this effort, Land party leaders may assume a more in-
dependent role in their respective areas. In addition, there is a potential source of
antagonism between the trade union wing of the party and the political leadership of
the party.
Following Schumacher's retirement, the various pro-Communist splinter groups
within the Social Democratic Party will probably remain in the party. Should the
party's policy remain firmly opposed either to the USSR or to Communism, these
groups may eventually break off and join the Communists.
If present US opposition to the socialization of German industry continues and
the Western German economy nevertheless attains some measure of prosperity, the
long-term result of Schumacher's retirement will be a loss of party strength to both
the Right and the Left. Elements of the right wing of the Social Democratic Party,
particularly the younger members who joined the party under Schumacher, may break
off and join rightist or more nationalistic political groupings. The Social Democratic
3
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "Allies or the German administrations identified with them are censured. The slowness\nof economic recovery, the bad food situation, and the failure to raise production levels-\nall these are advanced as political arguments, contributing to a popular belief that\nGermany is being eliminated systematically as a potential economic competitor of the\nWestern Powers. Extremists on both the Left and Right are able to capitalize on the\nresultant industrial unrest. Not even the moderate political parties believe that\nAllied interference in Germany is compatible with German economic recovery. Because\nof this German emphasis upon Allied interference as a political issue, the degree of\nAllied control in Germany may determine the future alignment of political forces in\nthat country.\nThe value of the Occupation in German eyes will be measured only by its ability\nto rehabilitate the Western German economy while preventing Soviet expansion into\nWestern Germany. German interest in economic aid, however, is no stronger than\nGerman resentment against present foreign control. As long as any form of Occupa-\ntion exists, German efforts to curtail or circumvent the jurisdiction of the Allied Military\nGovernments will continue. German governmental agencies will continue to evade\ntheir responsibilities and attribute their ineptitude to an insufficient delegation of\nauthority by the Occupation Powers, upon which will be visited all the resentment of\nthe German population against the prolongation of their miseries.\nThe political development of most immediate importance is the retirement of Kurt\nSchumacher, first chairman of the Social Democratic Party. His disappearance from\nthe scene may modify the present policy of the party and possibly its organization as\nwell.\nWith Schumacher in retirement, many South German party leaders, who in the\npast were unable to revolt against his leadership, will probably attempt to reduce the\nstrict control exercised by party headquarters. The first step may be a demand that\na dual chairmanship be created, which would equalize the position of the Land interests,\nrepresented largely by the South German Federalists and the central party bureauc-\nracy, represented largely by the North German Centralists, who have dominated the\nparty since 1945. Failing in this effort, Land party leaders may assume a more in-\ndependent role in their respective areas. In addition, there is a potential source of\nantagonism between the trade union wing of the party and the political leadership of\nthe party.\nFollowing Schumacher's retirement, the various pro-Communist splinter groups\nwithin the Social Democratic Party will probably remain in the party. Should the\nparty's policy remain firmly opposed either to the USSR or to Communism, these\ngroups may eventually break off and join the Communists.\nIf present US opposition to the socialization of German industry continues and\nthe Western German economy nevertheless attains some measure of prosperity, the\nlong-term result of Schumacher's retirement will be a loss of party strength to both\nthe Right and the Left. Elements of the right wing of the Social Democratic Party,\nparticularly the younger members who joined the party under Schumacher, may break\noff and join rightist or more nationalistic political groupings. The Social Democratic\n3"
}