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center, from which Schumacher drew his support, may swing toward the Left to retain its hold on the workers, particularly in the Ruhr. This will be reflected in in- creased party emphasis on Socialist dogma, including demands for socialization and participation in management and opposition to Allied economic policies in Western Germany, but is unlikely to result in a working alliance between the Social Democrats and the Communists in the near future. A working alliance between the SPD and the Communist Party for common objectives might develop, however, if the USSR ceases to menace Western Germany, and the SPD is prevented from fulfilling any of the major points of its party program because of US opposition to socialization. In general, however, the present political trend in Germany is to the Right, and may develop into a strong current of resurgent nationalism. Recent local elections in the US Zone indicate increasing rightist appeal to irredentist and dissatisfied elements as well as to German nationalists. A partial cause of this rightist trend has been the increased voting strength of ex-Nazis, who have been re-enfranchised and are beginning to make their strength felt. In addition, Germans expelled from foreign countries, such as the Volksdeutsche and Sudeten Germans from the East, are supporting nationalist and irredentist movements. The main cause of this trend, however, is the general attitude of the German people, who tend to be extremists with only a slight understanding of the theory of govern- ment by the center. Distrusting the Left for its connection with the USSR, the average German will gravitate toward the extreme Right and a policy of direct action, rather than adopt a parliamentary centrist attitude toward Communism and the USSR. At present, there are several rightist parties in Western Germany; of these the National Democratic Party in the US Zone appears the most likely vehicle for an expansion of German nationalism. Although still relatively weak, these parties may be expected to grow rapidly, unless US Military Government intervenes. Several os- tensibly nonpolitical organizations also have the personnel and the capability of ac- tively supporting a resurgence of nationalism. At present, the largest of these as- sociations is the Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen, an ecclesiastical welfare organ- ization with an organizational structure covering all Germany, facilities for interna- tional connections, and a very questionable executive personnel. In the future, this and similar groups, supported by elements of the governmental and economic ad- ministrations, can be expected to play an active role in promoting German nationalism. The ultimate results of the widening split between the Right and the Left in Ger- many will be: (1) the diminution of the Center; (2) the development of a minute but aggressive Left; and (3) the expansion of the Right. Under present conditions, how- ever, the fourth and most powerful element will be a dissatisfied but politically inert mass, which will be unable to oppose actively present Allied policies and unwilling to participate in the anti-Communist campaign. This political mass, however, will be a source of latent strength for the Right, and should the Germans receive political freedom, this element would actively support a rightist program for a centralized and unified German state, opposition to foreign intervention, and exploitation of the US- USSR struggle for the benefit of German nationalism. 4

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    "ocrText": "center, from which Schumacher drew his support, may swing toward the Left to\nretain its hold on the workers, particularly in the Ruhr. This will be reflected in in-\ncreased party emphasis on Socialist dogma, including demands for socialization and\nparticipation in management and opposition to Allied economic policies in Western\nGermany, but is unlikely to result in a working alliance between the Social Democrats\nand the Communists in the near future. A working alliance between the SPD and the\nCommunist Party for common objectives might develop, however, if the USSR ceases\nto menace Western Germany, and the SPD is prevented from fulfilling any of the major\npoints of its party program because of US opposition to socialization.\nIn general, however, the present political trend in Germany is to the Right, and\nmay develop into a strong current of resurgent nationalism. Recent local elections in\nthe US Zone indicate increasing rightist appeal to irredentist and dissatisfied elements\nas well as to German nationalists.\nA partial cause of this rightist trend has been the increased voting strength of\nex-Nazis, who have been re-enfranchised and are beginning to make their strength felt.\nIn addition, Germans expelled from foreign countries, such as the Volksdeutsche and\nSudeten Germans from the East, are supporting nationalist and irredentist movements.\nThe main cause of this trend, however, is the general attitude of the German people,\nwho tend to be extremists with only a slight understanding of the theory of govern-\nment by the center. Distrusting the Left for its connection with the USSR, the average\nGerman will gravitate toward the extreme Right and a policy of direct action, rather\nthan adopt a parliamentary centrist attitude toward Communism and the USSR.\nAt present, there are several rightist parties in Western Germany; of these the\nNational Democratic Party in the US Zone appears the most likely vehicle for an\nexpansion of German nationalism. Although still relatively weak, these parties may be\nexpected to grow rapidly, unless US Military Government intervenes. Several os-\ntensibly nonpolitical organizations also have the personnel and the capability of ac-\ntively supporting a resurgence of nationalism. At present, the largest of these as-\nsociations is the Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen, an ecclesiastical welfare organ-\nization with an organizational structure covering all Germany, facilities for interna-\ntional connections, and a very questionable executive personnel. In the future, this\nand similar groups, supported by elements of the governmental and economic ad-\nministrations, can be expected to play an active role in promoting German nationalism.\nThe ultimate results of the widening split between the Right and the Left in Ger-\nmany will be: (1) the diminution of the Center; (2) the development of a minute but\naggressive Left; and (3) the expansion of the Right. Under present conditions, how-\never, the fourth and most powerful element will be a dissatisfied but politically inert\nmass, which will be unable to oppose actively present Allied policies and unwilling to\nparticipate in the anti-Communist campaign. This political mass, however, will be a\nsource of latent strength for the Right, and should the Germans receive political\nfreedom, this element would actively support a rightist program for a centralized and\nunified German state, opposition to foreign intervention, and exploitation of the US-\nUSSR struggle for the benefit of German nationalism.\n4"
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