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Such moves would be made only after the Soviets had infiltrated all levels of the gov-
ernment, army, and party apparatus with loyal Communist leadership and reserved
sufficient power to continue a tight behind-the-scene control and direction of the
new state.
(6) Although the signing of a separate peace treaty would not necessarily imply
Soviet willingness to withdraw its occupation forces, such a move might be proposed
by the Kremlin in the hope that the resulting pressure would eventually induce the
Western Powers to withdraw their occupation forces and thus facilitate Communist
penetration into western Germany. This proposition would be generally supported in
western Germany but would be rejected by Western Europe, which prefers to maintain
the occupation of Germany until the perils of either Communist domination or of
resurgent German nationalism have been averted.
C. Soviet Pressure on Western Germany.
(1) With the termination of East-West discussions on Germany the USSR
would bend every effort to disrupt the political and economic stabilization of western
Germany and thereby nullify the latter's increasingly important contribution to Euro-
pean recovery. Prevented from accomplishing the foregoing aim overtly, the Krem-
lin would intensify attempts to attain the same end by subversion and propaganda.
This tactic would increase cooperation among the Western Powers against the Soviet
threat and would precipitate strong counter-measures by the occupation authorities.
(2) Leading the Soviet campaign of subversion and propaganda in western
Germany would be a very small but militant German Communist Party. The western
German Communists would, either directly or by the use of trade union "fronts"
attempt to sabotage production in key industries by means of strikes and riots. The
industrially important Ruhr would be a prime target in the Kremlin strategy.
(3) The Communist propaganda machine in western Germany would continue
to exploit every actual and imaginary grievance of the population. A profitable means
of Communist propaganda exploitation would be that of championing popular social
and economic reforms. With a weak German economy, and with inflation, lack of
consumer goods, and unemployment existing as unpleasant realities in western
Germany, Communist propaganda would have no scarcity of subject matter.
(4) The uncertain popularity in western Germany of the present Western
plan to set up a separate decentralized western government has been indicated by its
lack of strong support among German political leaders and the population in general.
Communist propaganda could be expected to dwell on the theme that the Soviet
Union had consistently championed establishment of a "democratic, peace-loving gov-
ernment for all Germany" only to have this plan blocked by the Western Powers. The
Communists furthermore would hardly allow the German people to forget that it was
the Soviet Union which advocated signing a peace treaty with Germany to be followed
within a year by troop withdrawals. By declaring any government established in east-
ern Germany to be the only legitimate government for all Germany, Soviet propaganda
would hope to keep alive for German nationalism the prospect of a revived "Greater
Germany." The stress on centralization of economic and political control and conse-
5
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"ocrText": "Such moves would be made only after the Soviets had infiltrated all levels of the gov-\nernment, army, and party apparatus with loyal Communist leadership and reserved\nsufficient power to continue a tight behind-the-scene control and direction of the\nnew state.\n(6) Although the signing of a separate peace treaty would not necessarily imply\nSoviet willingness to withdraw its occupation forces, such a move might be proposed\nby the Kremlin in the hope that the resulting pressure would eventually induce the\nWestern Powers to withdraw their occupation forces and thus facilitate Communist\npenetration into western Germany. This proposition would be generally supported in\nwestern Germany but would be rejected by Western Europe, which prefers to maintain\nthe occupation of Germany until the perils of either Communist domination or of\nresurgent German nationalism have been averted.\nC. Soviet Pressure on Western Germany.\n(1) With the termination of East-West discussions on Germany the USSR\nwould bend every effort to disrupt the political and economic stabilization of western\nGermany and thereby nullify the latter's increasingly important contribution to Euro-\npean recovery. Prevented from accomplishing the foregoing aim overtly, the Krem-\nlin would intensify attempts to attain the same end by subversion and propaganda.\nThis tactic would increase cooperation among the Western Powers against the Soviet\nthreat and would precipitate strong counter-measures by the occupation authorities.\n(2) Leading the Soviet campaign of subversion and propaganda in western\nGermany would be a very small but militant German Communist Party. The western\nGerman Communists would, either directly or by the use of trade union \"fronts\"\nattempt to sabotage production in key industries by means of strikes and riots. The\nindustrially important Ruhr would be a prime target in the Kremlin strategy.\n(3) The Communist propaganda machine in western Germany would continue\nto exploit every actual and imaginary grievance of the population. A profitable means\nof Communist propaganda exploitation would be that of championing popular social\nand economic reforms. With a weak German economy, and with inflation, lack of\nconsumer goods, and unemployment existing as unpleasant realities in western\nGermany, Communist propaganda would have no scarcity of subject matter.\n(4) The uncertain popularity in western Germany of the present Western\nplan to set up a separate decentralized western government has been indicated by its\nlack of strong support among German political leaders and the population in general.\nCommunist propaganda could be expected to dwell on the theme that the Soviet\nUnion had consistently championed establishment of a \"democratic, peace-loving gov-\nernment for all Germany\" only to have this plan blocked by the Western Powers. The\nCommunists furthermore would hardly allow the German people to forget that it was\nthe Soviet Union which advocated signing a peace treaty with Germany to be followed\nwithin a year by troop withdrawals. By declaring any government established in east-\nern Germany to be the only legitimate government for all Germany, Soviet propaganda\nwould hope to keep alive for German nationalism the prospect of a revived \"Greater\nGermany.\" The stress on centralization of economic and political control and conse-\n5"
}