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{
    "localId": "225249191",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 65-48, The Current Situation in Iran",
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    "id": "225249191",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 65-48, The Current Situation in Iran",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249191",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 8,
            "logicalDate": "1948-10-08",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1948
        }
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{
    "seq": 10,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nemployment of US military missions and the purchase of US military supplies. It has\nalso continued its attempts to penetrate Iranian economic and political life and its\nsubversive work among the Azerbaijanis and other discontented groups. Moreover,\nthe Soviets have employed trade restrictions to work hardships on the Iranian economy,\nparticularly in Iran's northern provinces.\nThe Soviet diplomatic offensive has been marked by extravagant charges that\nIran has displayed a hostile attitude toward the USSR, has allowed the US to \"take\nover\" the Iranian Army and to create military bases for use against the Soviets, and\nhas encouraged the Iranian press to develop an anti-Soviet bias. Soviet representa-\ntions to Iran have more than once suggested the possibility of war between the US\nand USSR, and have characterized Iran's attitude as intolerable, because of its refusal\nto grant an oil concession as well as for its dealings with the US. The tenor of many\nof the notes suggests that the USSR is laying the groundwork for possible direct inter-\nvention in Iran under Article VI of the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921, which permits such\naction if Iran is unable to halt the efforts of a \"third party\" to turn Iranian territory\ninto a base for military attack against the USSR.\nAlthough the impact of Soviet notes, particularly their implication of direct\naction against Iran, has recently given rise to considerable sentiment in favor of con-\nciliating (but not appeasing) the USSR, Soviet efforts to browbeat Iran have failed\nthus far to change its attitude of resistance to Soviet interference.\nIn February 1948 the Majlis, after considerable delay and soul-searching, accepted\nthe US arms credit in the face of express Soviet displeasure. The Hakimi Government\nsharply denied the various Soviet accusations made against it and in turn protested\nagainst Soviet harboring of groups hostile to Iran as well as against Soviet press and\nradio attacks, the incursion of armed bands into Iran from the USSR, and other hostile\nacts. Although Hajir, the present prime minister, may have had conciliatory motives\nfor his recent appointment of two pro-Soviet men to important government posts, he\nfirmly rejected the Soviet Ambassador's suggestion that the elimination of US influence\nwould pave the way for a settlement of all Soviet-Iranian differences.\nWhile Iran's repeated requests for advice and assistance indicate that it regards\nthe US as its principal source of support against Soviet aggression, it is not unaware of\nthe difficulty of obtaining prompt US assistance in the event of Soviet invasion. It\nis considering submission of the recent Soviet notes and the Iranian replies to the\nUN Security Council, which remains seized of Iran's old Azerbaijan case against the\nUSSR, as further protection against Soviet use of some legalistic pretext for interven-\ntion.\nMoreover, Iran's orientation toward the US is not inflexible and unquestioning.\nFrom time to time Iranian military leaders have indicated their dissatisfaction over\nthe scale of US military assistance to Iran (as compared to that provided Turkey and\nGreece) and over difficulties they have encountered in obtaining matériel under the\nUS arms credit program. Other indications that Iran does not consider itself rigidly\nbound to the US are provided by recent popular support for a policy of strict neutrality,\nwhich was reflected in the attempts to restrict the scope of the US military missions,\n7\nSECRET"
}