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ECRET
bos Individual Iranians (especially the Moslem religious leaders) have spoken out
strongly against the establishment of Israel, and there is generally an undercurrent of
sympathy for the Arab cause. Iran has shown no inclination, however, to give direct
support to the activity of the Arab states against the Jews. Jewish communities in
Iran have not been molested.
a3)
lo
918WA
saau
and
5.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS.
of
Although the situation in Iran is characterized by disunion, procrastination, and
irresponsibility, no major change in the current regime is expected in the near future.
The government will probably continue to be controlled by the conservative elements
which dominate the Majlis and (to a less degree) by the clergy, who are now engaged in
efforts to revive orthodox Islam. These controlling forces will be opposed by Iranians
who earnestly desire social reforms, by those favoring greater power for the Shah, and
by pro-Soviet elements of the population. Unscrupulous and opportunist leaders of
various groups will continue to collaborate against whatever government is in power,
and fluctuating alignments (as in the past) will confuse the political scene and obstruct
legislation. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, which is now reasserting itself, will undoubt-
edly attempt to capitalize on the confusion.
Economic evils such as deficit financing, unfavorable trade balances, hoarding
of and speculation in staples, inflated living costs, inadequate wages, and unemploy-
ment may be expected to continue for some time. Popular and political pressure will
probably compel the government to undertake a definite program of economic and
social improvements, but long delays in implementation of the program are almost
certain. Dissatisfaction with the government and the Majlis will increase; the Shah
will feel encouraged to press for greater power; and Soviet sympathizers will be stimu-
lated to greater activity.
Soviet pressure against Iran will undoubtedly continue. The elimination of
US influence and the establishment of a strong pro-Soviet subversive element are
primary objectives in the Soviet program for gaining a preponderant influence in Iran.
The Soviet Union may be expected to press its demands for an oil concession, in order
to wipe out the humiliation of Iran's rejection of the oil protocol in 1947, re-establish a
foothold in northern Iran, and obtain economic benefits. The Soviets may attempt to
gain control of strategic railways and ports through the Tudeh Party's influence among
rail and dock workers, and they will continue to restrict trade, at propitious times, for
the purpose of damaging the economy of Iran's northern provinces.
Mounting tension growing out of Iran's continued resistance to Soviet pressures
may provoke incidents leading to direct Soviet intervention; the Soviets may be en-
couraged to take such action by their belief that the US and the UK would not react
drastically to Soviet occupation, particularly if it were confined to northern Iran.
At
the moment, however, there is no evidence that the USSR considers its relations with
Iran so critical as to call for armed intervention. It is therefore more likely that the
USSR will continue for the time being its present policy of diplomatic browbeating,
subversive activity, and other methods short of war.
9
G
SECRET
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"ocrText": "ECRET\nbos Individual Iranians (especially the Moslem religious leaders) have spoken out\nstrongly against the establishment of Israel, and there is generally an undercurrent of\nsympathy for the Arab cause. Iran has shown no inclination, however, to give direct\nsupport to the activity of the Arab states against the Jews. Jewish communities in\nIran have not been molested.\na3)\nlo\n918WA\nsaau\nand\n5.\nPROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS.\nof\nAlthough the situation in Iran is characterized by disunion, procrastination, and\nirresponsibility, no major change in the current regime is expected in the near future.\nThe government will probably continue to be controlled by the conservative elements\nwhich dominate the Majlis and (to a less degree) by the clergy, who are now engaged in\nefforts to revive orthodox Islam. These controlling forces will be opposed by Iranians\nwho earnestly desire social reforms, by those favoring greater power for the Shah, and\nby pro-Soviet elements of the population. Unscrupulous and opportunist leaders of\nvarious groups will continue to collaborate against whatever government is in power,\nand fluctuating alignments (as in the past) will confuse the political scene and obstruct\nlegislation. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, which is now reasserting itself, will undoubt-\nedly attempt to capitalize on the confusion.\nEconomic evils such as deficit financing, unfavorable trade balances, hoarding\nof and speculation in staples, inflated living costs, inadequate wages, and unemploy-\nment may be expected to continue for some time. Popular and political pressure will\nprobably compel the government to undertake a definite program of economic and\nsocial improvements, but long delays in implementation of the program are almost\ncertain. Dissatisfaction with the government and the Majlis will increase; the Shah\nwill feel encouraged to press for greater power; and Soviet sympathizers will be stimu-\nlated to greater activity.\nSoviet pressure against Iran will undoubtedly continue. The elimination of\nUS influence and the establishment of a strong pro-Soviet subversive element are\nprimary objectives in the Soviet program for gaining a preponderant influence in Iran.\nThe Soviet Union may be expected to press its demands for an oil concession, in order\nto wipe out the humiliation of Iran's rejection of the oil protocol in 1947, re-establish a\nfoothold in northern Iran, and obtain economic benefits. The Soviets may attempt to\ngain control of strategic railways and ports through the Tudeh Party's influence among\nrail and dock workers, and they will continue to restrict trade, at propitious times, for\nthe purpose of damaging the economy of Iran's northern provinces.\nMounting tension growing out of Iran's continued resistance to Soviet pressures\nmay provoke incidents leading to direct Soviet intervention; the Soviets may be en-\ncouraged to take such action by their belief that the US and the UK would not react\ndrastically to Soviet occupation, particularly if it were confined to northern Iran.\nAt\nthe moment, however, there is no evidence that the USSR considers its relations with\nIran so critical as to call for armed intervention. It is therefore more likely that the\nUSSR will continue for the time being its present policy of diplomatic browbeating,\nsubversive activity, and other methods short of war.\n9\nG\nSECRET"
}