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{
    "localId": "225249258",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Appendices to ORE 58-48, The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East (To Cairo) Prior to 1950",
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    "id": "225249258",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Appendices to ORE 58-48, The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East (To Cairo) Prior to 1950",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249258",
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        "Intelligence Files"
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    "naId": 225249258,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 27,
            "logicalDate": "1948-10-27",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1948
        }
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{
    "seq": 21,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "SECIVL\nAtlantic, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf, connecting every major port and industrial\nregion of the conquered areas with the transportation net-work of the Soviet Union.\nThe USSR would thus acquire a high degree of flexibility for the organized distribution,\nin conformity with a comprehensive program, of the combined raw materials and fin-\nished products of the areas between Vladivostok and Gibraltar.\nThe extensive shipbuilding capacity of Western Europe (at least five times present\nSoviet capacity) would permit the USSR rapidly to expand its merchant fleet. Greatly\nincreased movements of freight between Western European ports and the Black Sea\nwould be possible at low cost, and increased coastwise shipping would indirectly aug-\nment the capacity of the land transportation systems. Additional quantities of freight\ncould be shipped from the Black Sea to the Maritime Provinces, which cannot now be\nsatisfactorily supplied by the Trans-Siberian railroad and the limited amount of ocean\nshipping available. Likewise, oil could be moved from the Eastern Mediterranean and\nthe Persian Gulf to export markets and to Soviet ports.\nA specific advantage which would result would be an ability to draw on the im-\nmense capacities of warm-water ports throughout Europe to supplement the severely\nrestricted capacities of ice-bound Soviet ports.\nHowever, under the conditions assumed, the effectiveness of all ports controlled\nby the USSR would be sharply reduced. Allied blockades would rapidly eliminate most\nof the Soviet overseas trade and would severely restrict the volume of coastwise\nshipping. The USSR, therefore, would not be able to exploit fully the advantages of the\nextensive shipbuilding capacity in conquered areas.\nThe foregoing conditions would throw an additional burden on the land transpor-\ntation systems. The strategic necessity of relying upon sources of supply east of the\n\"iron curtain\" for a substantial part of the military supplies required in Western Europe\nand the Near East would further increase the demands placed on the land transporta-\ntion systems.\nAlthough the rail systems of Europe are, in general, on the mend and are capable\nof handling present peacetime traffic, and while it is anticipated that the USSR would\nattempt to expand capacities, the growing effectiveness of allied counter-action,\nplus local sabotage, would rapidly reduce the railway systems of Europe to a condition\nin which only the barest industrial and military requirements could be handled. Com-\nplete collapse in certain areas could be averted only at excessive cost in labor and\nmaterials.\nA particularly weak spot in the Soviet rail transportation system would persist in\nthe war-damaged, dismantled, and deteriorated rail system in the Soviet Zone of Ger-\nmany. This system, on the verge of collapse, is handling less than half of its normal\npeacetime volume of traffic. There is at the most only one double-track line into Berlin.\nUnder wartime conditions the system might be organized on the basis of one-way lines,\nwhich could probably handle minimum military requirements for through traffic. The\nsystem would hardly permit the full exploitation of the industrial potential of the area\nby the USSR.\nAnother specific weakness would result from the poor linkage in land transportation\nfacilities from the USSR to the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. While\n19"
}