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b. Advantages. (1) The 15-20,000 qualified chemists and chemical engineers in Western Europe would represent an estimated 50 percent increase in personnel under Soviet control capable of conducting chemical warfare research and development (2) The chemical research and development facilities in France, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Sweden and western Germany would increase by approximately 50 percent the Soviet chemical research space adaptable to chemical warfare research. (3) Soviet development of the German nerve gases that produce an extremely high percentage of mortality, could be greatly enhanced by the German research chem- ists and technicians who conducted the original work on the nerve gases. (4) A moderate number of facilities in France, Sweden, and Western Germany for study and production of the more common chemical warfare agents would increase the Soviet chemical warfare production capacity. (5) Two French chemical warfare experimental stations and one Belgian station would represent a minor increase in the Soviet's present physical facilities. (6) Stocks of protective masks and clothing of improved design in Sweden, Belgium, and France would enhance the USSR position in defensive chemical warfare. c. Disadvantages. No disadvantages to the USSR chemical warfare program are foreseen. d. Discussion. (1) Chemical research laboratories which the USSR would acquire in Western Europe, in comparison with her own laboratories, would be of considerable value. Similarly the USSR would acquire capable chemical research personnel and, of greater immediate importance, the skilled technical force to operate an enlarged chemical warfare industry. In three to six months the laboratories and personnel could increase the Soviet capability in these categories by approximately 50 percent. (2) In chemical warfare the countries of Western Europe and the Middle East, with the exception of France, have concerned themselves only with the defensive aspects. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Sweden, and Switzerland the respective armies are to an appreciable degree equipped to withstand attack by chemical warfare agents. It is probable that some technical information of importance to the USSR's defensive position might be obtained from the staffs of these armies. (3) France besides her defensive preparations, has conducted research on the nerve gases and has now progressed to a large-scale laboratory production of one of these agents. The two French chemical warfare stations, though under-equipped and under-manned, would be of value to the USSR. Protective masks developed by various countries of Western Europe which would be improvements over existing So- viet equipment would place USSR troops in a better defensive position in chemical war- fare. (4) The numerous chemical research centers in western Germany, western Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy could figure in long-range development although their immediate value might not be great, as the USSR has 27

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    "ocrText": "b. Advantages.\n(1) The 15-20,000 qualified chemists and chemical engineers in Western\nEurope would represent an estimated 50 percent increase in personnel under Soviet\ncontrol capable of conducting chemical warfare research and development\n(2) The chemical research and development facilities in France, Switzerland,\nItaly, Belgium, Sweden and western Germany would increase by approximately 50\npercent the Soviet chemical research space adaptable to chemical warfare research.\n(3) Soviet development of the German nerve gases that produce an extremely\nhigh percentage of mortality, could be greatly enhanced by the German research chem-\nists and technicians who conducted the original work on the nerve gases.\n(4) A moderate number of facilities in France, Sweden, and Western Germany\nfor study and production of the more common chemical warfare agents would increase\nthe Soviet chemical warfare production capacity.\n(5) Two French chemical warfare experimental stations and one Belgian\nstation would represent a minor increase in the Soviet's present physical facilities.\n(6) Stocks of protective masks and clothing of improved design in Sweden,\nBelgium, and France would enhance the USSR position in defensive chemical warfare.\nc. Disadvantages.\nNo disadvantages to the USSR chemical warfare program are foreseen.\nd. Discussion.\n(1) Chemical research laboratories which the USSR would acquire in Western\nEurope, in comparison with her own laboratories, would be of considerable value.\nSimilarly the USSR would acquire capable chemical research personnel and, of greater\nimmediate importance, the skilled technical force to operate an enlarged chemical\nwarfare industry. In three to six months the laboratories and personnel could increase\nthe Soviet capability in these categories by approximately 50 percent.\n(2) In chemical warfare the countries of Western Europe and the Middle\nEast, with the exception of France, have concerned themselves only with the defensive\naspects. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Sweden, and Switzerland the respective armies\nare to an appreciable degree equipped to withstand attack by chemical warfare agents.\nIt is probable that some technical information of importance to the USSR's defensive\nposition might be obtained from the staffs of these armies.\n(3) France besides her defensive preparations, has conducted research on\nthe nerve gases and has now progressed to a large-scale laboratory production of one\nof these agents. The two French chemical warfare stations, though under-equipped\nand under-manned, would be of value to the USSR. Protective masks developed by\nvarious countries of Western Europe which would be improvements over existing So-\nviet equipment would place USSR troops in a better defensive position in chemical war-\nfare.\n(4) The numerous chemical research centers in western Germany, western\nAustria, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy could figure in long-range\ndevelopment although their immediate value might not be great, as the USSR has\n27"
}