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(b) The Research Centers which would be of the most immediate benefit
to the USSR are the weapons laboratories in Switzerland, Sweden, and Italy; the aero-
dynamics facilities in France; the nuclear physics laboratories in France, Switzerland,
Belgium, and Scandinavia; and the electronics laboratories at Paris, France and at
Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
(c) The advantage accruing in laboratory facilities, i.e., expropriated
precision measuring instruments, cyclotrons, wind tunnels, and other equipment, would
range from an immediate gain of some 5 percent in USSR domestic efficiency to a
steadily increasing gain of some 50 percent for all the Soviet area.
(2) Scientific Manpower.
(a) In Western Europe there are approximately 260,000 students in
higher educational institutions, while the USSR proper has about 660,000 such students.
The present Soviet zone of influence probably increases the number of Soviet-dominated
students by approximately 20 percent. If the USSR were to take over the Western
European educational system in toto, the Soviets would increase their reservoir of
potential scientists, engineers, and physicians by about 40 percent.
(b) By using a broad estimate based on the fact that most of the coun-
tries of Western Europe have, on an average, a comparable number of scientists per
head of population, it is believed that the Soviet scientific manpower potential, both
industrial and academic, would be increased about 80 percent given full collaboration
from these scientists. However, practical difficulties such as employing each in his
most useful field, the possibility of non-collaboration, and the inadequacy of certain
facilities would suggest about 50 percent as the final probable advantage.
(c) It is believed that the technological advance made by the USSR
since World War II is due in large measure to the use of those Europeans, particularly
the Germans, not under control of the Soviets. By applying the lessons learned in the
Soviet zones of Germany and Austria, the USSR could begin to receive certain benefits
from the services of acquired scientific personnel in six months to a year.
(3)
Scientific Projects under Development.
(a) The extent of the benefits to be derived would depend on the status
of the research projects in the acquired laboratories and on how closely such projects
parallel Soviet paths of investigation.
(b) The laboratories mentioned in 4 (a) above, are engaged in research
projects which, because of the quality of the men, equipment, and type of investigations,
would become Russia's chief asset in scientific war potential.
(4)
Total Advantages to USSR.
A projected scientific advantage would result from Soviet control of
Western Europe; that is, by the integration of the scientific strength now scattered
among the independent European nationals. In Sweden and Belgium, although finan-
cial support is considered adequate, there is a lack of competent nuclear physicists;
in Denmark and Italy there are good scientists but they are hampered by a lack of
36
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"ocrText": "(is\n(b) The Research Centers which would be of the most immediate benefit\nto the USSR are the weapons laboratories in Switzerland, Sweden, and Italy; the aero-\ndynamics facilities in France; the nuclear physics laboratories in France, Switzerland,\nBelgium, and Scandinavia; and the electronics laboratories at Paris, France and at\nEindhoven, The Netherlands.\n(c) The advantage accruing in laboratory facilities, i.e., expropriated\nprecision measuring instruments, cyclotrons, wind tunnels, and other equipment, would\nrange from an immediate gain of some 5 percent in USSR domestic efficiency to a\nsteadily increasing gain of some 50 percent for all the Soviet area.\n(2) Scientific Manpower.\n(a) In Western Europe there are approximately 260,000 students in\nhigher educational institutions, while the USSR proper has about 660,000 such students.\nThe present Soviet zone of influence probably increases the number of Soviet-dominated\nstudents by approximately 20 percent. If the USSR were to take over the Western\nEuropean educational system in toto, the Soviets would increase their reservoir of\npotential scientists, engineers, and physicians by about 40 percent.\n(b) By using a broad estimate based on the fact that most of the coun-\ntries of Western Europe have, on an average, a comparable number of scientists per\nhead of population, it is believed that the Soviet scientific manpower potential, both\nindustrial and academic, would be increased about 80 percent given full collaboration\nfrom these scientists. However, practical difficulties such as employing each in his\nmost useful field, the possibility of non-collaboration, and the inadequacy of certain\nfacilities would suggest about 50 percent as the final probable advantage.\n(c) It is believed that the technological advance made by the USSR\nsince World War II is due in large measure to the use of those Europeans, particularly\nthe Germans, not under control of the Soviets. By applying the lessons learned in the\nSoviet zones of Germany and Austria, the USSR could begin to receive certain benefits\nfrom the services of acquired scientific personnel in six months to a year.\n(3)\nScientific Projects under Development.\n(a) The extent of the benefits to be derived would depend on the status\nof the research projects in the acquired laboratories and on how closely such projects\nparallel Soviet paths of investigation.\n(b) The laboratories mentioned in 4 (a) above, are engaged in research\nprojects which, because of the quality of the men, equipment, and type of investigations,\nwould become Russia's chief asset in scientific war potential.\n(4)\nTotal Advantages to USSR.\nA projected scientific advantage would result from Soviet control of\nWestern Europe; that is, by the integration of the scientific strength now scattered\namong the independent European nationals. In Sweden and Belgium, although finan-\ncial support is considered adequate, there is a lack of competent nuclear physicists;\nin Denmark and Italy there are good scientists but they are hampered by a lack of\n36"
}