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{
    "localId": "225249309",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 67-48, Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas",
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    "id": "225249309",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249309",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 67-48, Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249309",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 8,
            "logicalDate": "1948-10-08",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1948
        }
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875479/875479-01-06.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\ngreater security to the population, the guerrillas must be all but completely eliminated\nbefore their cost to the government will become negligible.\nC. The guerrillas are useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against the US.\nTheir activity can assure the Kremlin of a continued drain of US dollars for unproduc-\ntive military expenditures, as well as for rehabilitation.\nd. Guerrilla operations are cheap, requiring neither a large number of men nor\nlarge expenditures in heavy equipment. So far the guerrillas have subsisted largely on\nfood collected on forage raids and have been armed, to a considerable extent through\nsatellite effort, with British equipment obtained during World War II or with captured\nGerman and Italian equipment; there is no reason to believe that the guerrillas cannot\ncontinue to be supplied and armed in much the same manner.\nThere is no evidence that the Kremlin feels that, because of the strong US interest\nin Greece and current US assistance to the Greeks in the form of money, matériel, and\nadvisers, it would be wise to defer further guerrilla action until US interest had waned.\nIt is probable, moreover, that any such consideration would be outweighed by the real-\nization that a prolonged period of inactivity could well destroy guerrilla enthusiasm\nfor the struggle and irreparably damage the present guerrilla organization. It also\nseems unlikely that the Soviets would be deterred from supporting the guerrillas by\nany fear of UN action to seal Greece's northern borders. The USSR has been able to\nblock any decisive UN action and probably feels confident that, as in the case of Pales-\ntine, no UN member (especially the US) would be willing to send troops to Greece.\nIt is true that Tito's defection raises practical difficulties in the matter of aiding\nthe guerrillas. Of the three northern neighbors, Yugoslavia had been the principal\nsource of supply and probably of military advice for the guerrillas. Currently, Yugo-\nslay border guards are still passively cooperating with the rebels, and the \"free\" Greek\nradio continues to operate from Yugoslav soil. It is possible, however, that Yugoslavia\nwill cease giving active aid to Markos because: (1) the Tito-Cominform split is keep-\ning Yugoslavia preoccupied with its own affairs and probably has not encouraged any\ndesire to assist the Kremlin in its foreign-policy aims; and (2) it might be convenient\neventually to effect a reconciliation with the Athens government, thereby eliminating\nan enemy on the south and keeping the door to the western world open. Tito still\nhas an active interest in Greek Macedonia, and a number of guerrillas are probably\nready to serve those interests, but they will undoubtedly be restrained until a more\npropitious time. Nevertheless, even with the defection of Yugoslavia, the Kremlin\ncan still supply the guerrillas through Albania and Bulgaria at only slightly increased\neffort and expense.\n2. With respect to the second question, it is apparent that the guerrillas, despite con-\ntinued Soviet-satellite aid, cannot now effect a military domination of Greece. Guer-\nrillas capabilities are slowly being reduced under steady pressure from the army; guer-\nrilla movements are being somewhat restricted, their supply problems (especially in\nareas distant from the Albanian and Bulgarian borders) are increasing, and the local\ndefenses of the government-held villages are improving. Hit-and-run tactics, how-\never, will still be feasible so long as supplies reach the guerrillas. Such activity, even on\n3\nSECRET"
}