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    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 69, Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of United States Counteraction",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 69, Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of United States Counteraction",
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        {
            "day": 9,
            "logicalDate": "1948-02-09",
            "month": 2,
            "year": 1948
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    "seq": 3,
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    "ocrText": "s.\n\"NATIONAL\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nN\nSERVICE\"\n1\nORE 69\nCopy No.\nPOSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OF GREECE IN THE\nABSENCE OF US COUNTERACTION\nSUMMARY\n1. Assumption: that the \"Markos Government\" has gained effective control of all\nGreece, including Crete and the Aegean and Ionian Islands.\n2. The problem: to estimate the consequences of the assumed development in the\nabsence of specific US counteraction.\n3. A direct consequence of the assumption would be that the USSR would gain\naccess to advance bases for: (a) military domination of the Straits; (b) envelopment\nof Turkey; and (c) interdiction of waterborne traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean.\n4. Far more disastrous than the loss of Greece itself would be the psychological\nand political repercussions of that event. These repercussions, if unchecked by US\ncounteraction, could result in international panic.\n5. There would be an immediate clamor for US economic assistance and military\nguarantees on a scale far exceeding what would have been required to prevent the fall\nof Greece and involving greater risk of collision with the USSR.\n6. Iran and the Kurdish area of Iraq would probably fall under Soviet domination,\ngiving the USSR effective control of the Iranian and Iraqi oil fields. Turkey and the\nArab States would continue to resist Soviet domination, but would be in grave jeopardy.\n7. Italy would probably go Communist within a few months. In France, however,\nDeGaulle would come to power. Great Britain would seek urgently to check the reper-\ncussions of the fall of Greece and to this end would press for US commitment to a defi-\nnite program of combined strategic counteraction. Spain would seek to escape from\npolitical isolation into military alliance with the US.\n8. From the economic point of view, the most serious consequence of the fall of\nGreece would be the possible loss of the petroleum resources of the Middle East (40 per-\ncent of proven world reserves) through political repercussions in that area. Another\nserious possibility would be that of Communist \"capture\" of the Greek and Italian mer-\nchant fleets. Otherwise the USSR would gain no great benefit, nor would the US and\nWestern Europe suffer any great loss from Soviet control of Greece, Italy, or Iran.\n9. The European Recovery Program would be little affected by the loss of Greece,\nper se, but it would suffer severe adverse effects from the psychological and political\nrepercussions of that event.\nNote: The information in this report is as of 28 January 1948, at which time the report was sub-\nmitted to the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council for coordination.\nThe Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, and the Air Intelligence Division, Direc-\ntorate of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, have concurred in the military aspects\nof this paper but have not commented on the political aspects. The statement of the Intelli-\ngence Organization of the Department of State disassociating itself from the paper is set\nforth in Enclosure \"A.\" The dissent of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department,\nis set forth in Enclosure \"B.\"\n1"
}