Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "225249363",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 69, Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of United States Counteraction",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249363"
}

{
    "id": "225249363",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249363",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 69, Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of United States Counteraction",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249363",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875479/875479-03-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875479/875479-03-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875479/875479-03-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 13,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249363",
    "naId": 225249363,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 9,
            "logicalDate": "1948-02-09",
            "month": 2,
            "year": 1948
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875479/875479-03-07.jpg",
    "mediaId": "0a2668beb4e373d1",
    "ocrText": "lifetime of Ibn Saud, but on his death will tend to break up, with consequent jeopardy\nto US oil interests there in the circumstances envisaged.\n11. ITALY.\nContinued reliance on US support would be the only course open to the De Gasperi\nGovernment. It would clamor for greatly increased economic aid and for military\nguarantees. The disillusionment of the Italian people would be such, however, that,\nwithout convincing evidence of a new US determination to defend Italy on such a scale\nas to guarantee that country against becoming a battleground, De Gasperi's popular\nsupport would tend to disintegrate. The Communists, as the only practical alternative\nto De Gasperi in the circumstances, would correspondingly gain strength. If a\nfree election were to be held, this popular reaction would probably carry the Commu-\nnists to power by political processes. If not, the demoralization of their opponents\nwould probably permit the Communists to seize power by force. One way or the other,\nthe fall of Greece to international Communism would probably be followed within\na\nfew months by the fall of Italy.\n12. FRANCE.\nThe Schuman Government would fall almost at once, but in France the immediate\nalternative to Schuman would be, not Communism, but De Gaulle. If De Gaulle\nfailed to bring order, military strength, and economic recovery, the only remaining\nalternative would be Communism. On this basis De Gaulle would demand not only\ngreatly increased economic support, but also US aid in French rearmament and a firm\nmilitary alliance.\n13. The UNITED KINGDOM.\nOfficial and popular opinion in Great Britain would be profoundly shocked by the\nloss of Greece and the consequent danger to traditional British interests in the Eastern\nMediterranean and Middle East. The prestige of the US, the Labor Government, and\nthe Foreign Minister alike would suffer. There would, however, be no reversal of\npresent British policy. Rather the British reaction would consist of urgent efforts to\ncontrol the damage, both directly and by pressing the US for more effective implemen-\ntation of the \"Truman Doctrine.\" These efforts would include an endeavor to revi-\ntalize combined strategic planning, as during the war, and to commit the US to a\ndefinite program of combined strategic counteraction.\nOn its own account the UK would suspend redeployment and demobilization, re-\ninforce the Eastern Mediterranean, intensify its efforts to reach satisfactory military\nagreements with the Arab States and press more vigorously for the formation of a\nWestern Bloc in Europe.\nAt the same time the UK would urge upon the United States the combined develop-\nment of a strategic position along the southern littoral of the Eastern Mediterranean, a\nreconsideration of the Palestine problem, and the provision of requisite economic, moral,\nand military support for the threatened countries of Europe and the Near and Middle\nEast.\nIn consequence of the UK's already acute dollar crisis, the impaired prospects of\nthe European Recovery Program, and the emergency measures envisaged, the UK\nitself would require additional US financial and economic assistance.\n5"
}