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{
    "localId": "225249402",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 77-48, Chinese Communist Capabilities for Control of All China",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 77-48, Chinese Communist Capabilities for Control of All China",
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            "logicalDate": "1948-12-10",
            "month": 12,
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    "ocrText": "CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR CONTROL OF ALL CHINA\nThis paper assumes that the intention of the Chinese Communist Party is to gain\nabsolute control of all China. It is the purpose of this paper to determine whether the\nChinese Communists are capable of so doing.\nThe Military Phase\nThe strength and the tactical success of the Chinese Communist Forces have been\nthe chief instruments in the ascent of the Communist Party, and will continue to be\nso until all organized resistance by the Nationalist Army has been overcome. As the\nNationalist Army is the major obstacle to that ascent, the mission of the Communist\nForces will be to proceed with the annihilation of the Nationalists' vital strength. The\nCommunist Forces, through extremely able use of available human resources, through\nsupport (derived or extracted) from the populace in Communist-held areas, and\nthrough a clever use of propaganda, have overcome initial limitations in the materials\nof war and have reached or exceeded parity with the Nationalists in numbers, weapons,\nand equipment. The Communists' greatest advantage over their opponent is found\nin this expert exploitation of human resources, and their prospect of eventual victory\nrests upon that ability.\na.\nThe Human Factor.\nHigh morale and excellent leadership, repetitive and finally credible propa-\nganda themes, plus a well-developed sense of purpose, have elevated the once materially\nweak Communist Forces to their present position of superiority in the civil conflict.\nThe morale of the opposing Nationalists is excessively low, and is reflected not only in\na marked preference for passive tactics but often in a wholesale refusal to fight. Entire\narmies surrender en masse, and even those units which choose to fight often find that\nthe defections of neighboring units have rendered their position tactically untenable.\nAs continued resistance appears pointless, and as Communist propaganda emphasizes\nthis, the defenses soon collapse. Further, the loss of such defense centers as Chin-\nhsien, Mukden, or Tsinan, has the same effect in an over-all strategic sense as do local\ndefections in a tactical sense.\nCommunist propaganda is aimed both at strengthening internal Communist\nmorale and at weakening the morale of National Government supporters. A simple\ntheme, constantly repeated-things are better under the Communists-ecreates in\ntime, and under the proper circumstances, a conviction in the minds of the Nationalist\nofficers and men that this is true. The Communists have offered equivalent grades to\nthose who \"come over\"; they offer food as a lure; they reiterate the essential brother-\nhood of all Chinese and the futility of internecine warfare (especially the futility of\ncontinued resistance to the Communist tide) ; they point out corruption and discrimina-\ntion within the Nationalist Forces; in fact there is, in Communist propaganda, some-\nthing for everybody. It is effective, for the will of the Nationalists to resist has been\n1"
}