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SECRET operational activity only. Too much emphasis has been placed on operation without proper attention to supply procurement, financial support, and proper maintenance and storage. Approximately 50 percent serviceability of aircraft is maintained in tac- tical units of the Air Force. Under sustained operations, serviceability would drop to approximately 30 percent. (3) The Naval Patrol has a total strength of 1,780 and has a wartime mission of serving as an auxiliary defense force although it now performs coastal patrol func- tions. Having only a small number of patrol craft and limited maintenance facilities, the Naval Patrol has not demonstrated effective capabilities to protect the long Philip- pine coastline. b. The Reserve Force is not fully organized. The only reserve unit yet consti- tuted is the Constabulary which, by law, is a part of the Reserve Force. It is estimated that at present not more than one regiment of reserves from World War II veterans and ex-guerrillas could be raised and organized within 30 to 60 days. In addition, three thousand universal military trainees, estimated to be the maximum training capability of the Republic, could be utilized. 2. THE CONSTABULARY. The Philippine Constabulary, a reserve component and the largest single element of the Armed Forces, merits special mention. The Constabulary has a total strength of 18,862, including 2,056 troops from the Ground Force, and serves in peacetime as the national police force under the supervision of the Secretary of Interior. It is divided into provincial commands with heaviest concentrations in central Luzon and Mindanao. The current objective of the Constabulary to restore and maintain law and order in the disaffected central Luzon provinces has not been attained. However, Constabulary forces have been able to reduce the scale of Hukbalahap lawlessness thereby preventing it from becoming a serious threat to the stability of the national government. Aside from the long-standing agrarian discontent, which is the fundamental cause of Huk activities, the Constabulary's failure to achieve its mission is attributed to: (1) lack of aggressiveness on the part of lower echelons; (2) widespread civilian pos- session of firearms from both Japanese and US sources and from loosely controlled com- mercial imports of small arms; (3) guerrilla tactics of the Huks; (4) lack of trained and disciplined personnel and equipment as well as inadequate pay; and (5) occasional passive resistance from the local populace which resents alleged Constabulary "abuses" committed during anti-Huk operations. 3. REQUIREMENTS. For fiscal year 1949 the government has appropriated approximately $27 million for national defense (or about 23 percent of its total budget) In addition, about $15.7 million was appropriated for the Constabulary. The Armed Forces are equipped with US Army surplus equipment much of which is inoperable because of improper distribu- tion of parts. Partly as a result of climate and terrain, maintenance of the remainder is generally poor. beniazi 918 BIE 20

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\noperational activity only. Too much emphasis has been placed on operation without\nproper attention to supply procurement, financial support, and proper maintenance\nand storage. Approximately 50 percent serviceability of aircraft is maintained in tac-\ntical units of the Air Force. Under sustained operations, serviceability would drop to\napproximately 30 percent.\n(3) The Naval Patrol has a total strength of 1,780 and has a wartime mission\nof serving as an auxiliary defense force although it now performs coastal patrol func-\ntions. Having only a small number of patrol craft and limited maintenance facilities,\nthe Naval Patrol has not demonstrated effective capabilities to protect the long Philip-\npine coastline.\nb. The Reserve Force is not fully organized. The only reserve unit yet consti-\ntuted is the Constabulary which, by law, is a part of the Reserve Force. It is estimated\nthat at present not more than one regiment of reserves from World War II veterans\nand ex-guerrillas could be raised and organized within 30 to 60 days. In addition, three\nthousand universal military trainees, estimated to be the maximum training capability\nof the Republic, could be utilized.\n2.\nTHE CONSTABULARY.\nThe Philippine Constabulary, a reserve component and the largest single element\nof the Armed Forces, merits special mention. The Constabulary has a total strength\nof 18,862, including 2,056 troops from the Ground Force, and serves in peacetime\nas the national police force under the supervision of the Secretary of Interior. It is\ndivided into provincial commands with heaviest concentrations in central Luzon and\nMindanao. The current objective of the Constabulary to restore and maintain law\nand order in the disaffected central Luzon provinces has not been attained. However,\nConstabulary forces have been able to reduce the scale of Hukbalahap lawlessness\nthereby preventing it from becoming a serious threat to the stability of the national\ngovernment.\nAside from the long-standing agrarian discontent, which is the fundamental cause\nof Huk activities, the Constabulary's failure to achieve its mission is attributed to:\n(1) lack of aggressiveness on the part of lower echelons; (2) widespread civilian pos-\nsession of firearms from both Japanese and US sources and from loosely controlled com-\nmercial imports of small arms; (3) guerrilla tactics of the Huks; (4) lack of trained\nand disciplined personnel and equipment as well as inadequate pay; and (5) occasional\npassive resistance from the local populace which resents alleged Constabulary \"abuses\"\ncommitted during anti-Huk operations.\n3. REQUIREMENTS.\nFor fiscal year 1949 the government has appropriated approximately $27 million\nfor national defense (or about 23 percent of its total budget) In addition, about $15.7\nmillion was appropriated for the Constabulary. The Armed Forces are equipped with\nUS Army surplus equipment much of which is inoperable because of improper distribu-\ntion of parts. Partly as a result of climate and terrain, maintenance of the remainder\nis generally poor.\nbeniazi\n918\nBIE\n20"
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