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10 MAJOR PROBLEMS OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY 1. POSITION OF THE DE GASPERI GOVERNMENT. The imminent threat of economic collapse and political chaos which overhung the De Gasperi Government at the beginning of 1948 had by the middle of the year been removed, permitting De Gasperi, still Premier, to turn from day-to-day crises to more fundamental questions of foreign and domestic policy. The national elections of 18 April 1948 gave the Christian Democratic Party a majority of seats in the new Parliament and confirmed the right of that Party to be the dominant element in the Cabinet until the holding of new elections, scheduled for 1953. This base of Christian Democratic political strength was broadened by the con- tinued Cabinet participation of the conservative Liberal Party and of the moderate- leftist Socialist Workers (PSLI) and Republican Parties. Even before the April elections, the inflation that had been leading toward eco- nomic collapse and social upheaval was slowed down by the vigorous deflationary meas- ures taken by Budget Minister (now President of the Republic) Einaudi in September 1947. Although this anti-inflationary program acted as a temporary brake on manu- facturing, the level of industrial production has since resumed its upward course, and wages and prices have remained reasonably steady. A further stabilizing factor was the assurance that the US, through the European Recovery Program, would provide considerable materials and credits for the rehabilitation of the Italian economy and the gradual raising of the Italian standard of living, which even in the prewar period had been lower than that of most European countries. Thus, by the summer of 1948, having been relieved of the critical threats to Italy's economic situation and his own political position, De Gasperi could turn his attention to the problem of guaranteeing the political and military security of Italy through alignment with other Western Powers. The Communists and left-wing Socialists, comprising one-third of Parliament, have offered bitter opposition on this issue, and have forced the government to approach the problem with caution. In addition, many moderate Socialists and the left wing of the Christian Democrats have argued for a clear-cut course of Italian neutrality. De Gasperi realizes that he would obtain greater popular support for his foreign policies if he could achieve a conspicuous success in fulfilling domestic needs. He faces special difficulties, however, in obtaining the long-term measures of economic and social reform necessary to this success. The extreme Left will oppose whatever recommendations the government may make in this field. Moreover, difficulties inher- ent in attaining the promised and badly needed changes are aggravated by the reluc- tance of the Liberals and even many of the Premier's own party to support any far- reaching economic or social legislation. Despite these obstacles, De Gasperi realizes that failure to take positive action would make him vulnerable to criticism from the moderate Left as well as the far Left, would strengthen the Communists, and would 3

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    "ocrText": "10\nMAJOR PROBLEMS OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY\n1.\nPOSITION OF THE DE GASPERI GOVERNMENT.\nThe imminent threat of economic collapse and political chaos which overhung the\nDe Gasperi Government at the beginning of 1948 had by the middle of the year been\nremoved, permitting De Gasperi, still Premier, to turn from day-to-day crises to more\nfundamental questions of foreign and domestic policy.\nThe national elections of 18 April 1948 gave the Christian Democratic Party\na\nmajority of seats in the new Parliament and confirmed the right of that Party to be\nthe dominant element in the Cabinet until the holding of new elections, scheduled for\n1953. This base of Christian Democratic political strength was broadened by the con-\ntinued Cabinet participation of the conservative Liberal Party and of the moderate-\nleftist Socialist Workers (PSLI) and Republican Parties.\nEven before the April elections, the inflation that had been leading toward eco-\nnomic collapse and social upheaval was slowed down by the vigorous deflationary meas-\nures taken by Budget Minister (now President of the Republic) Einaudi in September\n1947. Although this anti-inflationary program acted as a temporary brake on manu-\nfacturing, the level of industrial production has since resumed its upward course, and\nwages and prices have remained reasonably steady. A further stabilizing factor was\nthe assurance that the US, through the European Recovery Program, would provide\nconsiderable materials and credits for the rehabilitation of the Italian economy and\nthe gradual raising of the Italian standard of living, which even in the prewar period\nhad been lower than that of most European countries.\nThus, by the summer of 1948, having been relieved of the critical threats to\nItaly's economic situation and his own political position, De Gasperi could turn his\nattention to the problem of guaranteeing the political and military security of Italy\nthrough alignment with other Western Powers. The Communists and left-wing\nSocialists, comprising one-third of Parliament, have offered bitter opposition on this\nissue, and have forced the government to approach the problem with caution. In\naddition, many moderate Socialists and the left wing of the Christian Democrats have\nargued for a clear-cut course of Italian neutrality.\nDe Gasperi realizes that he would obtain greater popular support for his foreign\npolicies if he could achieve a conspicuous success in fulfilling domestic needs. He\nfaces special difficulties, however, in obtaining the long-term measures of economic\nand social reform necessary to this success. The extreme Left will oppose whatever\nrecommendations the government may make in this field. Moreover, difficulties inher-\nent in attaining the promised and badly needed changes are aggravated by the reluc-\ntance of the Liberals and even many of the Premier's own party to support any far-\nreaching economic or social legislation. Despite these obstacles, De Gasperi realizes\nthat failure to take positive action would make him vulnerable to criticism from the\nmoderate Left as well as the far Left, would strengthen the Communists, and would\n3"
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