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{
    "localId": "225249474",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 3-49, Consequences for United States Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 3-49, Consequences for United States Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1949-02-28",
            "month": 2,
            "year": 1949
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nENCLOSURE \"A\"\nDISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY\n1. The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, dissents from ORE 3-49,\nConsequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949. The Intelligence\nDivision does not believe that US troop withdrawal would be the major factor in the\ncollapse of the Republic of Korea. Neither does the Intelligence Division believe that\n\"such withdrawal would allow immediate exploitation of South Korea by the USSR.'\n2. The Intelligence Division believes that an invasion of South Korea by the\nNorth Korean People's Army is a possibility at present, and recognizes that the likeli-\nhood of such an invasion will increase somewhat, following the departure of United\nStates troops. However, the Intelligence Division considers that an invasion is a pos-\nsibility, rather than a probability, for the following reasons:\na. Action short of invasion might bring about the result desired by North\nKorean and, presumably, Soviet authorities, without incurring the risks involved in a\nmilitary operation. Such action could include the instigation of Communist-led dis-\nturbances in South Korea, the infiltration into the south of armed and trained agents\nand guerrillas, and continuation of border incidents on the 38th parallel.\nb. The People's Army still is a relatively small, although well trained and\nefficient, military force. At present it does not have, of itself, the preponderance of\nstrength over South Korean military forces which would be required to insure victory\nin an armed struggle. The People's Army, as a force in being, may well be considered\nby North Korean authorities to have greater value as a constant threat than if it were\ncommitted to a military adventure which conceivably could result in its defeat or in\nexpenditure of its strength without proportionate returns.\n3. The Intelligence Division concludes, for the reasons cited above, that an in-\nvasion of South Korea by North Korean forces is a possibility rather than a probability\nat the present time; and further, that this state will continue until such time as South\nKorean military forces are reduced to such a state as to render them incapable of resist-\ning significant North Korean military action.\n4. Further, it is the belief of the Intelligence Division that political and economic\nfactors other than the presence or absence of United States troops will have a decisive\ninfluence on the future course of events in Korea, and that the continued maintenance\nof a small United States Army force in South Korea would be only a relatively minor\npsychological contribution to the stability of the Republic of Korea. If continued eco-\nnomic and military aid to the Republic of Korea, to the extent presently projected, plus\nthe presence of a United Nations Commission, are not sufficient to sustain South Korean\nmorale and will to resist Communist expansion, it appears doubtful that the presence\nof a small United States combat force would do so.\n7\nrop SECRIT"
}