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{
    "localId": "225249474",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 3-49, Consequences for United States Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949",
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    "id": "225249474",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 3-49, Consequences for United States Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nthe adverse effects of the withdrawal on the will of the southern Koreans to resist\nCommunist revolts and invasions. Their presence probably would not, however, pre-\nvent the disintegration of the Republic of Korea and eventual Communist domination\nif US troops are withdrawn before the Korean security forces are capable of resisting a\ncombination of external and internal attacks.\nthat\n1.\nEFFECTS IN JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.\nin\na.\nPolitical and Psychological.\nThe political and psychological consequences of US troop withdrawal from\nKorea would be felt most acutely in Japan. Although many Japanese may anticipate\neventual Communist domination of all Korea as a logical development, the impact of\nactuality would be considerable. Japanese fear of Communist power would increase\nalong with doubts of US willingness or ability to defend Japan. The Japan Communist\nParty would be strengthened by easier communication with Communist forces across\nthe Tsushima straits and by the adherence of opportunistic converts. Similar political\nand psychological effects would follow to a lesser degree in other Far Eastern countries.\nGroups who have received or hoped for US support might question the sincerity of US\nintentions to oppose Communism and might feel forced to collaborate with heartened\nnative Communists and assume a more moderate attitude toward the USSR.\nb. Military.\nAssuming that US troop withdrawal meant consolidation of Communist con-\ntrol over all Korea, the USSR would be able to develop bases in the South from which\nthey could launch air, airborne, or amphibious attacks on Japan, Formosa, and the\nRyukyus, or submarine forays against shipping in Japanese waters.\nc. Economic.\nEconomic consequences, as such, would be unimportant. Japan would lose a\npotential small market for industrial goods and a potential producer of rice. The USSR\nwould gain an additional source of unskilled labor for projects in the Soviet Far East.\nThe potential contribution of consumer goods, particularly textiles, might also enhance\nthe total productive effort of an integrated Korean-Manchurian-Soviet Far East\neconomy.\nd. Propaganda.\nUS troop withdrawal would, of course, enhance the US position by weakening\nSoviet propaganda on the issue of imperialism and aggression, but it would subject\nKoreans to inevitable terror propaganda that would play upon their isolated position\nin the Far East. Furthermore, it must be realized that the probable subsequent col-\nlapse of the Republic of Korea would be a news item of such magnitude as to offset any\nfavorable propaganda effects that had been achieved either in Korea or in the Far\nEast generally.\n2 The deep concern aroused in Japan over the recent newspaper reports that the US might\nwithdraw troops from Japan is a sample of the reaction that would follow US troop withdrawal\nfrom Korea. The concern over a withdrawal from Korea, of course, would not be as great\nas that over a US withdrawal from Japan.\n3\nTOP SECRET"
}