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    "localId": "225249529",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 14-49, The Emergency Capabilities of the German Railway Systems",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 14-49, The Emergency Capabilities of the German Railway Systems",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 2,
            "logicalDate": "1949-08-02",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1949
        }
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{
    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) OF (E)\nwary\n12.7.77\nDept. of State letter,\nprom\nNc NARS Date 1.30.28\nTHE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN RAILWAY SYSTEMS\nSUMMARY\nThe capabilities of the German railways\ning than would the railways of the Soviet\nhave been drastically reduced as a result of\nZone.\nwar damage, loss of equipment, and general\nThe most important factor now limiting the\ndeterioration. With the systems operating\ncapabilities of the German railways is their\nnearly at capacity in 1948, German railway\nshortage of serviceable rolling stock and mo-\ntraffic amounted to only 63 percent of the 1937\ntive power, the effects of which have been\ntonnage, though it represented approximately\nmost severe in the Soviet Zone. Whereas the\n67 percent of the 1937 ton-kilometer total.\nSoviet Zone has less than 60 percent of its pre-\nEven at this curtailed level of operations, how-\nwar freight car and locomotive inventories in\never, the railways of Germany have a capacity\noperation, the Bizone has over 70 percent of\nwhich would considerably exceed the mini-\nits prewar serviceable inventories available.\nmum requirements of the civilian population\nThe present capabilities of the German rail-\nin an emergency.\nways as a whole or of any particular zone could\nThe latent excess capacity of the German\nbe increased by provision of additional rolling\nrailroads would be adequate to sustain rela-\nstock and motive power. Because of dis-\ntively large-scale military movements. The\nmantling and general deterioration, however,\npresent German rail system has a capacity\nany considerable and sustained increase in the\nabout 20 percent greater than that which\npresent traffic of the Soviet Zone would re-\nwould be required to move a volume of traffic\nquire concurrently extensive rehabilitation\nequal to that of the depression year 1932, in\nmeasures. Since such rehabilitation would\nwhich the modern German economy probably\nbe slow, the added military traffic in an emer-\nreached its lowest prewar level. This surplus\ngency would probably absorb any expansion\nin excess of 1932 traffic amounts to at least 8\nof rail capacity in the Soviet Zone, leaving lit-\nbillion ton-kilometers annually, or roughly\ntle capacity which could be used for building\nup local industrial traffic. In the Western\n130,000 metric tons daily on the basis of the\nZones, on the other hand, it is probable that\n1948 average haul. As almost all of the sur-\nwith added rolling stock the railways could\nplus capacity would be available in Western\nsupport not only a large-scale increase in mili-\nGermany, western systems would be capable\ntary traffic over a more prolonged period, but\nof supporting a far greater increase of military\nmight at the same time carry an increased\ntraffic at any reduced civilian standard of liv-\nvolume of industrial traffic.\nNote: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Navy, and the Air Force\nhave concurred in this report; for a dissent by the Intelligence Division, Department\nof the Army, see Enclosure A, p. 13. This report is based on information available\nto CIA as of June 1949.\n1"
}