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TOR SHORET
than does Western manpower. Even potentially, the principal initial contribution to
US strategy to be made by Asiatic forces would be in terms of ground forces for the
defense of their respective areas.
lo
The most effective potential forces are those of the Western-populated
Commonwealth areas, Australia and New Zealand, but both these countries have
definite manpower limitations. Among the Asiatic nations, the armed force potential
of Japan is the most significant but utilization of this potential is presently confronted
by political objections. While the manpower potential of India and Pakistan is nu-
merically adequate to prevent Soviet invasion of the Indian subcontinent, the neutral
inclinations of these two nations and the limited availability of trained leaders and
materiel renders uncertain the timely provision of defensive forces adequate to insure
security of the subcontinent. Political factors also render uncertain the availability
of potential Far Eastern base areas for prewar development by the US. Development
of forces and bases under war conditions would constitute an added burden and might
well be ineffective.
(d) The Factor of Initiative.
The final difficulty to be encountered in the exploitation of the Far
East by the US is closely related to the problem of timely provision of potential forces
and bases. Possessing the initiative in opening hostilities, the USSR may be able to
mount surprise attacks in such force as to overcome limitations on its offensive capa-
bilities and thus overrun areas for which the defenses otherwise might be adequate.
This consideration applies particularly to Japan, Taiwan, and northwestern Pakistan.
Effective US counteraction following such a development would require a major war
effort. Despite the factors of disadvantage presented above, failure to solve these
difficulties and to accept the consequent political, economic, and military costs will
deprive the US of the increasing strategic advantage to be derived in the Far East and
may subject the US to an ultimately decisive threat from the USSR.
b.
Developing Significance.
As war may be prolonged beyond the first year or two of hostilities and initial
.
strategic stockpiles of one or both major belligerents may become depleted, the Far
East will become a region of increasing significance to US strategy. The factors of
importance in the initial military phase discussed under paragraph 1a (2) above will
continue to be of supplemental significance to the main theater of war, and, as the
center of Soviet war production is moved farther eastward, may acquire growing direct
significance. However, in this intermediate phase of hostilities, the principal develop-
ing importance of military factors in the Far East will derive from their bearing, in
conjunction with the political factors, on continued US access to the essential raw
materials of Southeast Asia and India and on the denial of those materials to the
USSR. A consolidated and strengthened US position in the Asiatic offshore island
chain extending from Japan to the Philippines would be a material factor in securing
the most favorable US ocean routes to Southeast Asia and to India also, since avail-
ability of the Suez route would appear doubtful. In addition, US development and
exploitation in that island chain would serve to deny Soviet access to the southern
15
for
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"ocrText": "TOR SHORET\nthan does Western manpower. Even potentially, the principal initial contribution to\nUS strategy to be made by Asiatic forces would be in terms of ground forces for the\ndefense of their respective areas.\nlo\nThe most effective potential forces are those of the Western-populated\nCommonwealth areas, Australia and New Zealand, but both these countries have\ndefinite manpower limitations. Among the Asiatic nations, the armed force potential\nof Japan is the most significant but utilization of this potential is presently confronted\nby political objections. While the manpower potential of India and Pakistan is nu-\nmerically adequate to prevent Soviet invasion of the Indian subcontinent, the neutral\ninclinations of these two nations and the limited availability of trained leaders and\nmateriel renders uncertain the timely provision of defensive forces adequate to insure\nsecurity of the subcontinent. Political factors also render uncertain the availability\nof potential Far Eastern base areas for prewar development by the US. Development\nof forces and bases under war conditions would constitute an added burden and might\nwell be ineffective.\n(d) The Factor of Initiative.\nThe final difficulty to be encountered in the exploitation of the Far\nEast by the US is closely related to the problem of timely provision of potential forces\nand bases. Possessing the initiative in opening hostilities, the USSR may be able to\nmount surprise attacks in such force as to overcome limitations on its offensive capa-\nbilities and thus overrun areas for which the defenses otherwise might be adequate.\nThis consideration applies particularly to Japan, Taiwan, and northwestern Pakistan.\nEffective US counteraction following such a development would require a major war\neffort. Despite the factors of disadvantage presented above, failure to solve these\ndifficulties and to accept the consequent political, economic, and military costs will\ndeprive the US of the increasing strategic advantage to be derived in the Far East and\nmay subject the US to an ultimately decisive threat from the USSR.\nb.\nDeveloping Significance.\nAs war may be prolonged beyond the first year or two of hostilities and initial\n.\nstrategic stockpiles of one or both major belligerents may become depleted, the Far\nEast will become a region of increasing significance to US strategy. The factors of\nimportance in the initial military phase discussed under paragraph 1a (2) above will\ncontinue to be of supplemental significance to the main theater of war, and, as the\ncenter of Soviet war production is moved farther eastward, may acquire growing direct\nsignificance. However, in this intermediate phase of hostilities, the principal develop-\ning importance of military factors in the Far East will derive from their bearing, in\nconjunction with the political factors, on continued US access to the essential raw\nmaterials of Southeast Asia and India and on the denial of those materials to the\nUSSR. A consolidated and strengthened US position in the Asiatic offshore island\nchain extending from Japan to the Philippines would be a material factor in securing\nthe most favorable US ocean routes to Southeast Asia and to India also, since avail-\nability of the Suez route would appear doubtful. In addition, US development and\nexploitation in that island chain would serve to deny Soviet access to the southern\n15\nfor"
}