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2.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR.
(d)
a. Considerations in the Initial and Intermediate Military Phases.
to
(1) Limitations.
10
(a) Offensive.
At the outset of hostilities, the Far East could not contribute signifi-
cantly to Soviet efforts to destroy the basic US war potential because
(i) the US would be temporarily independent of Far Eastern re-
sources;
(ii) the US war potential would be located primarily in the con-
tinental US;
(iii) the USSR at this stage would lack the military resources needed
to conduct a decisive intercontinental war; and
(iv) so long as Soviet forces in the Far East were dependent on a
combination of stockpiling and access to the Soviet European war production complex
over the Trans-Siberian railroad, grave risks would be involved in mounting an inter-
continental offensive from Soviet Far Eastern bases.
(b) Defensive.
The Far East's contribution to Soviet defensive strategy in this period
would be for the most part passive. No indigenous Far Eastern forces would be capable
of threatening the USSR with offensive action at the outset of hostilities, and, in any
case, the basic Soviet war potential, located in central and western areas of the USSR,
would be protected from Far East-based attack by extensive expanses of formidable
terrain which could not be feasibly surmounted except by US air action at long range.
For these reasons, the Far East at the outset of hostilities would not be an immediately
decisive strategic region from either the offensive or defensive point of view.
(2) Factors of Immediate and Developing Importance.
(a) Offensive.
Both in the prewar period and in the early stages of hostilities, the
USSR nevertheless woud have important strategic objectives in the Far East. Offen-
sively, Soviet expansion in the Far East could provide;
(i) Security of established USSR Far Eastern bases;
(ii) Access to important sources of strategic materials and their de-
nial to the US;
(iii) The potential for a self-sufficient Far Eastern war economy;
(iv) Additional sources of military manpower, including the trained
manpower of Japan which could be exploited effectively by use of former Japanese
officers and technicians presently held in the USSR; and
(v) Bases and routes of access to the continental US notably in
northeastern Asia and the North Pacific.
Taken in total and with requisite exploitation, the attainment of these
objectives ultimately would make a decisive contribution to the Soviet strategic
offensive.
blow
to
ovilost
17
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"ocrText": "TOP CECRET\n2.\nSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR.\n(d)\na. Considerations in the Initial and Intermediate Military Phases.\nto\n(1) Limitations.\n10\n(a) Offensive.\nAt the outset of hostilities, the Far East could not contribute signifi-\ncantly to Soviet efforts to destroy the basic US war potential because\n(i) the US would be temporarily independent of Far Eastern re-\nsources;\n(ii) the US war potential would be located primarily in the con-\ntinental US;\n(iii) the USSR at this stage would lack the military resources needed\nto conduct a decisive intercontinental war; and\n(iv) so long as Soviet forces in the Far East were dependent on a\ncombination of stockpiling and access to the Soviet European war production complex\nover the Trans-Siberian railroad, grave risks would be involved in mounting an inter-\ncontinental offensive from Soviet Far Eastern bases.\n(b) Defensive.\nThe Far East's contribution to Soviet defensive strategy in this period\nwould be for the most part passive. No indigenous Far Eastern forces would be capable\nof threatening the USSR with offensive action at the outset of hostilities, and, in any\ncase, the basic Soviet war potential, located in central and western areas of the USSR,\nwould be protected from Far East-based attack by extensive expanses of formidable\nterrain which could not be feasibly surmounted except by US air action at long range.\nFor these reasons, the Far East at the outset of hostilities would not be an immediately\ndecisive strategic region from either the offensive or defensive point of view.\n(2) Factors of Immediate and Developing Importance.\n(a) Offensive.\nBoth in the prewar period and in the early stages of hostilities, the\nUSSR nevertheless woud have important strategic objectives in the Far East. Offen-\nsively, Soviet expansion in the Far East could provide;\n(i) Security of established USSR Far Eastern bases;\n(ii) Access to important sources of strategic materials and their de-\nnial to the US;\n(iii) The potential for a self-sufficient Far Eastern war economy;\n(iv) Additional sources of military manpower, including the trained\nmanpower of Japan which could be exploited effectively by use of former Japanese\nofficers and technicians presently held in the USSR; and\n(v) Bases and routes of access to the continental US notably in\nnortheastern Asia and the North Pacific.\nTaken in total and with requisite exploitation, the attainment of these\nobjectives ultimately would make a decisive contribution to the Soviet strategic\noffensive.\nblow\nto\novilost\n17\nTOP OECRET"
}