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{
    "localId": "225249727",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 24-49, The USSR Petroleum Industry",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 24-49, The USSR Petroleum Industry",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249727",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 5,
            "logicalDate": "1950-01-05",
            "month": 1,
            "year": 1950
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{
    "seq": 10,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "4\nI\nTOP SECRET\nproblems. Since the Soviets have very limited\nunder possible wartime conditions were de-\nrefining facilities for the production of cata-\nrived in the same manner. However, in the\nlytic-cracked base stock and alkylates, a short-\nlatter case the maximum extent to which\nage of these components for blending combat\nsupply might be curtailed without unduly\naviation gasoline has probably resulted. This\nimpairing the effectiveness of the industrial\nshortage of blending agents for aviation gaso-\neconomy to support the military machine in\nline may be the reason for the Soviet interest\nwar was balanced against the military re-\nin synthetic fuels when no better product is\nquirements as determined by a special study\navailable.\nmade by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nh. The Soviets will be relatively self-suffi-\ncient in 1949 with regard to petroleum prod-\nRequirements of Refined Products\nucts, with the exception of high-octane combat\nby Principal Consumers\naviation gasoline. However, this has been\n(Millions of Metric Tons)\nmade possible only by strict control over the\nsupply of petroleum and refined products and\n1949 Peace\n1949 War\nadherence to an allocation system which has\nAgriculture\n6.0\n5.9\nallowed for careful scheduling of available\nTransportation Rail\n3.1\n3.0\nsupply of refined products to meet the essential\nTransportation Motor\n4.4\n3.4\nneeds of principal consumers. If judged by\nIndustry\n6.7\n6.0\nWestern standards, present Soviet production\nShipping\n1.8\n.9\nof refined products is insufficient to meet the\nHome Use\n3.1\n1.5\nincreasing requirements of their expanding\nMilitary\n4.8\n13.1\neconomy, but severe restrictions on civilian\nTotal\n29.9\n33.8\nand industrial economy allows a rough balance\nbetween supply and minimum requirements.\ni. Distribution of Military POL Require-\nThe requirements of refined products for\nments Assuming War in 1949.\nthe principal consumers in 1949, peace and\nThe Soviet transportation system will have\nwar, are shown below. The data for the in-\nthe capability of distributing the total mili-\ndividual consumers for peacetime use were\ntary POL requirements amounting to over\nobtained by integration of the calculated con-\n12.5 * million metric tons, estimated as needed\nsumption data of each. These data, con-\nfor one year of military operations: 83 percent\nsidered percentage-wise, check closely the\nor about 10.5 million metric tons will be trans-\nrelative distribution or allocation system de-\nported during the year; about 1.6 million\nrived by the British independently. Esti-\nmetric tons will be stockpiled for the cam-\nmates were made by experts in the various\npaigns, and the Black Sea Naval Forces' needs,\nfields of interest as to the quantity of petro-\nsomewhat under a million metric tons, will\nleum products needed to operate the economy\nnot require transportation.\nat the current level of industrial activity. Use\nIf the entire military requirement is moved\nwas made of such critical indices as the growth\nover the railroads, the total Soviet rail petro-\nof the tractor park, ton-kilometers of freight\nleum distribution capability would be severely\nhauled, activity in the machine tool industry,\nstrained as there is a requirement of about\netc., as an indication of the general industrial\n28,000 tank cars out of a total of 40,000; and\ngrowth within the Soviet Union. It is noted\ntherefore, few tank cars would be available\nthat the principal difference between the year\nfor the movement of civilian and industrial\n1940, on which the British allocation system\nneeds during the war. However, it is not\nwas based, and the consumption pattern for\nlikely that tank cars will be used exclusively\n1949 is the emphasis on gasoline and diesel\nfor the movement of the military supplies, for\nfuel rather than on kerosene, which shows a\na considerable amount could be packaged in\nnatural development in the shift from a kero-\ndrums, barrels, or cans, and shipped to des-\nsene economy to a gasoline and diesel economy.\nAllocations for Soviet industrial economy\n* Has been revised to 13.1 million metric tons.\nTOP SECRET"
}