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APPENDIX B
TRANSPORTATION
1.
Distribution of Military POL Consumption
c. Discussion.
Assuming War in 1949.
(1) Under the assumption that the move-
ment of the military POL requirement would
a. Problem.
be given highest priority on the USSR trans-
To estimate the capabilities of the USSR
portation system, railroad transportation of
transportation system to distribute the So-
POL in tank cars would be used, whenever it
viet military POL requirements in the event
is economical, for all products except lubri-
of war during 1949 within the country and to
cants. Lubricants would be packaged in
the borders, and to estimate the amount of
drums, barrels, or cans at the refineries and
POL that will be in transit in order to insure
shipped to consuming areas in general pur-
sufficient supplies where and when needed.
pose freight cars. If the entire military POL
b. Assumptions.
requirement were shipped on the railroads,
(1) The total military POL requirements
this movement would require the use of a to-
are those set out specifically in JIG 278/6-
tal of 28,320 tank cars for aviation gasoline,
12,675,990 metric tons.¹
motor gasoline, Diesel, fuel and jet oils, and
(2) The Soviets will have stocked in the
1,363 general purpose cars for lubricants.
jump-off area sufficient POL to last for the
(2) Inasmuch as there are currently only
duration of the ground and air campaigns in-
about 40,000 serviceable tank cars in the
cluding the periods of combat and inactivity
USSR, the movement of the military POL re-
(1,316,150 metric tons) ; the Black Sea Naval
quirement would demand a substantial part
Forces' requirement will not need transporta-
of the total serviceable tank car supply, but
tion (824,090 metric tons) ; the distribution of
the inventory of general purpose freight cars
POL will include the ground and air require-
is so large that the military requirement for
ments for the occupation and for forces within
this type of car is almost insignificant. Ac-
the USSR and the entire naval requirement
cordingly, if the entire military POL require-
needing transportation (10,535,750 metric
ment is distributed on the railroads, the So-
tons)
viet tank car position would be severely
(3) The total military requirement will be
strained and leave an inadequate number of
supplied from production within the USSR.
tank cars for the distribution of civilian and
(4) The movement of the military POL re-
industrial POL needs in the event of war. It
quirement will be given highest priority on
is not likely, however, that the total military
the USSR transportation system.
requirement of aviation and motor gasoline,
(5) The average loaded petroleum tank car
Diesel, jet and fuel oils would be moved ex-
and general purpose freight car on the Soviet
clusively by tank cars or that the military
railroads will produce approximately 3,000
POL requirement would be hauled entirely
ton miles per day.
on the railroads.
1 The Soviet military POL requirements have been
(3) Some of the military POL requirements
revised to total 13.1 MMT. For the purposes of the
in addition to lubricants can be packaged in
present report, however, the original figure of 12.6
drums, barrels, or cans at the refineries and
MMT requirements has been retained which would
shipped to consuming areas also in general
otherwise require recalculations throughout the re-
port. The slight difference between the two figures
purpose freight cars. This would be most
does not in any way alter the conclusions arrived
feasible in connection with short hauls of mo-
at in the study.
tor gasoline. Moreover, it is entirely possible
OP SECRET
37
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"ocrText": "UNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nis 5.8.\nAPPENDIX B\nTRANSPORTATION\n1.\nDistribution of Military POL Consumption\nc. Discussion.\nAssuming War in 1949.\n(1) Under the assumption that the move-\nment of the military POL requirement would\na. Problem.\nbe given highest priority on the USSR trans-\nTo estimate the capabilities of the USSR\nportation system, railroad transportation of\ntransportation system to distribute the So-\nPOL in tank cars would be used, whenever it\nviet military POL requirements in the event\nis economical, for all products except lubri-\nof war during 1949 within the country and to\ncants. Lubricants would be packaged in\nthe borders, and to estimate the amount of\ndrums, barrels, or cans at the refineries and\nPOL that will be in transit in order to insure\nshipped to consuming areas in general pur-\nsufficient supplies where and when needed.\npose freight cars. If the entire military POL\nb. Assumptions.\nrequirement were shipped on the railroads,\n(1) The total military POL requirements\nthis movement would require the use of a to-\nare those set out specifically in JIG 278/6-\ntal of 28,320 tank cars for aviation gasoline,\n12,675,990 metric tons.¹\nmotor gasoline, Diesel, fuel and jet oils, and\n(2) The Soviets will have stocked in the\n1,363 general purpose cars for lubricants.\njump-off area sufficient POL to last for the\n(2) Inasmuch as there are currently only\nduration of the ground and air campaigns in-\nabout 40,000 serviceable tank cars in the\ncluding the periods of combat and inactivity\nUSSR, the movement of the military POL re-\n(1,316,150 metric tons) ; the Black Sea Naval\nquirement would demand a substantial part\nForces' requirement will not need transporta-\nof the total serviceable tank car supply, but\ntion (824,090 metric tons) ; the distribution of\nthe inventory of general purpose freight cars\nPOL will include the ground and air require-\nis so large that the military requirement for\nments for the occupation and for forces within\nthis type of car is almost insignificant. Ac-\nthe USSR and the entire naval requirement\ncordingly, if the entire military POL require-\nneeding transportation (10,535,750 metric\nment is distributed on the railroads, the So-\ntons)\nviet tank car position would be severely\n(3) The total military requirement will be\nstrained and leave an inadequate number of\nsupplied from production within the USSR.\ntank cars for the distribution of civilian and\n(4) The movement of the military POL re-\nindustrial POL needs in the event of war. It\nquirement will be given highest priority on\nis not likely, however, that the total military\nthe USSR transportation system.\nrequirement of aviation and motor gasoline,\n(5) The average loaded petroleum tank car\nDiesel, jet and fuel oils would be moved ex-\nand general purpose freight car on the Soviet\nclusively by tank cars or that the military\nrailroads will produce approximately 3,000\nPOL requirement would be hauled entirely\nton miles per day.\non the railroads.\n1 The Soviet military POL requirements have been\n(3) Some of the military POL requirements\nrevised to total 13.1 MMT. For the purposes of the\nin addition to lubricants can be packaged in\npresent report, however, the original figure of 12.6\ndrums, barrels, or cans at the refineries and\nMMT requirements has been retained which would\nshipped to consuming areas also in general\notherwise require recalculations throughout the re-\nport. The slight difference between the two figures\npurpose freight cars. This would be most\ndoes not in any way alter the conclusions arrived\nfeasible in connection with short hauls of mo-\nat in the study.\ntor gasoline. Moreover, it is entirely possible\nOP SECRET\n37"
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