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T OP SECR E T
of the possibility of a common frontier with a Western-type
democracy; and (4) permit the retention of sources of Man-
churian electric power along the Yalu River.
b. Intervention, even if not resulting in a decisive defeat
of UN forces, would: (1) enable the Chinese Communists to utilize
foreign war as an explanation for failure to carry out previously
announced economic reforms; (2) be consistent with and furnish
strong impetus to anti-Western trends in Asia; and (3) justify a
claim for maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to
China.
C. Intervention, with or without assurance of final victory,
might serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the
cause of the Soviet Union, in that it would involve the Western
bloc in a costly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East.
d. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet
bloc particularly face the prospect of a major set-back in the
struggle with the non-Communist world if UN forces are per.
mitted to achieve complete victory in Korea.
5. Factors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.
a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the con-
sequences of war with the US. Their domestic problems are of
such magnitude that the regime's entire domestic program and
economy would be jeopardized by the strains and the material
damage which would be sustained in war with the US. Anti-
Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime's very
existence would be endangered.
b. Intervention would minimize the possibility of Chinese
membership in the UN and of a seat on the Security Council.
- 2 ao
an
TOpEeRET
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"ocrText": "T OP SECR E T\nof the possibility of a common frontier with a Western-type\ndemocracy; and (4) permit the retention of sources of Man-\nchurian electric power along the Yalu River.\nb. Intervention, even if not resulting in a decisive defeat\nof UN forces, would: (1) enable the Chinese Communists to utilize\nforeign war as an explanation for failure to carry out previously\nannounced economic reforms; (2) be consistent with and furnish\nstrong impetus to anti-Western trends in Asia; and (3) justify a\nclaim for maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to\nChina.\nC. Intervention, with or without assurance of final victory,\nmight serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the\ncause of the Soviet Union, in that it would involve the Western\nbloc in a costly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East.\nd. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet\nbloc particularly face the prospect of a major set-back in the\nstruggle with the non-Communist world if UN forces are per.\nmitted to achieve complete victory in Korea.\n5. Factors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.\na. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the con-\nsequences of war with the US. Their domestic problems are of\nsuch magnitude that the regime's entire domestic program and\neconomy would be jeopardized by the strains and the material\ndamage which would be sustained in war with the US. Anti-\nCommunist forces would be encouraged and the regime's very\nexistence would be endangered.\nb. Intervention would minimize the possibility of Chinese\nmembership in the UN and of a seat on the Security Council.\n- 2 ao\nan\nTOpEeRET"
}