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TOI GEORE
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
(b) Most of the conversation centered around the question
as to whether or not the non-repatriation of prisoners of war who
have stated that they would forcibly resist repatriation to the Com-
mies, would remain as one of the essential elements of the armis-
tice negotiation (Defense view), or whether the U. N. negotiators would
be directed to offer to defer the resolution of this matter for "further
negotiations" and go ahead and attempt to effect an armistice (State
view).
State holds that the package deal of 28 April is not breached
by offering to defer this matter on the grounds that if we get an
armistice and get all of our prisoners back, then give the Commies
back their 83, 000 who are willing to go back and at the same time we
hold in custody the 14, 000 non-repatriates we are still sticking to our
principle of non-repatriation.
Mr. Acheson dealt at some length on what might happen in
the U.N. General Assembly which meets 15 October. He said that if
the U.S. can state to the G.A. that we have exhausted all means of
effecting an armistice (he feels that the Commies would reject the
State proposal), then we will receive full support from the G.A. On
the other hand, if we have not put to the Commies the Mexican proposi-
tion, he feels that the G. A. will then tell us to do so. It seemed to
TRUMAL
me to boil down to a question (State's point of view) as to whether we
should voluntarily offer the Mexican proposition or wait until it was
RECORDS
proposed by some other country and we are directed to do so by the
Ess
SERVICE"
G.A.
Mr. Acheson felt that we would lose nothing by making the
State proposal - that if they rejected it, we would be in a better posi-
tion before the G. A. : and that were the Communists to accept it, we
would still retain possession of the POWs in question and could, if
the negotiations dragged on indefinitely, simply release them on the
ground that they were political refugees, and thereby remove the issue
from the books.
Mr. Lovett, Fechteler and Libby outlined Defense support
of Clark's opposition to making any further proposals to the Commies.
We stated that we did not agree with State in its contention that the
proposition did not alter the package proposal of 28 April. Libby
stated that the Commies now regarded our agreement to airfield
construction as finished business and not conditional on resolution of
2
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"ocrText": "zon\nTOI GEORE\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n(b) Most of the conversation centered around the question\nas to whether or not the non-repatriation of prisoners of war who\nhave stated that they would forcibly resist repatriation to the Com-\nmies, would remain as one of the essential elements of the armis-\ntice negotiation (Defense view), or whether the U. N. negotiators would\nbe directed to offer to defer the resolution of this matter for \"further\nnegotiations\" and go ahead and attempt to effect an armistice (State\nview).\nState holds that the package deal of 28 April is not breached\nby offering to defer this matter on the grounds that if we get an\narmistice and get all of our prisoners back, then give the Commies\nback their 83, 000 who are willing to go back and at the same time we\nhold in custody the 14, 000 non-repatriates we are still sticking to our\nprinciple of non-repatriation.\nMr. Acheson dealt at some length on what might happen in\nthe U.N. General Assembly which meets 15 October. He said that if\nthe U.S. can state to the G.A. that we have exhausted all means of\neffecting an armistice (he feels that the Commies would reject the\nState proposal), then we will receive full support from the G.A. On\nthe other hand, if we have not put to the Commies the Mexican proposi-\ntion, he feels that the G. A. will then tell us to do so. It seemed to\nTRUMAL\nme to boil down to a question (State's point of view) as to whether we\nshould voluntarily offer the Mexican proposition or wait until it was\nRECORDS\nproposed by some other country and we are directed to do so by the\nEss\nSERVICE\"\nG.A.\nMr. Acheson felt that we would lose nothing by making the\nState proposal - that if they rejected it, we would be in a better posi-\ntion before the G. A. : and that were the Communists to accept it, we\nwould still retain possession of the POWs in question and could, if\nthe negotiations dragged on indefinitely, simply release them on the\nground that they were political refugees, and thereby remove the issue\nfrom the books.\nMr. Lovett, Fechteler and Libby outlined Defense support\nof Clark's opposition to making any further proposals to the Commies.\nWe stated that we did not agree with State in its contention that the\nproposition did not alter the package proposal of 28 April. Libby\nstated that the Commies now regarded our agreement to airfield\nconstruction as finished business and not conditional on resolution of\n2"
}