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{
    "localId": "229036597",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency Report, Advance Copy, Special Estimate Number 20, The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible U. S. Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea",
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    "id": "229036597",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency Report, Advance Copy, Special Estimate Number 20, The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible U. S. Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/229036597",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Korean War Files"
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    "naId": 229036597,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 15,
            "logicalDate": "1951-12-15",
            "month": 12,
            "year": 1951
        }
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{
    "seq": 3,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nd. The Communists could further partially overcome the\neffect of these measures by employing more of their ships in\nthe China trade, even though such dislocation of Soviet Bloc\nshipping might impose serious problems for the Soviet Bloc.\nThe USSR would also endeavor to expand overland shipments to\nCommunist China.\ne. Therefore, a UN embargo on exports and shipping to\nCommunist China is unlikely, by itself, to reduce Communist\nChinese imports substantially.\n2. Expansion of the Korean War by Naval Blockade of Communist\nChina\na. Effective interdiction of Communist Chinese seaborne\nimports would require a naval blockade (including an embargo)\nof all Chinese Communist seaports, including Port Arthur and\nDairen. It would be essential to prevent the use of Hong Kong\nand Macao as transshipment points for trade with Commanist\nChina.\nb. Such, interdiction would intensify the existing serious\neconomic strains in Communist China, but would not in itself\nforce the Chinese Communists to end the Korean war or threaten\nthe stability of the Chinese Communist regime.\n- 3 -\nTOD\nSECKEI"
}