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OCR Page 1 of 8See me
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by
ARCHIVES PRATIONAL AND
E. D. Canham's Broadcast July 25, 1950
RECORDS
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Let us once more consider the
conflicting news from Korea against a little perspective. Right now, we are absorbing
our news in headlines telling of actions over a single town and sometimes over a single
road block. This kind of news can be very misleading. Victories in these terms are
too encouraging and defeats too fateful. Joseph Harsch in TCSM tonight gives a balance
sheet of the campaign. He points out that there never was any intention or capacity to
hold a defense line at the 38th parallel, or in Seoul, or, indeed, anywhere short of a
bridge-head at the southern tip of Korea. With the kind of strong preparations the
communists had, and the weakness of our forces, the principal problem was not to stop
the northerners in mid-Korea, but to stay on the peninsula at all. The task was to hold
back the communist offensive long enough to permit the build-up of forces for a counter-
attack from our bridgehead at the south. It was a rear-guard action from start to
finish, trying to break the impetus and drive of the invaders. This
delaying
action,
says Mr. Harsch, was much more successful than the daily press dispatches have indicated.
It took the Communists about a week longer to break through and take Taejon than we had
anticipated. Meantime, the build-up in the south was proceeding significantly. From
doubting whether we could hold a bridgehead at all, from fears of another Dunkirk or
Bataan, the views of informed experts have become much more hopeful. There is a chance
Relations
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