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The 38th Parallel
Among the many oft-repeated false statements of partisan propa-
gandists are those that the United States gave Korea north of the 38th
parallel to Russia at Yalta, and that the Administration was at fault in
not occupying all of Korea. As usual, the facts are quite different.
There are three which are most important:
(1) Neither the division of Korea along the 38th
parallel nor the joint occupation of Korea was decided
upon or in fact considered in any way at the Yalta or
Potsdam Conferences. It was not the subject of any
agreement, secret or otherwise.
(2) The drawing of the line was entirely a military
decision recommended by Secretary Stimson upon the advice
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The sole purpose of the line was to define the areas
in which United States forces and Soviet forces would ac-
cept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea at the end
of the war against Japan. When the question was being
considered on August 11-15, 1945, Soviet forces already
were well into Manchuria. Other Soviet forces were on
the border between Korea and the Soviet Maritime Provinces.
s ARCHIVES "NATIONAL RECORDS AND
Some had already entered Korea. The great Soviet base of
s
SERVICE¹
Vladivostok is only some eighty miles from the northeast
border of Korea. On the other hand, the nearest American
forces were on Okinawa, some 600 miles south of Korea, and
were needed to occupy Japan while most of the forces avail-
able for movement into Korea were as far distant as the Philip-
pines, some 1500 to 2000 miles away.
It was recognized by the military and foreign policy
authorities that the line should be drawn as far north as
it was practicable for our troops to reach. The military
authorities with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended the 38th parallel because it included the
Korean capital of Seoul with its port and communication
area and because under the circumstances at the time the
United States could not send to Korea the forces necessary
to receive the Japanese surrender further north.
Secretary Stimson submitted this recommendation to the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and it was included
in General Order No. 1.
This was issued by General MacArthur as Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government for
all of the Japanese armed forces.
(3) Far from permitting the Soviet Union to take over
a part of Korea from which it could have been excluded, the
establishment of the 38th parallel line actually held for the
free people of Korea the southern half of the country, which
otherwise would easily have been overrun by the Red Army.
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"ocrText": "- 4 -\nThe 38th Parallel\nAmong the many oft-repeated false statements of partisan propa-\ngandists are those that the United States gave Korea north of the 38th\nparallel to Russia at Yalta, and that the Administration was at fault in\nnot occupying all of Korea. As usual, the facts are quite different.\nThere are three which are most important:\n(1) Neither the division of Korea along the 38th\nparallel nor the joint occupation of Korea was decided\nupon or in fact considered in any way at the Yalta or\nPotsdam Conferences. It was not the subject of any\nagreement, secret or otherwise.\n(2) The drawing of the line was entirely a military\ndecision recommended by Secretary Stimson upon the advice\nof the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nThe sole purpose of the line was to define the areas\nin which United States forces and Soviet forces would ac-\ncept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea at the end\nof the war against Japan. When the question was being\nconsidered on August 11-15, 1945, Soviet forces already\nwere well into Manchuria. Other Soviet forces were on\nthe border between Korea and the Soviet Maritime Provinces.\ns ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL RECORDS AND\nSome had already entered Korea. The great Soviet base of\ns\nSERVICE¹\nVladivostok is only some eighty miles from the northeast\nborder of Korea. On the other hand, the nearest American\nforces were on Okinawa, some 600 miles south of Korea, and\nwere needed to occupy Japan while most of the forces avail-\nable for movement into Korea were as far distant as the Philip-\npines, some 1500 to 2000 miles away.\nIt was recognized by the military and foreign policy\nauthorities that the line should be drawn as far north as\nit was practicable for our troops to reach. The military\nauthorities with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nrecommended the 38th parallel because it included the\nKorean capital of Seoul with its port and communication\narea and because under the circumstances at the time the\nUnited States could not send to Korea the forces necessary\nto receive the Japanese surrender further north.\nSecretary Stimson submitted this recommendation to the\nState-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and it was included\nin General Order No. 1.\nThis was issued by General MacArthur as Supreme Com-\nmander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government for\nall of the Japanese armed forces.\n(3) Far from permitting the Soviet Union to take over\na part of Korea from which it could have been excluded, the\nestablishment of the 38th parallel line actually held for the\nfree people of Korea the southern half of the country, which\notherwise would easily have been overrun by the Red Army."
}